

THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

BY
MILTON OFFUTT

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns
Hopkins University in Conformity with the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
1927

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BALTIMORE

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
PREFACE

This study of the protection of citizens abroad by the armed forces of the United States has been limited to a consideration of those occasions upon which American forces have operated on foreign soil or have engaged in actual hostilities with the troops or citizens of another nation within the jurisdiction of the foreign state. It takes no account of the much more numerous incidents in which protection to American citizens abroad was afforded simply by a display of force.

The unexpectedly large number of cases requiring consideration has made it necessary to compress almost to curtness many of the accounts of such incidents and to indicate only briefly their diplomatic and political backgrounds. In general it has seemed advisable to treat at greater length such cases as are comparatively little known or the sources for which are not everywhere obtainable, and to deal more briefly with the well known incidents.

The writer wishes to express his sincere thanks for the kind assistance and consideration of Dr. John Holladay Latané, under whose inspiration and direction this study was attempted; and for the friendly interest of Dr. John Martin Vincent and Dr. Edward Raymond Turner.

M. O.



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THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I

LEGAL ASPECTS OF PROTECTION BY FORCE

Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protection.

—Vattel.¹

The armed forces of the United States have been landed on foreign soil for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens living abroad on more than one hundred occasions during the past hundred and fifteen years. From the Aegean islands to Manchuria and from Mexico to the Falklands, American seamen and marines have been sent ashore to prevent by force of arms the injury of their countrymen wherever these have been endangered, or to exact reparation for wrongs committed against them. Sometimes the force employed has been only a dozen seamen in a cutter, who chased a piratical schooner ashore, pursued her crew into the hills, and burned the schooner or brought her off as a prize. On other occasions American armies of more than three thousand men have engaged in long campaigns with the people of foreign states, operations which must have been classified as wars if it were not for the fact that the Congress of the United States never recognized them as such by a formal exercise of its unique power to declare war.

The right of a state to protect by force its citizens living in a foreign country when sudden disturbances in the foreign state threaten the safety of their lives and property, and when

¹ The Law of Nations, VI, sec. 71.

the government under whose jurisdiction they reside has shown itself unable or unwilling to afford them reasonable protection, is a question which has engaged the attention of most writers on international law. Many of these differ on whether or not intervention, in certain cases, can be a right possessed by a state whose nationals are molested or endangered, but most of them, while denying that it can be, admit that under certain circumstances, it must be so considered.² Much of the difference of opinion on this matter appears to have arisen because many of those who have written upon it failed to make any distinction between intervention, which includes interference with the political concerns of another state, and interposition,³ which is confined solely to the protection of the persons or interests of the interposing state. Consequently, when a state has made use of armed force for the protection of its citizens abroad, its action has frequently been condemned as a violation of the sovereignty of the state whose territory has been invaded, and as a breach of international law, with no consideration of the fact that in many cases such use of force was accompanied by no interference with the political life of the invaded state.⁴ When, however, the distinction between political and non-political intervention has been appreciated, some authorities have held that the use of force for the protection of its citizens abroad becomes not only a right but, in certain cases, a duty of a sovereign state; and that the state against which such

² See, for instance, the list of opinions presented by Bonfils, *De Droit International Public* (4th ed.), 116; Calvo, *International Law*, Sec. 110; T. J. Lawrence, *Principles of International Law*, paragraph 75.

³ For a clear discussion of the difference between intervention for political purposes and interposition or non-political intervention, see Department of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14, Memorandum by the Solicitor (J. Reuben Clark, Jr.) on the "Right to protect citizens in foreign countries by landing forces" (Washington, October, 1912), especially pp. 22-31. Cited hereafter as Clark.

⁴ See, for instance, Lawrence, *Principles of International Law*, 115-120.

force is used may not justly consider itself aggrieved. Thus Oppenheim declares: ⁵

The right of protection over its citizens abroad, which a State holds, may cause an intervention by right to which the other party is legally bound to submit.

Bonfils, on the same point, remarks: ⁶

There is no intervention either in the act of constraining by reprisals or force of arms a state to fulfill its international engagements or to repair an injustice or an insult. There is pressure, violence, but not intervention. . . . To recommend its nationals to the authorities of the country in which they have established their residence, to take up the defense of their interests in diplomatic notes, to demand reparation for prejudice to which they have been subjected, &c., &c., is not to intervene; it is on the contrary to recognize the sovereignty of the state addressed.

In a passage of some length, Pradier-Fodéré expresses his opinion as follows: ⁷

It is the duty of all states to protect their nationals in foreign countries by all means which international law authorizes. It owes them such protection when the foreign state has proceeded against them in violation of the principles of international law: for example . . . if it has despoiled them of their property, if it has treated them with cruelty, if it has violated with respect to them the treaties of commerce and free establishment; it ought to protect them also even when the bad treatment or damage sustained by its nationals is not directly the act of the foreign state,—that is to say, of the foreign government, of its employees, or of the inhabitants supported by their government, but of persons having a private character, and if the state in which the offense has been committed has not done anything to disavow it.

Pradier-Fodéré proceeds then to make the point that persons who, for their private interests, establish themselves in a country other than their own, tacitly submit themselves to its law, and must make use of remedies which are open to all the inhabitants of the state in which they are domiciled, and that they may not, because of their foreign citizenship, “pretend to place themselves in a better condition than the nationals of that country,” ⁸ but become, to some extent, its

⁵ International Law, I, 183, 184.

⁶ De Droit International Public, 160.

⁷ Traité de Droit International Public, I, Sec. 402, p. 614.

⁸ W. E. Hall, International Law (6th ed.), 277, expresses the same opinion.

temporary subjects. He notes the difference between political and non-political intervention and declares:

As to the form of the exercise of protection, it is necessary to take also into consideration, and not to confound intervention with, the means of obtaining reparation for an injury and for an offense. The observations, the demands for explanations, the complaints, the offers of friendly settlement and arrangement, mediation, arbitration, demands for satisfaction, retorsion of law, war,—all this is not intervention. He alone intervenes who,—imposing his authority on a state weaker and incapable of escaping through fear of the consequences of its resistance,—is a burden upon the sovereignty of that country, suppresses its laws, acts contrary to its institutions, meddles in the administration of its justice, orders the measures which it is to take, suppresses measures taken, substitutes, in a word, his will for the effaced will of the government of that state; he intervenes also especially who does not limit himself to directing, to requiring, but who attempts by invasion, by military occupation, to impose upon the will of a country, to interfere in its internal affairs, to direct its conduct in determined ways.⁹

Admitting that sanction may be found for the act of a state in protecting by armed force its citizens abroad, the question arises, in the case of the United States, whether or not the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy,¹⁰ and possessing in great measure the control of foreign relations,¹¹ possesses the power, upon his own authority and without the concurrence of Congress, to use the armed forces of this country for that purpose. Congress alone, of course, has the right to declare war under the Constitution, but interposition for the protection of citizens is not essentially war; and although such interposition may easily lead to war, in the experience of the United States it has seldom done so. So long as the use of the army and navy of the United States for the protection of citizens resident in foreign countries does not amount to a recognized act of war, it seems to be an established fact that the President does, constitutionally, possess the power to make such use of those forces, and

⁹ *Traité de Droit International Public*, I, Sec. 406, p. 625.

¹⁰ Constitution of the United States, Article II, Sec. 2, Clause 1.

¹¹ See Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government*, 77-78; Edward L. Corwin, *The President's Control of Foreign Relations*, *passim*.

that Congress, except indirectly, as by disbanding the army and navy, may not prevent or render illegal his action.¹²

Granting to the President the power specified above, it follows logically that as international law is declared to be a part of the law of the United States,¹³ and as one principle of international law permits a state to use force for the protection of its citizens living in another state, the President has, by his constitutional right and duty to "take care that the laws [of the United States] be faithfully executed,"¹⁴ the right to use the armed forces of the United States for the protection of its citizens abroad.

Since human limitations prevent the President from personally performing all the acts required of him, the courts have recognized that he may delegate his powers to the heads of governmental departments, and that he "speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in relation to the subjects which appertain to their respective duties," so that the act of a head of a department is "in legal contemplation the act of the President."¹⁵ Consequently, an order issued by the Secretary of the Navy to the commanding officer of a ship or squadron has the authority of a direct order from the President and must involve the latter in its consequences.

As it is obvious that the use of force for the protection of citizens abroad may easily involve the United States in a situation destructive to its prestige among other powers, or one from which it may extricate itself only by war, and since the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the behavior of those forces, it would seem that the burden of responsibility for such situations as might arise must fall upon him. What has generally happened in the

¹² Clark, 34-38; Clarence Arthur Berdahl, *War Powers of the Executive in the United States* (University of Illinois, 1921), pp. 43-57.

¹³ See the opinion of the Supreme Court in *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U. S., 677, 700, as quoted in Clark, p. 40.

¹⁴ Constitution of the United States, Article II, Sec. 3. See also Article I, Sec. 8, and Article II, Sec. 2.

¹⁵ Berdahl, 21, quoting *Wilcox vs. Jackson*, 13 Pet., 498, 513 (1839), and *United States vs. Eliason*, 16 Pet., 291 (1842).

past is that naval officers commanding ships or squadrons on foreign stations have taken such action as they believed necessary for the protection of American lives and property, and have reported their action to the Secretary of the Navy after their government has been committed to their procedure. This has not been the case, of course, when the President, through the Navy Department, has despatched a vessel or a fleet with orders to obtain reparation for wrongs already committed and, if no satisfaction is obtainable otherwise, to retaliate by force; but such occasions have been relatively rare.

The authority by which, in an emergency and without consulting the Navy Department, commanders of ships or squadrons have landed forces for the protection of citizens in foreign countries will be found in the general orders issued to them by the Secretary of the Navy on their assuming command of a fleet or sailing on a cruise on detached service, and in the following paragraphs of the Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States:¹⁶

On occasions where injury to the United States or to the citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, the commander in chief¹⁷ shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof.

The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as

¹⁶ Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States (Washington, 1913), paragraphs 1646, 1647, 1648.

¹⁷ That is, the senior officer present. See Regulations, chap. XV, note.

a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed.

Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection to life and property, the assent of such authorities, or some one of them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved.¹⁹

The Naval Regulations, which are in the nature of general orders to all commissioned officers in the service, and which are approved, as issued, by the President, recognize, it will be seen, that the decision on the necessity of landing forces for the protection of citizens abroad cannot, generally, be made from Washington, but "must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers" who are in sufficiently close touch with the situation to be able to judge whether events, perhaps changing from hour to hour, make a landing under arms imperative. If a force is sent ashore on foreign soil, the naval officer in command is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for his decision, but eventually, the President must bear the responsibility for the incident.

It is difficult to see how such a state of affairs, dangerous to the peace and reputation of this country, can be avoided. When a sudden disturbance occurs in a foreign country, if protection is to be afforded Americans in time to be of service to them, it must almost always be done quickly. Consequently, unless communications with the Navy Department are rapid and sure, which has seldom been the case in the out-of-the-way places where protection was needed, the endangered citizens must either be protected or abandoned without the aid of a last minute order from Washington. Especially was this true before the electric telegraph brought at least some of the larger ports of the world in close touch

¹⁹ Secretary of State Cass, in a letter to Lord Napier, declared: "Our naval officers have the right—it is their duty, indeed—to employ the forces under their command, not only in self-defense, but for the protection of the persons and property of our citizens when exposed to acts of lawless outrage, and this they have done both in China and elsewhere, and will do again when necessary" (J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VII, 164).

with the Navy Department; and even since the development of long range wireless telegraphy, which became practical for naval vessels about fifteen years ago, naval officers have, in the face of an emergency, thought it necessary to act first and inform their government afterward. It speaks well for the "sound judgement" of the naval officers who have so often been faced with the critical decision whether or not to order a landing party ashore, that only once¹⁹ has the United States government refused its approval when that decision has led to the use of the armed forces of this country for the protection of its citizens abroad.

¹⁹ In the case of Commodore Porter's landing at Foxardo, Porto Rico, November, 1824. See below, chapter II, sec. 8.

CHAPTER II

INSTANCES OF PROTECTION BY FORCE, 1813-1865

SECTION 1.—OCCUPATION OF NUKAHIVA, MARQUESAS, 1813

While on his celebrated cruise to the Pacific in the years 1813 and 1814, during which he created havoc among British whalers and merchantmen in the South Sea, Captain David Porter, in October, 1813, found that his frigate, the *Essex*, then almost a year at sea, was badly in need of repairs. Accompanied by several of his prizes, he put in at the "Island of Nooaheevah, one of the Washington group" (Nukahiva in the Marquesas), landed, and took possession of the island on behalf of the government of the United States, giving it the name of Madison's Island. Here he established a station and set about refitting.¹

Most of the natives proved friendly, but during his stay at Nukahiva Captain Porter several times found it necessary to send small forces ashore and engage in skirmishes with hostile tribes that persisted in attacking his men. One of these incidents occurred on April 13, 1813, when a detail of marines from the *Essex*, under Lieutenant John M. Gamble, landed and drove off a party of natives who had assaulted the station.²

SECTION 2.—DESTRUCTION OF PIRATE STATIONS, CUBA, 1822

While statesmen were deliberating upon means for the suppression of piracy in the Caribbean, and while some American naval officers were exchanging unsatisfactory notes with the Spanish governors of Cuba and Porto Rico³ in

¹ See *The Naval Temple*, containing a complete history of the battles fought by the Navy of the United States (2nd edition, Barber Badger, Boston, 1816), p. 121.

² See *Journal of a Cruise made to the Pacific Ocean*, by Captain David Porter, in the United States Frigate *Essex* (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1815).

³ For the correspondence between United States naval officers and the Spanish authorities during 1822, see *American State Papers*, *Naval Affairs*, I, 805-812. See also, chap. V, below.

an effort to obtain permission to land forces on unsettled parts of the islands for the pursuit of pirates who fled inland, other naval officers had already set about solving the problem of putting down the freebooters in their own way.

On January 7, 1822, Lieutenant James Ramage, in the schooner *Porpoise*, with forty men, while cruising along the northwest coast of Cuba, came upon a piratical station. He captured six vessels, burned five of them, took three prisoners, and landed and burned the station.⁴

Captain Stephen Cassin, with the *Peacock*, on September 28, fell in with a piratical ship somewhere between Havana and Cape San Antonio, Cuba, chased her ashore, and so discovered another pirate station. Here he took five small ships, landed and recovered eighty-nine bags of coffee which the pirates had hidden in the brush, burned three of his prizes and sent the other two into New Orleans.⁵

Between October 16, 1821, when Lieutenant Lawrence Kearney, in the *Enterprise*, captured four schooners and a sloop, operating under the leadership of the notorious pirate Gibbs, while they were in the act of robbing the American ship *Lucies*, the brig *Aristides*, and the British brig *Larch*, off Cape San Antonio, and March 4, 1825, when Lieutenant G. Pendergrast, in a captured sloop, took a piratical vessel at Boca del Inferno near Ponce, Porto Rico, the American ships operating against the Caribbean pirates captured altogether twenty-seven schooners, two sloops, one brig, nineteen boats and barges, and thirteen unclassified vessels, a total of sixty-two pirate craft.⁶

⁴ Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 804. See also 17th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 56.

⁵ Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 804.

⁶ See Robert W. Neeser, *Statistical and Chronological History of the United States Navy, 1775-1907* (New York, 1909), II, 60, 61, 308-313.

SECTION 3.—PURSUIT OF PIRATES NEAR ESCONDIDO, CUBA,
APRIL 8, 1823

At seven o'clock on the morning of April 8, 1823, Lieutenant C. K. Stribling, with the United States barges *Gallinipper* and *Mosquito*, cruising off the north coast of Cuba under orders from Captain Stephen Cassin and Commodore David Porter to seek out and destroy piratical craft, discovered a schooner off Escondido about three miles to the eastward, apparently full of men and making suspiciously desperate efforts to gain the shore by the use of her sweeps.

At 8 h. 15 m. Lieutenant Stribling fired two muskets, to bring the chase to. On firing the second gun, she commenced firing with round and grape, and musketry. We returned it with our muskets, at the same time making every exertion to get alongside of her; at 8 h. 30 m. the schooner succeeded in gaining the shore; in an instant we were on board of her . . . secured one man, and found two of her crew killed—one on board, the other on shore. . . . I landed the marines with some of the seamen; but the thickness of the under-wood rendered it imprudent to pursue. . . . It may be proper to mention that the schooner, on commencing her fire, hoisted Spanish colors.⁷

Lieutenant Stribling's force suffered no casualties. The complement of the schooner was found to be thirty-six men.

SECTION 4.—CAYO BLANCO, CUBA, APRIL 16, 1823

On April 16, 1823, at ten in the morning, Captain Stephen Cassin, in the U. S. sloop *Peacock* accompanied by the barge *Gallinipper*, while engaged in a search for pirates near Cayo Blanco, Cuba, caught sight of a large armed felucca and gave chase.⁸ The felucca immediately put about and disappeared around the corner of a small island. Captain Cassin continued the chase and soon came in sight of a small group of buildings on the shore from which men were hurriedly removing packages. Closer inspection revealed the felucca, unrigged and hidden by a covering of bushes.

⁷ Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 1109, Report of Lieut. C. K. Stribling to Captain Stephen Cassin, Apr. 8, 1823.

⁸ Ibid., II, p. 241, Report of Captain Cassin to Commodore David Porter, Apr. 28, 1823. See also, Captains' Letters, MS., LXXXI, No. 97, and Officers' Letters, MS., LXXIII, No. 99.

As the American force approached, the pirates opened fire, whereupon Captain Cassin landed a small body of seamen and attempted to capture them. The pirates fled into the undergrowth, and after pursuing them for about half a mile, exchanging shots with them frequently, Captain Cassin's men were forced to give up the chase. They returned to the beach, burned the store-houses of the filibusters, and re-embarked, taking with them the felucca. The American force sustained no casualties.

SECTION 5.—SIGNAPA BAY, CUBA, JULY 11, 1823

While searching the Cuban coast from Cape Francis to Cape Blanco, carrying out his instructions from Commodore David Porter, Lieutenant-Commandant W. H. Watson, with the barges *Gallinipper* and *Mosquito*, on July 11, 1823, discovered a piratical topsail schooner in Signapa Bay. The pirates, when pursued, made for Signapa village and, as Watson's men boarded the schooner, attempted to escape by jumping overboard and swimming ashore. All but fifteen of them were cut off, driven back into the sea, and captured; and of those who reached the shore, eleven were killed or taken by a detail of Watson's men who landed and pursued them into the country. The schooner proved to be the *Catalina*, commanded by the noted pirate Diaboleto, who had seized her a short time earlier; and the American seamen found on board her, and released, two of her former crew. Lieutenant Watson's force, which numbered twenty-six, suffered no casualties in the affair.^a

SECTION 6.—CAPE CRUZ, CUBA, JULY 21, 1823

On the evening of July 21, 1823, Lieutenant Lawrence Kearney of the U. S. schooner *Grey Hound*, and Lieutenant J. T. Newton, of the U. S. schooner *Beagle*, while walking along the beach at Cape Cruz, Cuba, for exercise, were fired

^a Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 1114, Report of Lt.-Commandant W. H. Watson to Commodore David Porter, July 11, 1823.

upon and driven back to their gigs by a piratical band who had seen their landing and had lain in ambush behind a rocky point.¹⁰ Early next day, Lieutenant Kearney, as senior officer, sent ashore a party under Lieutenant D. G. Farragut which attempted to take the pirates in the rear while the schooners bombarded them from the sea. The attack drove the pirates out of their strong position among some rocks and they made their escape into the hills, with the exception of two old and feeble men who were taken. It was discovered that a woman, "a second Helen M'Gregor," and several children were taking an active part in the operations of the band.

The landing party found a large collection of plundered articles of little value. After burning the town which the pirates had occupied, it withdrew.¹¹

SECTION 7.—PURSUIT OF PIRATES AT CAMRIOCA, CUBA,

OCTOBER 23, 1823

At Camrioca, Cuba, on October 23, 1823, Lieutenant Hunter, while acting as part of a flotilla under Lieutenant Charles W. Skinner in the *Porpoise*, chased a piratical schooner ashore and pursued her crew into the woods. The pirates escaped. While preparing to bring off the captured schooner, Lieutenant Hunter's men found several trunks containing American manufactured articles, three American flags, and some bloodstained clothing.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., II, 246-248, Report of Lieutenant Lawrence Kearney to Commodore David Porter, Aug. 10, 1823.

¹¹ In his report of the affair, Lieutenant Kearney wrote that he had given an account thereof in great detail "in the event of a question arising as to the propriety of landing and burning property on a foreign shore; and should this case be noticed by the supporters of 'territorial jurisdiction,' (over uninhabited parts of Cuba, notorious only for murder and piracy), it will be seen that your officers and men's lives have been jeopardized, and the flag of our country made a target for the lawless villians to fire at, at their pleasure, and which will continue to be so, if any restrictions should be put upon our landing in similar places, where no authority exists than the will of the marauders themselves who inhabit those places."

¹² Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, II, 255, Report of Lieutenant Charles W. Skinner to the Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 24, 1824.

SECTION 8.—EXPEDITION TO FOXARDO, PORTO RICO,

NOVEMBER, 1824

While at the port of Saint Thomas, Danish West Indies, in November, 1824, Commodore Porter received word that Lieutenant-Commandant C. T. Platt, of the United States schooner *Beagle*, one of the smaller ships of Porter's squadron, had visited Foxardo (Fajardo), Porto Rico, to inquire about certain goods carried off by pirates and supposed to have been deposited there; and that, although recognized as an American officer, he had been shamefully treated and imprisoned for a time.

Indignant at this outrage, which he considered as the greatest of a number "heaped upon us by the authorities of Porto Rico,"¹³ Commodore Porter proceeded in the U. S. S. *John Adams* to Passage Island, where he left the ship on account of her size, and taking with him the schooners *Grampus* and *Beagle* and some of the boats of the *John Adams*, with her Captain, Dallas, and a part of his crew, on November 14, entered the port of Foxardo.

Discovering a battery on the shore, manned by Spanish soldiers, preparing to fire on his flotilla as they anchored, Porter quickly sent ashore a landing force of seamen and marines with orders to spike the guns. This was done without difficulty, as the Spaniards fled on the approach of the force. Porter then landed about two hundred officers and men and marched on the town of Foxardo, which lay back about two miles from the port. After spiking on the way another small battery which commanded the road, he reached the village and found the authorities prepared for defence.

Halting his men a short distance from the entrance to the town, he sent in a flag bearing a note dated November 12, 1824, requiring "the Alcaide or Governor," with the captain of the port, to come to him and make atonement for the outrage, giving them one hour to deliberate.

¹³ Ibid., I, 1024, Commodore David Porter to the Hon. Samuel L. Southard, Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 14, 1824. For a detailed account, see *ibid.*, II, 139-141.

They appeared accordingly, and, after begging pardon (in presence of all the officers) of the officer who had been insulted, and expressing great penitence, I permitted them to return to town, on their promising to respect all American officers who may visit them hereafter. We then returned to the vessels, and left the harbor, after being at anchor three hours.¹⁴

Porter's action, taken on his own initiative, did not meet with favor from his superiors. The House of Representatives, on December 27, 1824, resolved that President Monroe communicate to the House information "explaining the character and objects of the visit," and in the meantime the Navy Department had issued orders for his prompt return home with the purpose of investigating his conduct.¹⁵

SECTION 9.—SAGUA LA GRANDE, CUBA, MARCH 25, 1825

In accordance with orders from Commodore Lewis Warrington, dated March 19, 1825, Lieutenant-Commandant Isaac McKeever, with the U. S. steam galliot *Sea Gull* and the barge *Gallinipper*, sailed from Matanzas, Cuba, in search of pirates. The *Sea Gull* soon fell in with H. M. S. *Dartmouth*, Captain Maude, cruising for the same purpose. The two commanding officers shared their information, and McKeever proposed that they join forces for an expedition into Sagua la Grande. The Englishman agreed, with the understanding that McKeever should conduct the enterprise.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See R. Beale, A Report of the Trial of Commodore David Porter, of the Navy of the United States, before a General Court Martial, July, 1825 (Washington City, 1825). Also, David Porter, An Exposition of the Facts and Circumstances which Justified the Expedition to Foxardo . . . with the Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry Thereon, Held by Order of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, 1825). At the court martial Porter was held to have exceeded his powers and was suspended from the navy for six months. Feeling that this sentence was unjust, he resigned his commission in 1826 and, shortly after, accepted an offer to become an admiral in the service of Mexico at a reputed salary of \$25,000 a year.

¹⁶ 19th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 2, pp. 114-116, Report of Lt.-Commandant Isaac McKeever to Commodore Lewis Warrington, commanding U. S. Naval Forces in the West Indies, Apr. 1, 1825. A British force had been active in the suppression of piracy in the West Indies for several years.

Leaving the *Sea Gull* and the *Dartmouth*, McKeever took the *Gallinipper* and two American cutters with five men in each, and accompanied by a British barge and two cutters started for Sagua la Grande. The expedition entered that port about noon on March 25, and compelled a fisherman to act as pilot up the river to Jutia Gorda Key, where, about four o'clock, they caught sight of the masts of a vessel concealed in the bushes. On seeing the approach of the barges and cutters, the concealed ship hoisted Spanish colors and ordered them to keep off under threat of opening fire. As the boats came on steadily up the narrow channel, the crew of the vessel made several unsuccessful attempts to carry out the threat with her cannon. McKeever's men waded ashore within pistol shot of the ship, and he called on her commander to come ashore, and to hold his fire. The pirate leader, whose name was Antonio Ripol, jumped overboard and attempted to escape, but was seized. He was told to order his ship's colors hauled down and his crew to surrender, and he had complied with the first demand when someone on the ship fired a pistol at one of the cutters, then close alongside. A general engagement followed, and in the confusion Ripol again attempted flight. McKeever shot him, but although badly wounded he rose and ran at some of the American seamen with a long knife. These again wounded him and captured him. Meanwhile, eight of the pirates had been shot while running into the mangrove bushes and nineteen others were driven below by boarders, and captured. The piratical schooner proved to be heavily armed and was equipped to carry thirty-five men.¹⁷ A quick search discovered that the pirates had placed lighted matches and laid trains to the magazine. These were carefully removed.

McKeever's men found many fresh and clean cases of American manufactured articles on board, and another lot of such cases concealed in the bushes near the schooner.

The next day, March 26, the expedition discovered another

¹⁷ She mounted two 6-pounders on pivots, four swivels and several "blunderbusses."

large piratical schooner and gave chase. The schooner's crew ran her ashore and escaped into the bushes, leaving the vessel on fire with an opened keg of powder on deck. McKeever's men immediately boarded her and put out the fire. "She proved to be the boat whose crew had murdered the five men belonging to the American brig *Betsey*, that was wrecked on the Double Headed Shot Keys, in December last." A part of the expedition meanwhile pursued the pirates to Key La Cosinerra, their place of refuge, and burned the village. The entire force then returned to Jutia Gorda, loaded the two captured vessels with the property which they had recovered, and burned the buildings on the Key. On leaving, they brought off "an old man, of more genteel appearance than the rest." "I have since discovered," wrote Lieutenant-Commandant McKeever in his report, "that he is the commandant of Sagua la Grande, and in some way, intimately connected with these pirates."¹⁸ The only casualty of the expedition was a British marine, who received a cut on his arm.

SECTION 10.—MICONI AND ANDROS ISLANDS, GREECE,
OCTOBER, 1827

As early as July 7, 1825, Commodore John Rodgers, from Gibraltar, informed the Secretary of the Navy that if, in the war then existing, the Greeks failed to win their independence from the Turks, a large part of their seafaring men would probably become pirates;¹⁹ and in his first annual message to Congress, President John Quincy Adams alluded to "a few instances" of piratical depredations upon American

¹⁸ The flotilla found H. M. S. *Dartmouth* at Key Mona, on March 29. Captain Maude, when told of the captures in which his boats had taken part, expressed a strong desire to communicate with Commodore Warrington before the prisoners were tried.

¹⁹ 19th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 2, p. 124. Commodore Rodgers added, "The noble cause in which they are engaged, would almost forbid such an idea; yet, as the like has happened heretofore, at different periods of their history, it may happen again; and for this reason, I shall keep an eye to that quarter; particularly as our commerce to Smyrna, at this time is very considerable, and, I am told, progressively increasing. . . ."

merchant vessels "by privateers or pirates wearing the Grecian flag, but without real authority from the Greek or any other government."²⁰ A few months later conditions had become so serious that it was found necessary for American vessels in the eastern Mediterranean to be convoyed by warships, especially when bound to or from Smyrna. Commanders of the convoying vessels were ordered scrupulously to maintain the neutrality of the United States.²¹ Although after the battle of Navarino, in 1827, the fleets of England and France attempted to suppress piracy and drew up strict regulations for the control of privateers and armed vessels,²² the situation of the Greeks, both on the mainland and the islands, was such as to drive many of them to piracy for a bare living, "and to tempt the unprincipled of other nations to seek and use their flag to cover their depredations."²³ By the summer of 1827 a system of piracy was as well developed among the Greek islands as, an observer declared, "any other system or any other pursuit."²⁴ Small boats, mounting only a few guns, frequently propelled by sweeps, and carrying large crews, well armed, made it their practice to lie hidden among the islands of the Greek archipelago until a solitary merchantman happened to pass by. Then, if it fell calm, and generally under cover of darkness, a single pirate vessel or several of them together would man the sweeps and go alongside the merchantman, carry her by

²⁰ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 875.

²¹ 19th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 2, p. 15. For another example of the general orders and instructions issued to the commanders of the convoying vessels, see *ibid.*, p. 17.

²² Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, III, 139-140.

²³ *Ibid.*, III, 175, The Hon. Samuel L. Southard, Secretary of the Navy, to the Hon. Samuel Smith, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, March 11, 1828. Congress protested constantly against the heavy expenditure necessary to maintain an effective squadron in the Mediterranean.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177, a private letter dated Dec. 12, 1827. The writer declared, "Piracy has Egina, the present seat of the Greek government, for its fountain head. Here under the authority of a personage who signs him secretary, or clerk, a great number of commissions are [sic] issued to brigs, schooners and small boats, or anything which presents the price of the signature into his hands."

boarding, overpower the crew, and either loot the ship and take to their boats again or tow the merchantman into some convenient and sympathetic harbor to dispose of her cargo at leisure and to fit out the vessel as another pirate craft.

It was on the night of October 15, 1827, that an English brig under convoy of the United States ship *Porpoise*, Lieutenant Benj. Cooper, bound from Smyrna to Port Mahon, was attacked during a calm in the Doro Passage.²⁵ Three pirate boats, carrying about two hundred men, audaciously boarded the brig, which had dropped a short distance astern of the *Porpoise*, and had taken her in tow for the island of Andros when their action was discovered. Lieutenant Cooper despatched four of the boats from the *Porpoise* after the pirates. His men succeeded in overtaking one of their craft and for three-quarters of an hour fired into it as it fled. One of the *Porpoise's* boats, under Lieutenant Carr, returned to the English brig and found on board forty pirates who had jumped into the sea in an effort to gain their own boats when the Americans first attacked, but who had been left behind and had climbed back aboard the brig with the idea of regaining possession of her. Lieutenant Carr, with one midshipman and four seamen, boarded the brig and put to death almost all of them.

Disposal of their plunder was easy for the pirates, since nearly every town had a pirate agent or "fence" who would sell for them the stolen cargoes.²⁶ So difficult was it to catch the pirates in the act, since they had always a haven near at hand, that American officers detailed to guard our commerce in the eastern Mediterranean early in the autumn of 1827 began to talk of the necessity for organized reprisals.²⁷

On September 25, the U. S. S. *Warren*, Master-Commandant Lawrence Kearney, who had had experience with piracy of a similar sort in the Caribbean a few years before, sailed

²⁵ Ibid., p. 176, Report of Lieut. Benj. Cooper to Commodore William Crane, Nov. 19, 1827.

²⁶ Ibid., III, 177.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 175-176, Capt. D. T. Patterson commanding U. S. S. *Constitution* at Smyrna to Commodore William Crane, Sept. 27, 1827.

with a convoy of American vessels from Smyrna. On October 4, off Carabusa, a piratical stronghold, the *Warren* captured an armed boat with a crew of fourteen men and one boy, and a few hours later took a brig wearing the Greek flag, pierced for sixteen guns, as she was bound into the harbor of Carabusa.²⁸ While cruising off Milo, on October 25, Kearney heard of the looting of the American brigs *Rob Roy* and *Cherub*. That day he chased a piratical 10-gun brig from Carabusa and ran her ashore on the island of Argenteire. Her crew escaped into the mountains, but Kearney landed men on the brig and burned her. Three days later Kearney found the *Cherub* at Syra and took possession of her. On October 30 and 31, while cruising around the Island of Miconi, he captured a large tratta capable of rowing forty oars. On the next morning the *Warren* entered Miconi harbor, and Kearney sent on shore a few men who succeeded in identifying and recovering some of the property and cargo of the *Cherub*, and two cases of opium from the *Rob Roy*, along with other loot. The inhabitants of the town brought off to the *Warren* four men accused of piracy. Before leaving the harbor Kearney seized and burned a boat abandoned by pirates who lived in Miconi. During the week from November 7 to November 14 Kearney cruised about the island of Andros, combing the harbors and sending occasional boat parties ashore to search for pirate craft, of which they brought off or burned three.

SECTION 11.—FALKLAND ISLANDS, DECEMBER 31, 1831

Although the use of the Falkland Islands as a base by American sealing vessels and whalers had been freely permitted while the islands were under the domination of Spain and for some years thereafter, in July and August, 1831, three American ships were seized while in the port of the islands, and their captains and crews were imprisoned and

²⁸ Ibid., p. 177. Extracts from the log of the U. S. S. *Warren*. .

badly treated.²⁹ The seizures were made by Louis Vernet,³⁰ who, in an irregular manner, had, on June 10, 1829, obtained a decree from the government of Buenos Aires constituting him civil and military governor of the islands. When the news of this interference with what were considered the rights of American seamen reached Washington, an armed vessel was despatched to investigate the matter and to "aid in affording all lawful protection to our trade which may be necessary."³¹

Some unsatisfactory correspondence passed between the United States consul at Buenos Aires, George W. Slacum,³² and the minister of foreign affairs of that republic. Late in November Captain Silas Duncan reached Buenos Aires in the United States sloop-of-war *Lexington*, and after learning how the affair stood, on December 1 sent a note to Mr. Slacum informing him of his intention to visit the Falkland Islands to "protect the citizens and commerce of the United States engaged in the fisheries," and requesting him to notify the government of Buenos Aires.³³ Another series of notes followed, in which the Argentinos protested that the United States had no right to fish upon the islands or use them in any manner. Meanwhile proof had come into Captain Duncan's hands that Vernet had actually plundered the *Harriet*, and on December 9, while the diplomatic exchange continued, the *Lexington* sailed for the Falklands,³⁴ arriving there on December 31.

²⁹ J. N. Reynolds, *Voyage of the United States Frigate Potomac*, under the command of Commodore John Downes, during the circumnavigation of the Globe, in the years 1831, 1832, 1833 and 1834 (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1835), 482-484, hereinafter referred to as *Voyage of the Potomac*. The vessels seized were the *Harriet*, Captain Davison, of Stonington; the *Breakwater*, Captain Carew, of Stonington; and the *Superior*, Captain Stephen Congar, of New York.

³⁰ A German adventurer, and at this time a naturalized citizen of the United States.

³¹ Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1116, President Jackson's annual message to Congress, December 6, 1831.

³² The United States Minister resident, Mr. Forbes, had died in June, 1831. See *Voyage of the Potomac*, 486.

³³ *Voyage of the Potomac*, 487.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

Captain Duncan at once sent a small force ashore and, after releasing the American vessels and their crews, arrested seven men who had taken part in their capture, dispersed the remaining inhabitants of the islands, and spiked a few cannon lying on the beach. He then sailed to Montevideo, arriving on February 7, 1832, and sent a note to the Government of Buenos Aires offering to surrender his prisoners if the government would assume responsibility for their acts.³⁵

SECTION 12.—QUALLAH BATTOO, SUMATRA, FEBRUARY 6, 1832

On February 7, 1831, the American ship *Friendship*, Captain Endicott, of Salem, while engaged in taking on a cargo of pepper at the town of Quallah Battoo, Sumatra, was treacherously set upon by Malay natives who boarded her, murdered her chief mate and two of the crew, and looted her of everything except the cargo of pepper.³⁶ When news of this act of piracy reached the United States there was a general demand on the part of those who had trade relations with the East that an expedition be sent to Quallah Battoo equipped to exact reparation from the natives or to punish them so thoroughly for the outrage that it would never be repeated.

Accordingly, Commodore John Downes, in the U. S. frigate *Potomac*, received orders from the Secretary of the Navy on August 9, 1831, to proceed to Sumatra, verify the details of the attack on the *Friendship*, determine especially whether or not the American traders had given any provocation to the Sumatrans, and to demand of the chief men of Quallah

³⁵ Ibid., 490. For an account of the diplomatic situation created by Captain Duncan's action, see *ibid.*, pp. 491-514, and Moore's *Digest of International Law*, I, 298, 299, 883. Also, Harper's *Encyclopaedia of United States History*, III, 307, 308.

³⁶ Voyage of the *Potomac*, including a particular account of the engagement at Quallah-Battoo, on the coast of Sumatra; with all the official documents relating to the same (New York, 1835), pp. 530-533; Statement furnished to Commodore Downes by the Secretary of the Navy as a part of his orders for the cruise. See also, *Am. St. P., Naval Affairs*, IV, 150-153. The town of Quallah Battoo had a population of about four thousand. The natives, in 1832, owed no allegiance to any civilized power.

Battoo restitution for the property stolen and the immediate punishment of those concerned in the murder of the American seamen.³⁷ If these demands were not complied with in a reasonable length of time, Commodore Downes was authorized to seize the murderers if possible and send them to the United States for trial, to recover by force as much of the property of the *Friendship* as he could, and to destroy the boats, forts and dwellings near the scene of the attack, giving public warning to the population of the town that unless restitution were made and forbearance used toward American vessels thereafter, an expedition would be sent to their island to inflict more ample punishment.³⁸

The *Potomac* arrived off Quallah Battoo on February 5, 1832. Satisfied from information which he had collected that the report of the attack on the *Friendship* as furnished to the Secretary of the Navy by her owners was substantially true and that any demands for restitution or the surrender of the actual murderers would be futile,³⁹ Commodore Downes, at daybreak on February 6, sent ashore a landing party of two hundred and fifty seamen and marines with a 6-pounder under the command of Lieutenant of Marines Irvine Shubrick. After a fiercely contested action of about two and one-half hours,⁴⁰ during which three forts were captured, most of the town destroyed by fire, several proas burned on the building stocks, and more than one hundred and fifty of the Quallah Battooans killed, the landing force retired to the beach and returned aboard the *Potomac*. The American casualties were slight; two men killed and eleven wounded. The expedition recovered only the medicine chest

³⁷ Secretary of the Navy Levi Woodbury to Commodore John Downes, August 9, 1831, as printed in *Voyage of the Potomac*, 528.

³⁸ See also 22d Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 2, p. 38, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1831.

³⁹ Report of Commodore J. W. Downes to the Secretary of the Navy, Captains Letters, MS., February, 1832, No. 73, in Naval War Records Office, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁰ For a detailed account of the action, see MS. Report of Lieut. Irvine Shubrick to Commodore Downes, Feb. 6, 1832, Captains Letters, MS., Feb., 1832, No. 74, Naval War Records Office.

of the *Friendship*.⁴¹ Next day Commodore Downes, in order to give the natives an example of the effect of 32-pound shot on their defences, and also because they had not as yet shown any evidence of a desire for peace, fired three broadsides from the *Potomac* into a small fort to the south of the town, which, because it lay on the other side of a small river, had not been taken by the landing party. A number of white flags were immediately hoisted on the shore, and an envoy sent off to the ship, who asked for peace. The Commodore demanded restitution for the plundering of the *Friendship* and insisted on the punishment of those who were concerned in the affair, but, finding that both of these objects were impossible of achievement, granted peace, at the same time assuring the envoy "that if forbearance should not be exercised hereafter from committing piracies and murders upon American citizens, other ships of war would be despatched to inflict upon them further punishment."⁴²

SECTION 13.—MUCKIE, SUMATRA, 1839 .

While at Colombo with the United States frigate *Columbia* and the sloop-of-war *John Adams*, in the summer of 1839, Commodore G. C. Read, commanding the East India Squadron, received information that an act of piracy, accompanied by the murder of two American citizens, had recently been committed by the natives of Muckie, on the island of Sumatra.⁴³ "Acting under his general instructions," Commodore Read immediately proceeded to the town of Muckie and, "having vainly sought redress by the restoration of

⁴¹ In his report to the Secretary of the Navy, cited above, Commodore Downes wrote: "I adopted this mode of enforcing our demands, in hopes of getting possession of the rajahs, by surrounding and surprising the forts in which they usually reside, and thus, most probably, inducing the payment of money for their ransome. I regret to say, however, that in consequence of their desperate fighting, neither giving nor receiving quarter, no prisoners were made. . . ."

⁴² Report of Commodore Downes. See also, *Voyage of the Potomac*, 121-124.

⁴³ 26th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 532, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1839.

the plundered property and the surrender of the murderers, he inflicted a severe and merited chastisement on the Barbarians."

SECTION 14.—FIJI ISLANDS, JULY 12, 1840

While engaged in surveying Sualib Bay in the Fiji Islands, during the summer of 1840, a cutter belonging to the South Seas Exploring Expedition under command of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes ran upon a reef at low tide. Her crew was attacked by natives, and two of them were killed. The survivors found it necessary to abandon the cutter and escape in a small boat. On July 12, Lieutenant Wilkes and Lieutenant W. L. Hudson, with seventy seamen and marines from the United States sloops-of-war *Vincennes* and *Porpoise*, two of the larger vessels comprising the expedition, landed near the place of the attack. Next morning Wilkes demanded the return of the cutter and her equipment, and when the response of the natives was unsatisfactory his force burned the towns of Tye and Sualib. The landing force was not opposed and no lives were lost on either side.⁴⁴

On July 24, while walking on the beach at Malolo, Lieutenant Joseph A. Underwood and Midshipman Wilkes Henry were killed from ambush.⁴⁵ In retaliation Wilkes sent ashore Lieutenant Commander Cadwalader Ringgold with seventy officers and men from the *Porpoise*. Ringgold landed on July 26, and after a sharp skirmish with the natives burned the town of Sualib, just rebuilt, and destroyed Arro. The natives lost fifty-seven killed, while one American was severely wounded.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition during the years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842* (5 vols., Philadelphia, 1845), III, 241. For a brief account see the *North American Review*, LVI, No. 119 (Apr., 1843), pp. 257-270.

⁴⁵ Wilkes, III, pp. 426-429, Report of Lieut. James Alden to Wilkes.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, III, pp. 267-270, 273-282, 432-436.

SECTION 15.—DRUMMOND ISLAND, KINGSMILL GROUP,

JUNE, 1841

Early in December, 1840, the sloop-of-war *Peacock*, Lieutenant W. L. Hudson, in company with the tender *Flying Fish*, both vessels attached to the South Seas Exploring Expedition under Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, left Oahu in the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands for an exploratory cruise among the island groups to the south and west. After visiting the Samoan Islands, Bowditch Island, and the Ellice Islands, the *Peacock* touched at the Kingsmill group in the late spring of 1841. While at Drummond Island, on April 7, a seaman, John Anderson, was carried off by the natives and killed.⁴⁷

Lieutenant Hudson sent ashore Lieutenant William M. Walker with eighty officers and men on April 9. While the *Peacock* covered the landing with her guns, Lieutenant Walker offered the chief man of the island tobacco for the body of Anderson and demanded that the murderers be delivered up to him under the terms of an agreement made several years before by a vessel of the expedition. When the natives returned only insulting messages, Walker advanced his men, drove off six hundred of the savages after killing twelve of them, and burned the town of Utiroa, destroying three hundred houses. No Americans were injured.⁴⁸

SECTION 16.—PERRY'S EXPEDITION TO JAPAN, 1853-1854

When Commodore Matthew C. Perry visited Japan in the summer of 1853 and again in the spring of 1854,⁴⁹ the major

⁴⁷ Ibid., V, 56. Also James Fenimore Cooper, *History of the Navy of the United States* (New York, 1856), III, 48-49. Details of this affair are scanty because of the loss of the *Peacock* in the Columbia River soon afterward. Cooper mistakenly places the affair on "one of the Samoan Islands." See the MS. reports of the South Seas Exploring Expedition.

⁴⁸ Wilkes, V, 58, 512.

⁴⁹ The expedition to Japan has been so fully chronicled and contemporary accounts are so easily available that no detailed account will be given here. See the message of President Pierce, Jan. 31, 1855 (33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 34); Francis L. Hawkes, *Narrative of the Expedition of the American Squadron to China*

purpose of his expedition was the negotiation of a treaty of amity and commerce between the governments of Japan and the United States, but in his instructions from the Department of State ⁵⁰ the duty of protecting American seamen in Japanese waters was recognized, and he was authorized to bring to the attention of the island government the cases of the *Morrison*, the *Lagoda*, and the *Lawrence*.⁵¹

On the first occasion, Perry had in company two steamships and two sloops-of-war, and as the vessels sailed into Yedo Bay on July 8, 1853, their decks were cleared for action and their great guns were loaded.⁵² When he landed on July 14, on purpose to deliver his credentials and his message from the President of the United States, he took ashore with him an escort of four hundred officers, seamen and marines from the squadron, fully armed and equipped. The fleet sailed away on July 17.

Seas and Japan (33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 79, 3 vols.); Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852, p. 295; 1855, p. 6 (33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. No. 520). For the manuscript sources, see East India Squadron Letters, 1852-1855, MS., vols. I and II, and the logs of the *Mississippi*, *Powhatan*, *Macedonian*, *Susquehanna*, *Plymouth*, *Saratoga*, and *Vandalia*. See also Aaron H. Palmer, Documents and Facts Illustrating the Origin of the Mission to Japan (Washington, 1857).

⁵⁰ 33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 34, Correspondence of M. C. Perry. Perry wrote his own instructions and submitted them to acting Secretary of State C. M. Conrad, who issued them to him on November 5, 1852.

⁵¹ The *Morrison* visited the bay of Yedo in July, 1837, in an effort to open up the port to trade and missionaries. She was fired on by forts, and after receiving the same treatment at Kagoshima, left the island. The *Lagoda*, a whaler, was wrecked on a shoal in the Japan sea in February, 1848, and the survivors among her crew were confined by the Japanese and ill treated. The *Lawrence*, also a whaler, was wrecked in May, 1846, and her survivors were imprisoned for seventeen months.

⁵² Perry took these precautions because of the firing on the *Morrison* in 1837 and the uncertain nature of his reception by the Japanese. The aggressive tone of Perry's communications to the Navy Department reporting the incidents of the first visit caused some uneasiness at Washington, and by direction of President Pierce, the Secretary of the Navy (J. C. Dobbin) immediately wrote the Commodore that his mission was intended to be one of peaceful negotiation and that he must use no violence except in self defense (33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 34, p. 57).

On his return to Yedo, in February, 1854, the squadron was increased to ten vessels, including three steamships; and when on March 8, he visited the gaudy pavillion erected at Yokohama for his reception, and received the reply of the Japanese government to his proposals, an armed force of five hundred men from the ships accompanied him.

SECTION 17.—OPERATIONS NEAR SHANGHAI, CHINA, 1854

The development of the full force of the Taiping rebellion,⁵³ the capture of Shanghai by the insurgents on September 7, 1853, and subsequent incessant skirmishing near the city, caused Commodore Perry to leave the sloop-of-war *Plymouth*, Commander John Kelly, at that port when he sailed with his squadron on his second visit to Japan. Late in February, 1854, the Imperialists encamped about the city in force and their fleet anchored in the river. Both forces began a series of petty acts of aggression toward foreign residents, the army by "tearing down buildings that were being put up and stealing the materials,"⁵⁴ while the fleet without warning fired upon and searched all boats passing up or down the river.

Complaints addressed to the general commanding the Imperialist troops and to the Tao-tai, or admiral of the fleet, brought at length from these two functionaries admissions that they were unable any longer to protect foreign interests and that the foreigners must protect themselves. On March 8, a pilot boat owned by a Mr. Ayres, an American, was fired upon and captured by the *Sir Herbert Compton*, a vessel of the Imperialist fleet. The American flag which the pilot boat carried at the time was hauled down and her crew of six men was maltreated. Early that night Lieutenant John Guest, under orders from Commander Kelly, took a cutter and eleven

⁵³ For an account of the rebellion and the policy of the United States toward China during its course, see Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1922), pp. 206-241.

⁵⁴ East India, China and Japan Squadron Letter Book, MS., January, 1854—May, 1855, II, 359, Report of Commander Kelly to Commodore Porter, July 22, 1854.

armed men from the *Plymouth*, and, accompanied by the three American owners of the pilot boat, went alongside the *Sir Herbert Compton* on purpose to demand from her commanding officer the return of the stolen boat. After an unsatisfactory conversation with the Chinese, Lieutenant Guest determined to use force, and by gallant action succeeded in bringing out of the midst of the Imperialist fleet the boat and her crew.⁵⁵

Commander Kelly, through Mr. Murphy, the United States consul, demanded that the *Sir Herbert Compton*, as an apology, hoist an American flag at her fore royal masthead and give it twenty-one guns. More than four months later, on July 21, at noon, this was done.⁵⁶ In the meantime, "the aggressions of the Imperial troops still continued in the outskirts of the settlement." And although frequently warned by the different consuls of the consequences that might take place, if they were not suppressed, the old reply was given, that the foreigners would be obliged to protect themselves. On April 3, some of the troops began to steal a small building "near the Race Course," and when the owner remonstrated

⁵⁵ Ibid., II, pp. 356-358, Report of Lieut. John Guest to Commander John Kelly, March 9, 1854: "I . . . therefore determined to execute the second part of your instructions . . . 'to obtain the release of the captured boat if I could', by which I supposed myself authorized to use force, as far as the means under my command would admit. The "*Sir Herbert Compton*" mounting ten or twelve guns being anchored in the middle of the Chinese Fleet and having some Forty men on her deck as well as I could judge at night—renegadoes of all nations; I thought the attempt to release the six persons, who composed the crew . . . a matter of some delicacy. . . . I must premise that the Prisoners were tied up by the hair of the head around the main mast. . . . I therefore called my men 'to come on board' which they did with surprising alacrity, cutlasses in hand and they soon cast loose the prisoners. . . . Mr. Donaldson called out to me that some men on the poop deck were aiming their muskets at us; fortunately the commanding Officer was very near me; drawing and cocking my pistol I presented it at him, and told him the first shot fired I would blow his brains out. Upon this threat he called out loudly for his crew to desist and we got off the Prisoners as well as the boat without further difficulty."

⁵⁶ Ibid., report of Commander Kelly to Commodore Perry, cited above, 360, 361.

they attacked him. With a pistol he drove them off, but the incident precipitated a serious attack on foreigners.⁶⁷

A small body of British marines, which had been posted ashore for such an emergency, moved on the Imperialists and were driven back. Immediately the British ships *Encounter* and *Grecian* landed one hundred and fifty seamen and marines, and the *Plymouth* sent ashore a similar force of sixty men. These, assisted by volunteers from the foreign quarter and about thirty men from American merchant vessels at Shanghai, drove the Chinese into their encampments. The joint forces patrolled the outskirts of the city during the night, and next morning, April 4, after a conference between Captain O'Callaghan, the British senior officer, Commander Kelly, and the consuls of the two countries, it was considered "necessary for the safety of the settlement, to direct a communication to the general and Tao-tai, informing them of the cause of the disturbance the evening previous; and stating that the entrenched encampments immediately in the vicinity of the Race Course must be abandoned by 4 o'clock that day, or we should be obliged, for our own security, to destroy them."⁶⁸

The Chinese refused to move. At the hour named, the joint forces attacked under cover of the fire of a 12-pound boat howitzer and two private field guns worked by American residents of Shanghai. The front of the Imperialist encampments was protected by a deep stream, but after about ten minutes sharp fighting the Chinese forces were taken in the flank and they began to retreat in disorder, leaving a number of dead and wounded. The British force under Captain O'Callaghan sustained the larger share of the action, and, after capturing the camps, burned them. Next day the earthworks were pulled down. Two Americans were killed

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 361, 362. "Soon after they began to assemble from the different camps in the neighborhood, and attacked a lady and gentleman who were walking on the Race Course. The gentleman received several wounds, while the lady had to fly for her life—pursued by these men."

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 362.

and four wounded, while the British lost one man killed and three wounded.⁵⁹ The joint forces remained ashore patrolling the Race Course area until June 17, when they reembarked.

The disorders which accompanied the rebellion kept the American vessels on the China station busy during the summer and autumn of 1854. In obedience to orders from Commodore M. C. Perry, on July 15 Captain William J. McCluney, in the U. S. S. *Powhatan*, started on a cruise to various ports along the Chinese coast. On July 19 he anchored near Kintang or Sylvester Island, off the mouth of the Yung River, leading to Ning-Po.⁶⁰ Early next day Lieutenants R. B. Pegram and Nicholson were sent with two armed boats to deliver letters to the acting United States consul, Dr. McCarter, and Mr. J. Goddard, a missionary, at Ning-Po. The boats reached that town, twelve miles up the river, at noon, and next day Captain McCluney received letters from Lieutenant Pegram and Dr. McCarter which caused him to get up steam and enter the mouth of the river. He immediately sent up Acting Master R. B. Lowry with a launch and a strong crew, with twelve marines and a field gun as a reenforcement for the forces under Lieutenant Pegram. These forces remained ashore at Ning-Po as a guard for two days. The information sent to Captain McCluney proved a false alarm. No disorder developed, and on July 23 the entire force returned to the ship.

Piratical attacks upon foreign shipping became a frequent annoyance in the autumn of 1854, and attempts by combined British and American forces to put down the nuisance led to several engagements with the pirates in which many of their junks were destroyed and their storehouses on the small islands lying off the coast were bombarded.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 364. One of the Americans killed was Captain Pearson, of the American clipper ship *Rose Standish*, who had volunteered to man the howitzer.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 396 ff., Report of Captain William J. McCluney to Commodore Perry, Aug. 7, 1854.

⁶¹ For example, see the affair of the Chilean barque *Caldera*. She

SECTION 18.—BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN DEL NORTE,
NICARAGUA, 1854

A controversy arose in 1852 between the government of San Juan del Norte or Greytown, on the Mosquito Coast, and the agents of the Accessory Transit Company, an American firm chartered in Nicaragua, over the title to a tract of land on the north side of the harbor known as Puntas Arenas. Both sides claimed the property and affairs reached a crisis when on February 8, 1853, the city council of San Juan passed a resolution notifying the company that it must remove its establishment from Puntas Arenas within a certain number of days.⁶² Commander George N. Hollins, in the United States sloop-of-war *Cyane*, reached San Juan on March 10, shortly before the expiration of the time limit set by the city council. On learning the details of the situation he promptly sent ashore an armed force of twenty-four marines under Lieutenant W. D. Hurst as a guard for the company's property, and informed the population of the town that he intended to protect the persons and interests of American citizens from molestation. A few days later, when the dispute seemed to be settled by compromise, the guard was recalled aboard the *Cyane*.⁶³

Soon after, Commander Hollins sailed north; and the

sailed from Hong Kong on October 5 for San Francisco, and American merchants (Alvord and Company) were interested in her cargo to the extent of \$100,000. Off the mouth of the Canton River she was plundered by three piratical junks and burned to the water's edge. Commodore Joel Abbott, who had succeeded Perry in command on the station, sent Lieutenant George H. Preble, with the chartered steamer *Queen*, to act in concert with Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling and a British force against the pirates' settlement on the island of Tyho. On November 2 and 3, the *Queen*, with H. M. ships *Baracouta* and *Encounter*, attacked and destroyed the settlement and burned seven piratical junks. See East India Squadron Letter Book, 1854-1856, MS., 16, 23, 24, 34.

⁶² For a discussion of the legal side of the affair, see J. B. Moore, A Digest of International Law, VII, 112-116, and II, 414-417; 33d Cong., 1st sess., S. Docs. Nos. 8 and 85, H. Ex. Doc. No. 126; 35th Cong., 1st sess., S. Ex. Docs. Nos. 9 and 10.

⁶³ 33d Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 297; 33d Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 8, pp. 10, 11.

authorities of San Juan effected the destruction by fire of some of the company's buildings upon the Puntas Arenas property and stole part of the contents.⁶⁴ In May, 1854, the United States minister to Central America, Mr. Solon Borland, while on a visit to the consul at San Juan, Mr. Joseph W. Fabens, was surrounded by a mob, the leaders of which tried to arrest him. While the mayor of the town was explaining to Mr. Borland that this action was being taken without his sanction, some one in the crowd threw a broken bottle at the minister which struck and slightly cut his face. When the news of these incidents reached Washington, at the request of Secretary of State W. L. Marcy, Commander Hollins was ordered to return with the *Cyane* to San Juan and to obtain reparation for the indignity to Mr. Borland as well as for the losses suffered by the Accessory Transit Company.⁶⁵

The *Cyane* sailed from New York on June 19, and on her arrival at San Juan, "Commander Hollins, learning from Mr. Fabens, the United States commercial agent at that place, that the demands made by him, by order of the State Department, for a proper reparation of wrongs committed by them, had been treated with derision and contempt,"⁶⁶ made through Mr. Fabens a final request to the people of the town for a satisfactory adjustment.⁶⁷ The people of San Juan paid little attention to Mr. Fabens' request, and on July 12, at nine o'clock in the morning, Commander Hollins caused to be posted in the town a proclamation declaring that if the demands made by the commercial agent were not immediately

⁶⁴ Commanders' Letters, MS., 1854, III, Letter 23, enclosure "2nd A.", Joseph W. Fabens to the Authorities of San Juan del Norte.

⁶⁵ 33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 385 (Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1854); 33d Cong., 1st sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 85, pp. 5, 6.

⁶⁶ 33d Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 385, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1854.

⁶⁷ See Commanders' Letters, MS., 1854, III, Letter 23, enclosure "2nd B.", Proclamation of Joseph W. Fabens to the "Pretended Authorities" and the people of San Juan, July 11, 1854. Fabens demanded \$16,000 for goods stolen, \$8,000 for a building burned, an apology for the indignity to Mr. Borland, and assurances for the future.

complied with, he would, at nine o'clock on the next morning, July 13, proceed to bombard the city.⁶⁸ A force of marines and seamen under Lieutenants Pickering and Fountleroy was sent ashore to secure all arms and ammunition possible and to act as a guard for Mr. Fabens and the United States archives.

Derisive remarks were the only answer to this manifesto, and at the hour named, in spite of a bitter protest from Lieutenant W. D. Jolly,⁶⁹ commanding H. M. schooner *Bermuda*, the *Cyane* opened fire with shells.⁷⁰ All foreigners and "those favourable to the United States" had been notified that a steamer would be at their service on the morning before the bombardment to take them to safety. The steamer was sent in at daylight on July 13, but few embarked on it to Puntas Arenas. The bombardment continued for three-quarters of an hour; and was followed by an equal period of quiet. At 10.30 o'clock firing was resumed for half an hour, with another interval of quiet until 2 p. m. After twenty minutes further firing, the bombardment ceased. The pauses were ordered by Commander Hollins so that the authorities of San Juan might have opportunities to treat, but no move in that direction was made. At 4 p. m. a detail under Lieutenants Pickering and Fountleroy was sent ashore to finish the work of destruction by fire. An armed party attacked the detail near the landing, but fled at the first volley from the Americans. No lives were lost. Most of the town was destroyed, and the landing force retired. In his

⁶⁸ Ibid., "Copy D.", Proclamation of Commander Hollins to whom it may concern, 9 A. M., July 12.

⁶⁹ Ibid., "2nd D.", Letter from W. D. Jolly, Lieut. Commanding H. M. schooner *Bermuda* at Greytown to Commander Hollins, July 12. "The inhabitants of this city as well as the houses and property are entirely defenceless and quite at your mercy. I do therefore notify you that such an act will be without precedent among civilised nations and I beg to call your attention to the fact that a large amount of property of British subjects as well as others which it is my duty to protect will be destroyed, but the force under my command is so totally inadequate for this protection against the *Cyane* I can only enter this my protest."

⁷⁰ Ibid., enclosure H., Report of Commander Hollins to the Hon. J. C. Dobbin, Secretary of the Navy, July 16, 1854.

annual report for the year 1854, the Secretary of the Navy declared, "I could not reprove this commander for his conduct."⁷¹

SECTION 19.—FIJI ISLANDS, OCTOBER 28, 1855

Commander E. B. Boutwell, in the sloop-of-war *John Adams*, in the summer of 1855 received orders from Commodore William Mervine, senior officer of the United States Pacific squadron, to visit the Fiji Islands and exact reparation from natives for a number of injuries committed upon American residents and ship-wrecked seamen.⁷² The *John Adams* reached the islands in September, and after vainly trying to obtain satisfaction and redress from some of the native chiefs, on October 28 Commander Boutwell sent ashore a small force which drove off the natives and destroyed the villages of Namula and Vutia, on the island of Viti Levu. Two days later a similar landing party burned the town of

⁷¹ 33rd Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 385. Secretary Dobbin added: "We may well regret the stern necessity which constrained him, but it should be remembered that Commander Hollins had been compelled but a year before to interfere and stop these same people in their progress of destruction of American property; that he had, besides, seen the report of our Minister speaking of them as 'being persons, almost without exception, of notoriously bad character—some of them discharged penitentiary convicts and refugees from justice, habitually manifesting evil dispositions toward our citizens, and indulging those dispositions to the injury of persons and property whenever they are not restrained by force,' and that he was 'unable to regard them in any other light than as pirates and outlaws;' that he knew that this ungoverned populace had for a season restrained an American Minister's personal liberty and rudely assailed him; that they had retained and refused to surrender the stolen property of some of our countrymen; that they had contemptuously turned a deaf ear to his appeals for adjustment, and, that his alternative was to inflict punishment or return to his country with a well armed national vessel and report that he had demanded satisfaction, and, upon being treated with contempt, had felt it his duty to come home." See also President Pierce's annual message to Congress, December 4, 1854, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 2814-2817.

⁷² For a detailed account of the operations of the *John Adams* at the Fiji Islands, see the report of Commander E. B. Boutwell to Commodore William Mervine, Dec. 22, 1855, printed as 34th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 115. The MS. sources are in Pacific Squadron Letters, Sept., 1854—June, 1856, I.

Lassalassa, remained ashore during the night, and on October 31 completed the work of reprisal by destroying two more small settlements.

The natives were now ready for peace, and Commander Boutwell compelled the great chief of the island to "sign" a covenant promising good treatment of Americans for the future. The *John Adams* sailed from the islands on November 8. Many natives had been killed during the operations ashore, while the Americans lost one killed and two men wounded.

SECTION 20.—MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1855

When a revolution, accompanied by severe fighting, broke out in Montevideo, Uruguay, on November 25, 1855, Captain W. F. Lynch, of the U. S. S. *Germantown*, considering the lives and property of American residents and other foreigners in grave danger, landed a considerable body of seaman and marines from his ship and from the U. S. S. *Bainbridge*. British, French and Spanish warships in the harbor of Montevideo also sent ashore detachments for the protection of their nationals, and Captain Lynch, as senior naval officer of the foreign forces, assumed command of a joint column which occupied the custom house without resistance from either Uruguayan faction. When this was accomplished, the American consulate was put under the protection of an armed guard, and, as the revolution appeared to be becoming more dangerous to the interests of foreigners, Captain Lynch ordered ashore an additional detail of seamen from his ships and put the American forces ashore, now numbering about one hundred, under the command of First Lieutenant A. S. Nicholson.⁷³

The foreign forces were reembarked on November 29, when the Uruguayan government had succeeded in putting down the uprising. Captain Lynch, immediately after his forces had withdrawn, received a note from the Uruguayan Secre-

⁷³ Brazil Squadron Letters, MS., September, 1854—April, 1856, II, No. 104, pp. 650-655.

tary of Foreign Affairs, expressing the thanks of his government for the American commander's action in protecting the custom house and the lives and property of foreign residents during the disturbance, along with a note to the same effect signed by nine of the more prominent foreigners.⁷⁴

SECTION 21.—PANAMA; SEPTEMBER 19, 1856

On September 19, 1856, a disturbance arose in the legislative assembly of the state of Panama, Republic of New Granada, during which one of the legislators was slightly wounded. Both political parties which at that time divided the state rushed to arms and the party of the opposition, known as the Blacks, retired outside the limits of the city of Panama, and prepared for a war. The acting governor of Panama, Don Franco. Fabriga, verbally suggested to the United States consul in the city that he ask the commanders of the two United States ships then in the harbor, the *Independence* and the *St. Marys*, to station armed boats off shore. This the consul, Mr. My de Sabla, refused to do until the governor should make an official request.⁷⁵

Later in the afternoon of the same day Commodore William Mervine, commanding the Pacific Squadron, asked Mr. de Sabla to inform the governor that he wished to land some men from his ships to protect the American citizens living in the town during the conflict which was imminent. In the presence of the British and French consuls, Governor Fabriga agreed and requested that Commodore Mervine land a part of his forces at the railroad station. Soon afterward an armed force of one hundred and sixty men with a field gun was sent ashore from the ships, and the railroad station was occupied. On the following day Governor Fabriga confirmed his request to Commodore Mervine in writing.

The presence of the American force at the railroad station appeared to have a quieting effect on the turbulent spirits of

⁷⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 654, 655.

⁷⁵ 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, p. 4, Mr. de Sabla to Mr. Marcy, Oct. 2, 1856.

the natives of Panama. The expected battle between the two political factions of the state did not occur, and on September 22 the parties from the *Independence* and the *St. Marys* were reembarked.⁷⁶

SECTION 22.—DESTRUCTION OF THE BARRIER FORTS, CANTON,
CHINA, NOVEMBER, 1856

During the troubles between the British and the authorities of Canton, China, which reached a crisis in the autumn of 1856, the British commander in chief on the station found it advisable to land some of his force and take a position near the city. To prevent injury to Americans and their property during the fighting which was imminent, Commander A. H. Foote, of the United States sloop-of-war *Portsmouth*, sent ashore small detachments from his vessel and from the sloop-of-war *Levant*.⁷⁷ In the British attack upon the palace of the governor of Canton several Americans took part without orders, and when Commander Foote discovered this and hastened to consult Commodore James Armstrong, who was at Whampoa, a decision was reached to withdraw the American forces. On November 15 or 16,⁷⁸ while an unarmed boat from the *Portsmouth*, prominently displaying the American flag, was proceeding up the river to Canton, several shots were fired at it from the so-called Barrier Forts on the shore.⁷⁹ The Governor of Canton was called on for an apology for the insult, and when none was forthcoming, on November 20, Commodore Armstrong landed a force of two hundred and eighty-seven officers and men, with four guns, from the

⁷⁶ See also *ibid.*, pp. 84-89, for letters from Commander T. Bailey and Commodore William Mervine to the Secretary of the Navy, which give an interesting description of the situation at Panama from the viewpoint of those charged with the responsibility of protecting the lives and property of Americans there.

⁷⁷ See East India Squadron Letters, MS., 1855-1856, I, 133, 135-140.

⁷⁸ The manuscripts differ as to the date.

⁷⁹ 35th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 11, p. 577, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1857.

squadron, under Commanders Foote, H. H. Bell, of the U. S. S. *San Jacinto*, and William Smith, of the *Levant*.

The Barrier Forts were assailed, and one was captured on the afternoon of November 20. Next day two more forts were reduced, and on November 22 the last fort surrendered. The forts, which had mounted one hundred and seventy-six cannon, with a garrison of about five thousand, were razed. It was estimated that four hundred Chinese were killed in the actions, and many more wounded. The American casualties numbered seven killed and twenty-two wounded.

In his annual report for the year 1857, Isaac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, declared, "The prompt and decisive course pursued by Commodore Armstrong, his officers and men, has caused the flag of the United States to be respected by the Chinese, contributed largely to the security of our citizens in China, and, during the troubles which followed, has probably been the means of saving many lives and much property."⁸⁰

Soon after this incident the first commercial treaty between China and the United States was negotiated.

SECTION 23.—MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, JANUARY, 1858

When Flag Officer French Forrest, commanding the Brazil Squadron, arrived at Montevideo, Uruguay, in January, 1858, he found that the people of one of the political factions of the state had taken up arms and were advancing on the capital. The government of Uruguay applied to foreign consular agents to request that an armed force be landed for the protection of the lives and property of the foreign residents. Forrest landed a detachment of marines from his squadron and himself commanded them during their stay in Montevideo.⁸¹ A strict neutrality toward both political factions was observed, and the detachment concerned itself only with the protection of foreigners. When, about ten days after they

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 577.

⁸¹ 35th Cong., 2d sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 15, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1858.

had landed, the revolutionary party capitulated, the marines were withdrawn without incident.⁸²

SECTION 24.—FIJI ISLANDS, 1858

In June, 1858, the United States sloop-of-war *Vandalia*, Commander Arthur Sinclair, was ordered from Panama on a six months cruise among the islands of the South Pacific. The cruise, like many similar ones before and after it, was for the purpose of showing the flag in an out of the way part of the world and affording to American citizens and their property any protection which might prove to be necessary.

After rescuing from Oeno and Pitcairn Islands more than forty survivors, the officers, crew and passengers of the American clipper ship *Wild Wave*, who had taken refuge there when their vessel was wrecked, Commander Sinclair took the *Vandalia* to Waya, in the Fiji Islands.⁸³ Here he found that two American traders had been murdered by natives. Commander Sinclair addressed a demand to the chief men of Waya that the murderers be delivered to him; and was answered by defiance. A landing force of three officers and forty seamen and marines, under command of Lieutenant Caldwell, was immediately sent on shore with orders to assault and destroy the principal village on the island. After five hours marching through deep ravines filled with loose rocks and along cliffs, the party reached the village and attacked. When fourteen of the natives had been killed, including two of the head men of the town, the savages were driven off, carrying away with them many wounded. Lieutenant Caldwell destroyed more than one hundred huts, the greater part of the village, and returned with his party to the *Vandalia*. None of the American force was killed, although a few were wounded.

⁸² For a more detailed account of the landing, see Brazil Squadron Letters, MS., XVI, No. 57.

⁸³ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1859, p. 1145.

SECTION 25.—SHANGHAI, CHINA, AUGUST, 1859

Early in August, 1859, while the U. S. S. *Mississippi* was lying at Shanghai, China, a disturbance directed against foreigners occurred there because of rumors which were in circulation among the Chinese that coolies were being kidnapped and taken aboard a French merchant vessel.⁸⁴ The United States consul and several American merchants called upon the commanding officer of the *Mississippi*, Captain W. C. Nicholson, for assistance in protecting themselves and their property. Captain Nicholson immediately placed the *Mississippi* before the town and landed a portion of her crew under arms. Quiet was soon restored, and the American force withdrew.

SECTION 26.—KISEMBO, PORTUGUESE WEST AFRICA, MARCH,
1860

While lying in the United States sloop-of-war *Marion* at Kisembo, Portuguese West Africa, Commander Thomas W. Brent, on March 1, 1860, was asked by American residents of that town to land a force from his vessel large enough to protect them and their factories from the natives, who, they feared, were planning an attack on the Portuguese settlement. Commander Brent went ashore, taking with him several officers and forty seamen and marines, and with this force guarded the factories during the night. Next day he withdrew his men to the *Marion*.

On March 3, in response to a prearranged signal from the shore, Commander Brent landed fifty seamen and marines with a howitzer. That day a fight took place between the natives and the Portuguese, during which the former made several attempts to burn the American factories, being prevented from doing so by the guard from the *Marion*. On March 4, when the natives had been defeated, the force returned to the ship. While ashore, the landing party had

⁸⁴ 36th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 2, p. 1148, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1859.

carefully observed neutrality as to the Portuguese and the natives, the object of the landing being solely the protection of American lives and property. Commander Brent's men co-operated, during the fighting on March 3, with a similar force from H. M. S. *Falcon*, Commander Fitzroy.⁸⁵

SECTION 27.—PANAMA, SEPTEMBER 27, 1860

During an insurrection which occurred near Panama on September 27, 1860, stray bullets from a "brisk fire [which] was commenced from the outskirts of the city" killed six and wounded three of the white inhabitants.⁸⁶ The United States sloop-of-war *St. Marys*, Commander William D. Porter, was at that time lying in the harbor of Panama, having been ordered there by the Navy Department some time before because of unsettled conditions on the Isthmus.

Immediately after the firing began on September 27, Commander Porter went on shore, consulted the United States consul, and, at the request of the military intendente⁸⁷ and of the agent of the Panama Railroad, soon afterward landed a body of seamen and marines with a field piece. This force took possession of the railroad station without opposition. On September 28, the governor of Panama delivered up the city to the joint occupation of forces from the *St. Marys* and H. M. S. *Clio*. The British and Americans remained in control of Panama until October 7, when the insurrection came to an end and they were withdrawn to their ships.

SECTION 28.—AFFAIR OF THE STEAMER *PEMBROKE*, SHIMONOSEKI, JAPAN, 1863

During 1863, only the ships *Jamestown* and *Wyoming* represented the interests of the United States in the East India and China seas.⁸⁸ Fortunately, conditions in the East were

⁸⁵ 36th Cong., 2d sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 14, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1860.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 15, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1860.

⁸⁷ 58th Cong., 2d sess., S, Doc. No. 143, p. 6. See also, *ibid.*, p. 5, Mr. Corwine to Mr. Cass; and pp. 90-96, Commander W. D. Porter to the Secretary of the Navy, various dates.

⁸⁸ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1863, p. xi.

peaceful at that time, except for a single peculiar affair which took place in the Straits of Shimonoseki, Japan.

About sundown on June 25, the American steamer *Pembroke* anchored for the night near the entrance to the Straits. Soon afterward, a Japanesse barque came to an anchor about a quarter of a mile away from the *Pembroke* in the direction of the head of the Straits. In the midst of a violent thunder-storm which broke soon after midnight on June 26, the barque opened fire on the *Pembroke*. Soon a brig anchored near the barque and also commenced a rapid cannonade directed at the *Pembroke*. The American vessel raised steam with considerable energy and, although badly damaged, managed to escape the two sailing vessels and run out to sea through the Bungo Passage, an unfrequented strait.⁸⁹

Commander D. McDougal, commanding the *Wyoming*, received word of this incident on the evening of July 10, while at Yokohama. Through Japanese sources he learned that the barque and the brig were vessels belonging to the Prince of Nagato, and that the American steamer had disappeared and was perhaps sunk. Soon after, the mail packet from Shanghai brought authentic details of the affair, and on July 13 the *Wyoming* left Yokohama, arriving off the entrance to the Straits of Shimonoseki on the morning of July 16.⁹⁰

Commander McDougal proceeded up the Straits and off the town of Shimonoseki found a steamer, a barque and a brig at anchor. All wore the Japanese colors at the peak and the colors of the Prince of Nagato at the fore. The *Wyoming* stood towards these vessels and, when within range, was fired on by six batteries on the shore. The *Wyoming* passed close between the steamer and the two sailing vessels and received and returned fire from each. After the engagement had lasted for an hour, the Japanese steamer attempted to get under way, when two shells from the *Wyoming* exploded her

⁸⁹ Statement of the officers of the American steamer *Pembroke* before the United States Consul at Shanghai, July 3, 1863, 38th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 560.

⁹⁰ Report of Commander D. McDougal to the Hon. Gideon Welles, July 23, 1863, 38th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 558.

boilers. The brig appeared about to sink, and the barque was ashore, badly damaged. In the narrow straits, with no charts and with his pilot fearful of going ashore because of a strong tidal current, Commander McDougal was now induced to withdraw. The *Wyoming* had been hulled eleven times. Five of her crew were killed and six wounded. It was believed that forty men were killed on the Japanese steamer alone when her boilers exploded.⁹¹

Although no communication whatever seems to have taken place between the *Wyoming* and the commanders of the Japanese vessels, either before or during the engagement, Commander McDougal learned that the Prince of Nagato had apparently commenced a small war on his own account.⁹² A powerful and turbulent nobleman, he was bitterly opposed to foreigners and had shown his displeasure at their admittance to Japanese territory on several earlier occasions. On July 7 his forces had fired on the French steamer *Kien-Chang*; and on July 11 they had attacked H. M. S. *Medusa*, a small gunboat, killing four and wounding seven of her crew. Commander McDougal pointed out in his report that the incident of the *Pembroke* was in direct violation of existing treaties with Japan, and declared that the matter of further punishment was in the hands of the ministers of the Treaty Powers.⁹³

SECTION 29.—PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES MINISTER,
YEDO, JAPAN, 1864

When the United States minister to Japan, Robert H. Pruyn, in the summer of 1864, found it necessary to visit Yedo so as to be able to negotiate directly with the Japanese government for the settlement of American claims arising out

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 561, Additional Report of Commander McDougal, July 25, 1863. See also Commanders' Letters, MS., July, 1863, No. 113.

⁹² 38th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 559.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 561. See Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, 1854; and Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, 1858, W. M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909, I, 996-998, 1000-1006.

of the affair of the *Pembroke* and the burning of the United States legation at Yedo on May 26, 1862, he was accompanied by a guard of sixty-five seamen and marines from the U. S. S. *Jamestown*.⁹⁴ This force was landed on July 14, 1864, and remained ashore as a guard during the three weeks required for the negotiations. The Japanese government had declined to guarantee his safety in Yedo, but, according to Mr. Pruyn, the chief reason he asked for a guard was because he believed its presence would impress the authorities and make easier his work.

SECTION 30.—JOINT EXPEDITION TO STRAITS OF SHIMONOSEKI,
JAPAN, 1864

Because of attacks made upon American, British, French and Dutch vessels by the forces of the Prince of Nagato, who had fortified the Straits of Shimonoseki and ordered the exclusion of foreigners, and because of a threat on the part of the Japanese government to close the port of Yokohama, these actions constituting breaches of the treaties made between Japan and the various powers concerned, the representatives of the four nations determined, in the summer of 1864, to open the straits by force and to take such measures as would prevent further hostile acts.⁹⁵ On August 25 of that year they instructed accordingly the commanding officers of their naval forces in those waters.⁹⁶ The expedition consisted of nine British, three French, and four Dutch steam ships of war, with a force available for landing of about one thousand

⁹⁴ Private Correspondence of Hon. Robert H. Pruyn, Minister-Resident of the United States in Japan, MS., May, 1862—April, 1865, as cited in Payson Jackson Treat, *The Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853—1865*, Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1917, Johns Hopkins University, pp. 344, 345. See also Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1864, III, 541.

⁹⁵ For a full account of the strange situation prevailing in Japan at this time and of the events which culminated in the expedition into the Straits of Shimonoseki, see Payson Jackson Treat, *op. cit.*, 238-434.

⁹⁶ Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1864, III, 549.

men, and a small American steamer especially chartered for the purpose of showing the American flag,⁹⁷ since the ministers of the treaty powers were anxious that the Japanese should know that the United States was in accord with the movement.

The seventeen vessels sailed from Yokohama on August 28 and 29.⁹⁸ The American steamer, the *Ta-Kiang*, was under command of Lieutenant Frederick Pearson, who had been instructed by Captain Cicero Price, of the *Jamestown*, to render to the commander of the expedition every aid possible short of taking his vessel under the fire of the batteries at Shimonoseki. She carried a Parrot gun on an improvised mount and fifteen seamen from the *Jamestown*, together with a surgeon, and her chief rôle was to be the towing of boats carrying landing parties and the care of wounded men.⁹⁹

On September 2, all of the allied vessels met near the island of Hima Sima; and on September 4, the fleet got under way, anchoring off the mouth of the Straits of Shimonoseki, in sight of the batteries on the Nagato shore, at 4 P. M.¹⁰⁰ Next morning the fleet moved closer in and the *Ta-Kiang* took up a position between the French and British flagships. No attempt was made to communicate with the shore. At 4.10 P. M. the English admiral, in H. M. S. *Euryalus*, fired a shot, and a general engagement followed until 5.30 o'clock, when all the batteries in sight had been silenced. In the night a party from one of the British ships landed and spiked some of the guns. The Japanese opened fire again early the next morning. About 8.30 o'clock the *Ta-Kiang* steamed up close to the batteries, firing shells from her gun and towing

⁹⁷ See Rear Admirals', Commodores' and Captains' Letters, MS., July-August, 1864, No. 304, Captain Cicero Price to the Hon. Gideon Welles, August 23, 1864. The *Jamestown*, the only American warship in Asiatic waters during the summer of 1864, was a sailing vessel and therefore unsuited to take part in the operations.

⁹⁸ Ibid., September-October, 1864, No. 59, Captain Cicero Price to the Hon. Gideon Welles, Sept. 8, 1864.

⁹⁹ Ibid., No. 59 A., Captain Cicero Price to Lieutenant Fred. Pearson, Aug. 18, 1864.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., No. 164 A., Report of Lieutenant Frederick Pearson to Captain Cicero Price, Sept. 11, 1864.

two boats containing a landing party from the French ship *Dupliex*. At the same time other vessels towed in boats full of British, French and Dutch seamen, and by noon all the forts were taken. Skirmishing continued throughout the day, and at dark the Japanese counter-attacked. They were driven back, and after spiking the guns in eight batteries and destroying the magazines, the landing parties retired to their ships. For two days the allied forces were engaged in destroying all the forts and bringing off to the fleet many of their cannon.¹⁰¹ During this time the *Ta-Kiang* received on board twenty-three wounded men. On the afternoon of September 8, hostilities ceased, and an envoy from the Prince of Nagato appeared with a white flag and asked for peace.¹⁰² All the ships in the fleet hoisted white flags, and on September 14, after negotiations between the allied commanders and two of the chief councillors of the Prince of Nagato, terms of peace were agreed upon.¹⁰³

The *Ta-Kiang* returned to Yokohama on the evening of September 21 with twenty-four wounded British seamen. During the attack on the forts she had fired eighteen shells from her gun. Her crew suffered no casualties.¹⁰⁴ The losses of the entire expedition were twelve killed, fifty-six wounded, and one missing.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ Altogether, sixty-two guns were removed.

¹⁰² Foreign Relations, 1864, III, 578.

¹⁰³ These allowed free passage of the Straits to all ships of all countries; promised friendly treatment and the right to purchase coal and supplies, and to land in rough weather; guaranteed that no new forts would be built and no repairs would be made to the old ones; and, as the town of Shimonoseki "might have justly been burnt for having first fired on foreign ships, but it was not,"—so a ransom was to be paid and the whole expenses of the expedition were to be paid by the Prince of Nagato.

¹⁰⁴ Rear Admirals', Commodores', and Captains' Letters, MS., September-October, 1864, No. 164, Captain Cicero Price to the Hon. Gideon Welles, Sept. 23, 1864.

¹⁰⁵ British Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons No. 57, p. 111, as cited by Treat, p. 360. An account of the operations is also printed in Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I, vol. III, pp. 192, 201-204.

CHAPTER III

INSTANCES OF PROTECTION BY FORCE, 1865-1899

SECTION 31.—PANAMA, 1865

At Panama, at half-past five o'clock on the afternoon of March 9, 1865, a revolution, so sudden that its coming was entirely unsuspected by any except those taking part in it, broke out. Mr. F. W. Rice, United States consul at Aspinwall, who was by chance at Panama, joined with Mr. Alexander R. McKee, consul at that town, in requesting Captain Edward Middleton, of the U. S. S. *St. Marys*, then anchored in the harbor, to land men for the protection of the lives and property of American residents.¹ Permission to land an armed force from the *St. Marys* was asked of Vice-President Calancha, then acting as head of the government, whose overthrow was the object of the revolution, and his consent was readily obtained.²

Captain Middleton immediately landed and took into Panama a small detachment of marines with which he occupied the United States consulate during the night. No violence was offered to any foreign residents of the city, and on the next morning, at seven o'clock, the marines returned on board the *St. Marys*. The success of the revolution apparently met with the desires of most of the people of the state, and for a few months Panama enjoyed tranquillity.³

SECTION 32.—ISLAND OF FORMOSA, JUNE 13, 1867

Early in the spring of 1867 a report reached Rear Admiral H. H. Bell, lying in the U. S. S. *Hartford* at Shanghai, that the American barque *Rover* had been wrecked on the southeastern extremity of the island of Formosa, and it was

¹ 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, p. 25.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26. Sr. Calancha was soon afterward forced to fly for his life, and he took refuge on board the *St. Marys*.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

rumored that all on board had been murdered by the natives.⁴ Commander Febiger, with the U. S. S. *Ashuelot*, was ordered to visit the scene of the wreck, discover the truth of the affair, and rescue any survivors.

The *Ashuelot* arrived off Tai-Wau-Foo in April, and Commander Febiger required of the three chief men of the island an immediate investigation, the seizure and punishment of those who might be implicated, and the delivery of any survivors. These authorities were interested and sympathetic. They wished to be helpful but, while admitting the truth of the report, they claimed that they could not control the tribe of savages who had perpetrated the outrage, nor bring them to justice. They declared further, what was unfortunately soon found to be true, that it was difficult to employ effectively an armed force against savages who were incapable of holding negotiations with civilized people. On visiting the coast where the *Rover* had gone ashore, Commander Febiger decided that the force under his authority was too small to attempt action against them.⁵

Determined to avenge the crew of the *Rover* and to punish the natives of Formosa in a manner most calculated to impress upon them a prudent regard for the lives of shipwrecked Americans, Rear Admiral Bell sailed from Shanghai in June, taking with him the U. S. S. *Hartford* and *Wyoming*, on purpose to destroy if possible the town of the savages. At Taka he received aboard Mr. Pickering, an interpreter; Mr. Taylor, a merchant who traded with the Formosans; and Her Britannic Majesty's consul, Mr. Charles Carroll. Mr. Carroll had already tried without success to ransom the *Rover's* survivors.

The ships anchored at South Cape, Formosa, half a mile off shore early on the morning of June 13, and at about 8.30 o'clock one hundred and eighty officers and men,⁶ of whom

⁴ 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 7, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1867.

⁵ Ibid., p. 8. See also *ibid.*, pp. 54-56, Rear Admiral Bell to the Hon. Gideon Welles, June 19, 1867, and Enclosures A to F.

⁶ 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 8.

forty-three were marines,⁷ were sent ashore under orders of Commander George C. Belknap of the *Hartford* and Lieutenant Alexander S. Mackenzie. The savages, dressed in clouts and red war paint, their muskets glittering in the sun, at the same time began to assemble on hills about two miles from the beach and, with the glasses, could be seen from the decks of the ships. As the American force advanced toward them, they disappeared into the jungle, thereafter keeping under cover and displaying "a strategy and courage equal to [that of] North American Indians. Delivering their fire, they retreated without being seen by our men, who, charging on their coverts, frequently fell into ambuscades." Futile skirmishing of this sort continued until four o'clock. By that time Lieutenant Mackenzie had been killed and thirteen officers and men, including Commander Belknap, had suffered sunstroke;⁸ and the landing party returned to the beach and reembarked. While ashore, the force had burned some native huts and had made every effort to fire the jungle which proved "fireproof at that season." Admiral Bell decided that another landing would accomplish nothing, and the *Hartford* and *Wyoming* set sail for Shanghai.⁹

SECTION 33.—PROTECTION OF AMERICANS IN JAPAN, 1868

The Japanese ports of Osaka and Hiogo were opened to foreign trade on January 1, 1868. Within a few days Japanese hostility toward foreigners, to some extent caused by innovations upon the ancient customs of the country, became so obvious at Osaka that Rear Admiral H. H. Bell, who had attended the opening of the port with some of the vessels of the Asiatic Squadron, decided to remain there a while in case the protection of his ships might be needed by American merchants.¹⁰ Unfortunately, Admiral Bell was

⁷ Ibid., p. 59.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 61, 62, Enclosure F.

⁹ For a more detailed account, see Asiatic Squadron Letters, MS., 1867-1868, p. 301.

¹⁰ 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 10, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868.

drowned on January 11, when his barge was swamped; and the command of the squadron devolved upon Commodore John R. Goldsborough.¹¹

The harmony which prevailed at the opening of the ports proved short. Hostile acts, directed against foreigners, became common. On January 27 a small war broke out at Osaka between the forces of the Tycoon, who favored the extension of commercial intercourse, and those who wished to prohibit it entirely in spite of the treaties. The Tycoon was defeated, and on the night of January 31 sought shelter on board the U. S. S. *Iroquois*.¹² Next morning he was transferred to one of his own war junks. That day, February 1, the foreign ministers were compelled to leave Osaka and were taken to Hiogo by the *Iroquois*.

On February 4, a detachment of Japanese soldiers suddenly attacked foreign residents in the streets of Hiogo and a member of the crew of the U. S. S. *Oneida* was wounded by a musket ball. In consequence, a joint landing was carried out by the naval forces of the treaty powers which were at hand, and measures were taken by force for the protection of the foreign settlement. The American force remained ashore at Hiogo until February 8, when an envoy from the Mikado arrived at the United States legation with news of a change of government and gave assurance that foreigners in Japan would be protected.

On the same day that this party was withdrawn, a small force was landed from the U. S. S. *Shenandoah* at Nagasaki, where demonstrations against foreigners were occurring.¹³ Nearly a month later, on April 3, it became necessary to send a detachment of twenty-five men into Yokohama, and on April 17 this force was increased by the despatch of a detail of marines. The entire guard was reembarked on May 12.¹⁴

Twice more during the year 1868 American forces were landed in Japan for the protection of American interests.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. xi.

¹³ Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1868, I, 680.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 707-722.

On July 13, an officer and twenty men were sent into Yokohama to guard the United States legation,¹⁵ and on September 25 the marine guard of the U. S. S. *Piscataqua* was stationed ashore at Neegata for a few days when the lives of some Americans were threatened by rioting.¹⁶

SECTION 34.—MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, FEBRUARY, 1868

On February 7, 1868, acting in harmony with the commanders of other squadrons and at the request of Governor Flores, Rear Admiral C. H. Davis landed a force of fifty seamen and marines at Montevideo, Uruguay, for the protection of foreign residents and the custom house during a political disturbance. This force was withdrawn next day.¹⁷ Soon afterward, Governor Flores was assassinated, and on February 19, a similar force was sent ashore to prevent the subsequent rioting from causing injury to foreign residents. No collisions occurred between the Americans and the people of Montevideo, and after quiet was restored, the detachment reembarked on February 26.

SECTION 35.—ASPINWALL, APRIL 7, 1868

On April 7, 1868, while the police of Aspinwall and the Colombian troops usually stationed there were absent at Chiriqui, where they had been sent in consequence of the death of the president of the republic, the streets of the town became "filled with excited and lawless individuals."¹⁸ Anticipating a riot, the agents of one of the steamship companies which used the port as a terminal applied to the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Penobscot* to protect passengers and treasure in transit. A force composed of two officers and twelve seamen, under Acting Master Thomas Nelson, was landed in compliance with this request. No serious trouble developed, and when the need for protection had passed, the detachment was reembarked.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 780.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 824.

¹⁷ 40th Cong., 3d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. xiv, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. xiii, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868.

SECTION 36.—AFFAIR OF THE PIRATE *FORWARD*, RIO TECAPAN, MEXICO, JUNE 17, 1870

On May 27, 1870, the steamer *Forward*, carrying the flag of the Republic of San Salvador, landed between one hundred and two hundred men at Guyamas, Mexico, assailed and looted the custom house, forced foreign merchants to contribute heavily in money and goods, compelled the United States consul under protest to supply bunker coal, kidnapped a civil officer of the Mexican government as a hostage, and sailed away. The officers of the vessel claimed to be acting under the orders of Placido Vega, a revolutionary leader. Her contributions were exacted from German, English, Spanish and American merchants.¹⁹

When the affair at Guyamas was reported to him, Commander W. W. Low, lying in the U. S. S. *Mohican* at Mazatlan, felt satisfied that the steamer was acting as a vessel of war without any commission to do so. He regarded her as a pirate and resolved to capture or destroy her. Leaving Mazatlan in search of the *Forward* on June 6, he learned, a few days later at Boca Tecapan, a small town half way between San Blas and Mazatlan, that she had taken refuge in the Rio Tecapan. At daylight on June 17, Commander Low sent Lieutenant W. H. Brownson with six armed boats from the *Mohican* to attempt to bring her out.²⁰

Lieutenant Brownson and his party found the *Forward* forty miles up the river, and recognized her as a former British gunboat. Most of the crew had left her after running her aground in the narrow channel, and they had planted her four small guns in a battery on the shore. Brownson and his party boarded the pirate vessel about 8 P. M. on June 17, capturing six men they found on board.²¹ Seeing a small

¹⁹ 41st Cong., 3d. sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, p. 144, Commander W. W. Low to the Hon. G. M. Robeson. See also, North Pacific Squadron Letters, MS., 1869-1870, Nos. 87-90; and United States Army and Navy Journal, VII, 791.

²⁰ 41st Cong., 3d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, p. 145.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146, Report of Lieut. Brownson to Commander Low.

boat pulling away from under her bows, Brownson sent a cutter to overtake it. When the cutter opened fire on the boat, the battery on shore, near which was gathered a group of about one hundred and seventy men, replied with grape and canister. After an engagement lasting forty minutes, during which his men had made strenuous efforts to get the *Forward* afloat, Lieutenant Brownson saw that it was impossible to move her. He set her well on fire, using turpentine liberally, and ordered his men to leave her and pull back for the *Mohican*. The party reached the ship at 2 P. M. the next day, and reported two men killed and six wounded.²²

It was afterwards learned that two British cruisers were searching for the *Forward*, with orders to capture or destroy her, at the time when she was burned by the party from the *Mohican*.²³

SECTION 37.—LOW-RODGERS EXPEDITION TO KOREA, 1871

Trespassing in the interests of trade upon what was then known as the Hermit Nation, in the summer of 1866 the American schooner *General Sherman* ascended the Ping Yang in Korea. During September of that year her officers and crew, twenty-seven persons altogether, were set upon while ashore by an excited crowd of Koreans and killed. The ship was burned. Although the government of the country was definitely hostile to foreigners, in this incident the natives acted without encouragement from the mandarins.²⁴ The details of the fate of the *General Sherman* and her people were not known until many years later, but in the autumn of 1866 a rumor that she had been wrecked and her crew murdered or taken prisoner reached Rear Admiral H. H. Bell, commanding the Asiatic Squadron. Bell ordered Com-

²² Ibid., p. 147, Report of Lieut. Brownson to Commander Low.

²³ Ibid., p. 149, Rear Admiral Turner to the Hon. George M. Robeson. See also *ibid.*, pp. 142-144, Commodore W. R. Taylor to Rear Admiral Thomas Turner.

²⁴ 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pp. 45, 46, Report of H. H. Bell, Rear Admiral commanding the U. S. Asiatic Squadron, to the Hon. Gideon Welles, Hong Kong, February 16, 1867. See also enclosures A, B, C, and D.

mander R. W. Shufeldt in the *Wachusett* to investigate the report and, if it proved to be true, to demand of the Korean authorities that any survivors, whatever their nationality, should be delivered on the deck of the *Wachusett*.²⁵

Since his pilot believed it unsafe to take the frigate into the Ping Yang at that season, Commander Shufeldt anchored near the mouth of the Tai Tong River, fifty miles to the southward, on January 23, 1867.²⁶ After persuading a native of his peaceful intentions, Commander Shufeldt sent by him a message to the king of Korea explaining the object of his visit. He received no reply, but a week after he had anchored an officer came on board who claimed to be from the capital. From him, the American commander learned only that he was expected to leave Korean waters as soon as possible. Finding himself unable to establish satisfactory communications with any of the authorities of the country, Shufeldt returned to Hong Kong. In his report to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Bell declared, "until the government takes efficient action on this case, our countrymen lawfully navigating the seas adjacent to Korea will be in peril of life and liberty of person from the barbarities of the people and authorities of that country, who aim at the exclusion of strangers."²⁷

Four years later, in the winter of 1870-1871, it became rumored among the vessels of the Asiatic Station that the United States government had decided upon an investigation of the affair of the *General Sherman* and had instructed Frederick F. Low, the United States Minister to China, to discover the truth and to arrange and conclude, if possible, a convention with the Koreans for the protection of seamen or whalers who, by shipwreck or stress of weather, might be forced to take refuge on their coast.²⁸

²⁵ 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 6, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1867.

²⁶ Both of these rivers flow into the sea on the west coast of Korea.

²⁷ 40th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 7.

²⁸ Winfield Scott Schley, *Forty-five Years Under the Flag* (New York, 1904), p. 76. Schley was serving in the *Benecia* at the time, and

With the consent of the Chinese authorities,²⁹ Mr. Low sailed with Rear Admiral John Rodgers from Nagasaki on May 16, 1871; and the flagship *Colorado*, accompanied by the ships *Alaska*, *Benecia*, *Monocacy* and *Palos*, anchored in the Salee River off the Isle de Boiseé on May 30.³⁰ Admiral Rodgers had been instructed by the Navy Department "to transport and convoy the diplomatic representative of our Government, to exhibit, in his behalf, such force as was proper to illustrate his dignity in the eyes of the people, who respect only the exhibition of power, or as might be necessary to ensure the safety of the expedition and vindicate, if need be, the honor of the flag."³¹

Soon after the *Colorado* had anchored, a junk brought on board some Korean messengers who announced that three envoys had been appointed to confer with the Americans,³² and on the next afternoon these arrived. They were assured that the mission of the fleet was peaceful and that only to resent attack would it resort to force. Permission was asked to make surveys along their coast and, while awaiting more competent envoys, to take soundings farther up the Saleé River. The Koreans made no objection, and they were then asked to see to it that their people were notified of the friendly intention of the squadron, so that the ships' boats ascending the river might not be molested while surveying. They were told that no surveying parties would be sent out for twenty-four hours so that they might have ample time to pass the word along the river. To this, also, the envoys did not dissent.³³ On June 1, the small steamers *Monocacy* and *Palos*,

his memoirs contain a full account of the expedition to Korea, together with a chart of the operations (p. 88), and two interesting photographs taken in the captured Korean forts.

²⁹ 42d Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, p. 12, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1871.

³⁰ Seaton Schroeder, *A Half Century of Naval Service* (New York, 1922), pp. 47, 48.

³¹ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1871, p. 12.

³² 42d Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, p. 275, Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers, June 3, 1871.

³³ W. E. Griffis, *Corea, the Hermit Nation*, declares that they did not understand. In this book, chapters 44, 45, 46 and 48, Griffis makes out an unusually bad case for the Low-Rodgers expedition and the events which resulted from it.

with four steam launches, all under the orders of Commander H. C. Blake, were sent up the river to take soundings.³⁴

As the small vessels approached a sharp bend in the river just above its mouth, they were suddenly fired upon by a line of forts mounting 32-pounders and many small pieces lashed together in rows of five or six. The signal for the fusillade was apparently given by a single shot from a pistol fired near a standard bearing the device of the commanding general.³⁵ No warning that the Koreans objected to the approach of the boats was given. The fire was unexpected, but the *Palos* and *Monocacy* promptly returned it with their guns, and soon drove the Koreans out of their works. In doing so they steamed up close in order to draw the fire of the forts away from the small ships' launches, and a strong flood tide caught them and rushed them, almost unmanageable, around the bend in the river, past the batteries, where they anchored and continued shelling. When the forts were silenced they steamed out and, after collecting the launches, returned to the squadron. The fire from the batteries, while furious during the fifteen minutes for which they maintained it, was wild, and the only American casualties were two men wounded.³⁶

The firing had been heard in the fleet, and when Admiral Rodgers learned of the nature of the affair he decided to send in a landing force on the next morning and to destroy the forts. The dangerous experience of the *Monocacy* and *Palos* when they were whirled past the bend in the river, however, caused the expedition to be postponed until neap tides should make the currents in the river less violent. Meanwhile, no apology was offered, no envoy sent by the Koreans. "Indeed, in correspondence which passed between the minister and the prefect of the district lying hereabout, the ambushed attempt to cut off and destroy our whole surveying party was assumed by the Korean official to be entirely in accordance with the

³⁴ Report of Admiral Rodgers, cited above, p. 276.

³⁵ 42 Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, p. 277, Report of Commander H. C. Blake to Rear Admiral John Rodgers, June 2, 1871.

³⁶ Report of Admiral Rodgers, p. 277.

proprieties of intercourse between civilized people, their own civilization being, as was somewhat proudly stated, four thousand years old.”³⁷ Mr. Low demanded an apology, and when none was forthcoming, on June 10, at 10 A. M., the punitive expedition started. The *Palos* and *Monocacy*, with four steam launches and twenty-two boats carrying a landing force of six hundred and fifty-one officers and men,³⁸ and seven howitzers, were under the orders of Commander Blake and Commander L. A. Kimberly. When within range of the forts, which were found to be on Kang Hoa island, the *Monocacy* shelled the garrison from their guns after a short engagement, and the *Palos*, towing the twenty-two boats, cast them off close to the beach. They pulled in rapidly and landed, and the natives abandoned their first works. The first fort was occupied about noon, and most of the guns smaller than 32-pounders were thrown into the river. The large cannon were spiked, and a few 18-pounders and small bronze guns with a curious breech-loading device were spared as trophies. The landing force went into camp for the night. A midnight attack by the Koreans was driven off, and on the morning of June 11, the fort was completely destroyed. When the force advanced to the next fort, which had been heavily shelled by the *Monocacy*, it was found deserted. After destroying the guns, the Americans moved on. About noon, following a march through rough country, the main citadel of the Koreans, on a conical hill about one hundred and fifty feet high, was stormed by a force under Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee. The garrison resisted stoutly and, after the fort was taken with the cutlass and bayonet, not a single Korean survived. When the natives saw that their citadel had fallen they abandoned their two remaining forts and fled into the hills, pursued by shells from the *Monocacy* and the howitzers. The American losses were Lieutenant McKee and two seamen killed, and ten men wounded. The number of Koreans

³⁷ 42 Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, p. 280, Report of Rear Admiral John Rodgers to the Hon. George M. Robeson, July 5, 1871.

³⁸ Of whom one hundred and five were marines.

killed is not known, although two hundred and forty-three dead were counted in the forts.³⁹ Twenty prisoners were taken, treated if wounded, and released.⁴⁰

In his orders to Commander Blake, Admiral Rodgers, mindful of the primary aim of the expedition, had instructed him to take advantage of any overtures toward peace, and if none were made, to take and destroy the forts which had fired on the surveying party, holding them "long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offenses at our pleasure."⁴¹ When Commander Blake notified him that the forts were taken and could be held by the American force, Rodgers decided not to do so "in as much as our purpose was not to enter upon extended operations." Blake was ordered to withdraw his force, and on June 12 the landing party was reëmbarked without hindrance.⁴²

Finding that it was now impossible to conclude a peaceful treaty, and with no authority to continue hostilities unless again attacked, Admiral Rodgers left the anchorage of Boiséé on July 3, and reached Cheefoo, China, two days later. In his annual report for the year 1871, Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson stated his belief that, although the Low-Rodgers expedition to Korea had failed in its main object, it would "contribute materially in its effects to the consideration and comfort and perhaps to the safety of our citizens located there."⁴³ Admiral Rodgers' course in punishing the Koreans for firing upon his boats was approved by the Department.

³⁹ 42 Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, pp. 281-283.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 284, 285.

⁴² For a more detailed account of the operations, see *ibid.*, p. 285, Blake to Rodgers; p. 288, Commander E. P. McCrea's report; p. 290, Commander L. A. Kimberly's report; p. 294, Commander W. S. Schley's report. Also the General Order of June 5, 1871, *ibid.*, pp. 308-310.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 13. Actually, the Koreans seem to have considered the affair a defeat for the Americans because, as they looked upon it, the latter retired. Their reports to the Chinese took this tone, and the expedition was generally regretted by foreign representatives and naval officers in China because the prestige of all the Western powers suffered by the oriental view.

SECTION 38.—PANAMA, MAY 7, 1873

In 1873, upon two occasions, it became necessary, in the opinion of the senior naval officer at the scene of the disturbance, to land a force from our war vessels for the protection of American citizens and their property. Both landings were at Panama and they were made "at the request or with the permission of the authorities, or under an admission, on their part, of their inability to promise the security and protection due from them."⁴⁴

When Rear Admiral Charles Steedman, in the U. S. S. *Pensacola*, anchored at Panama on May 7, 1873,⁴⁵ he found hostilities in progress between opposing political factions attempting to get control of the government of the state of Panama.⁴⁶ On the evening before his arrival, Commander G. C. Belknap, of the U. S. S. *Tuscarora*, then at Panama, had agreed to the request of the United States consul, Mr. Owen M. Long, and several other American and foreign residents, that when they should make a signal from the shore he would land a force to protect them and their property. The signal agreed upon was made at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of Admiral Steedman's arrival, and immediately a force of one hundred men with two field guns,⁴⁷ which had been organized by Commander Belknap on board the *Tuscarora*,⁴⁸ landed and occupied the station of the Panama Railroad. The officer in command of the landing party, Lieutenant T. B. M. Mason, U. S. N., was ordered to confine his activities strictly to the protection of the station and property of the railroad, and not to enter the town.⁴⁹

At six o'clock, soon after this force had taken up its position, Mr. Long requested that one hundred and fifty

⁴⁴ 43d Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, p. 8, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1873.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 260, Report of Rear Admiral Charles Steedman to the Hon. Geo. M. Robeson, May 13, 1873.

⁴⁶ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1873, p. 8.

⁴⁷ Report of Rear Admiral Steedman, cited above, p. 260.

⁴⁸ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1873, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Report of Rear Admiral Steedman, p. 260.

marines be sent into the town of Panama for the safeguarding of himself and others during the night. Admiral Steedman did not feel justified in landing such a force after dark and marching it through the streets of a disturbed and possibly hostile city, and also considered that he had "no right to land men on the soil of a friendly power without the consent of the authorities."⁵⁰

Next morning a deputation of influential foreign residents, bearing a letter from Mr. Long, visited Admiral Steedman and asked that a force of one hundred men be placed in the town for their protection, stating that the leaders of both the contending parties in Panama had agreed that this should be done.⁵¹ Thereupon Admiral Steedman landed another body of one hundred seamen and marines with two more pieces of artillery, and ordered this force to take up a position in the town so that it could offer protection to foreign residents. Sharp fighting took place in the streets of Panama soon afterwards, during which more than fifty men of the opposing factions were killed and an equal number was wounded. The American forces, however, did not come into collision with either Panamanian party. Without incident, the force stationed in the town was withdrawn on May 11, after tranquillity had been restored; and the garrison of the railroad station reëmbarked on the *Tuscarora* on May 22.⁵²

SECTION 39.—PANAMA, SEPTEMBER 24, 1873

Although quiescent after May, 1873, the revolutionary movement in Panama continued, and on September 24 another violent outbreak seemed imminent.⁵³ The Governor of Panama notified the United States consul that under the conditions then existing he was unable to afford the Panama

⁵⁰ Ibid., Enclosure A, p. 261.

⁵¹ Ibid., Enclosure C, p. 262.

⁵² Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1873, p. 8. See also 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, pp. 102, 103.

⁵³ 43d Cong., 1 sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, p. 263, Report of Rear Admiral John J. Almy to the Hon. George M. Robeson, Oct. 6, 1873. Rear Admiral Almy relieved Rear Admiral Steedman at Panama on Sept. 22.

Railroad that protection and safeguard guaranteed by the treaty of 1846. In consideration of this admission Admiral John J. Almy, who had recently succeeded Admiral Steedman, landed from the U. S. S. *Benecia* and *Pensacola*, on the afternoon of September 24, a force of one hundred and thirty men with howitzers and ordered them to occupy the Panama Railroad station for its protection, and to be prepared to furnish armed parties on trains to and from Aspinwall "to guard the passengers and specie which were daily being transported over the road."⁵⁴

During the night the anticipated revolution became a violent fact, and the American force ashore was soon increased to one hundred and ninety men, some being stationed in the United States consulate and others scattered among the houses of American residents. On October 6, hostilities ceased, "the outside or besieging party, under General Correoso . . . being deficient in ammunition,"⁵⁵ and two days later the American force was withdrawn except for a detail of thirty men who were left to guard the railroad station for a few days longer.

The landing of American forces at Panama during the two emergencies of May and September, 1873, besides quieting the fears of foreign merchants and residents of the town, secured the safe transit of the Isthmus for the passengers, freight and specie carried by four steamship lines, two of them not American, depending on the Panama Railroad for prompt connection.⁵⁶

SECTION 40.—HONOLULU, HAWAII, FEBRUARY 13, 1874

On February 13, 1874, Commander George E. Belknap, in the U. S. S. *Tuscarora*, which was engaged in running a line

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 264. The general is also referred to in the various reports and dispatches as Cerreoso and Cornoso.

⁵⁶ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1873, p. 8. For a detailed account of the landings and the incidents leading to them, see 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, pp. 44-51, 97-103, especially the two reports of Rear-Admiral John J. Almy to Secretary of the Navy, October 6, 1873.

of deep sea soundings as preparation for the laying of a submarine cable between the United States and Japan, while at anchor in Honolulu harbor with the U. S. S. *Portsmouth*, Commander Skerrett, at the earnest solicitation of the Hawaiian government, landed a force of one hundred and fifty officers and men and a Gatling gun.⁵⁷

The occasion was the election of a new king of the Sandwich Islands on February 12, when "riotous proceedings occurred,"⁵⁸ because of a dispute over the election between Prince David Kalakaua and Dowager Queen Emma, widow of the late King Lunalilo.⁵⁹ At the pressing request of the Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs, W. L. Green, made to him through the United States minister resident, Henry A. Pierce,⁶⁰ Commander Belknap landed his force "to aid in restoring order, and to be in readiness to protect the interests of our own citizens should they be jeopardized."⁶¹

The landing was accomplished without unfortunate incident, and it was necessary for the Americans only to approach the square before the courthouse, where the chief disturbance was taking place, for the rioters to withdraw. The courthouse was occupied and sentries posted at other public buildings. The inauguration of King David proceeded without further disorder, and on February 16 a part of the American force was withdrawn, the remainder reembarking on February 20, after the government had signified that their presence was no longer needed.⁶² Resolutions of thanks for their efforts were later tendered to the officers and men of the American vessels by the Hawaiian government, the legislative

⁵⁷ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1874, p. 8.

⁵⁸ See Albert P. Taylor, "The American Navy in Hawaii," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. LIII, No. 249 (August, 1927), pp. 907-924, especially pp. 919, 920.

⁵⁹ 43d Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, pp. 181-185, Report of Commander George E. Belknap to the Hon. George M. Robeson, Feb. 21, 1874. The vote was 39 in favor of Prince David and 6 for Dowager Queen Emma. This report contains an interesting description of the election and the subsequent rioting.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 181.

⁶¹ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1874, p. 8.

⁶² Ibid. See also Commander Belknap's report, p. 184.

assembly, and the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu;⁶³ and when King Lunalilo was buried on February 28, three hundred men from the United States ships *Tuscarora*, *Benevia* and *Portsmouth* landed and marched in the funeral cortege.⁶⁴

Dowager Queen Emma was born Emma Booker, an English girl, and married into the Hawaiian royal family in 1856.⁶⁵ Her adherents were so strong that King David admittedly owed his accession to the throne to the American show of force.⁶⁶

SECTION 41.—TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF MATAMOROS,
MEXICO, MAY 18, 1876

General Gonzalez, a revolutionary chief, informed the American consul at Matamoros, Mexico, on May 18, 1876, that because of the approach of a column of National troops under General Escolido he was about to abandon the town.⁶⁷ Since no civil authority existed there, the consul requested Commander Johnson, of the U. S. S. *Lackawanna*, to land a small force to police Matamoros and protect foreign interests until the arrival of the troops under General Escolido and the restoration of civil control. "This proceeding seems to have been so obviously necessary and proper under the circumstances," wrote Secretary of State Fish to the Mexican minister at Washington on May 19, "that it is hoped the Mexican Government will not disapprove the act, especially as the force will be withdrawn as soon as the authority of that government shall be restored."

⁶³ 43d Cong., 2nd sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, p. 197, pp. 185, 186.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 181, Report of Captain W. E. Hopkins to Rear Admiral A. M. Pennock, March 5, 1874.

⁶⁵ Memoires of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford (London, 1914), p. 57.

⁶⁶ Taylor, op. cit. p. 920.

⁶⁷ Notes to the Mexican Legation, VIII, 55, as quoted in Department of State, Division of Information, Series M., No. 14, p. 61.

* SECTION 42.—ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT, JULY 14, 1882

When friction between the British and the Egyptians under Arabi Pasha became serious, in the early summer of 1882, Rear Admiral J. W. A. Nicholson, commanding the European Station, ordered the U. S. S. *Galena* to Alexandria and proceeded there from Lisbon with his flagship, U. S. S. *Lancaster*.⁶⁸ Admiral Nicholson reached Alexandria on June 27, and found the *Galena* awaiting him.⁶⁹

The British began the bombardment of Alexandria early on July 11,⁷⁰ and before night three great fires were sweeping the foreign quarter of the city, while under cover of the catastrophe mobs began to pillage and destroy. "Arabi, before leaving with his troops, had opened the prisons, and the convicts, joined by the lower class of the town and by some of the Bedouins . . . proceeded to sack the city and kill every Christian they could find. A hundred Europeans, many of them wounded, who had, when the riots broke out, gathered in the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, resisted desperately the attacks made upon it. Scores of wretched fugitives were cut down or beaten to death. . . . Nothing European escaped the rage of the fanatics."⁷¹

On July 13 more than eleven hundred men were landed from British ships of war at Alexandria to take possession of the silenced forts and to drive out the Arabs who were still looting and firing the city.⁷² Next day, July 14, a detachment of six officers, seventy marines and fifty seamen from the *Lancaster* was ordered by Admiral Nicholson to land in the city to give protection to American interests and prop-

⁶⁸ 47th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, vol. I, p. 14, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1882. See also European Squadron Letters, MS., 1882, p. 59.

⁶⁹ 47th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, vol. I, p. 42. See also 47th Cong., 1st sess., H. Misc. Doc. No. 46, pp. 2, 3.

⁷⁰ Ensign Charles G. Rogers, U. S. N., "The Bombardment of Alexandria," in Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, vol. VIII, Whole No. 22, p. 528. (From material supplied by the U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence).

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 535.

⁷² Ibid., p. 536.

erty there. A part of this force was stationed in the United States consulate to prevent it from being burned,⁷³ while the remainder assisted the British and a small detachment from a German warship, which had been landed to protect the German hospital, in checking and extinguishing the fires. During the day nine or ten incendiaries were shot while in the act of setting fires.⁷⁴ By nightfall, order had been to some extent restored; and most of the American force was recalled to the *Lancaster* at noon on July 15. The rest reembarked on July 18. Admiral Nicholson remained at Alexandria until July 20,⁷⁵ by which date the British had the city completely under control. His initiative in landing an American force during the confusion and rioting which followed the bombardment was approved by the Navy Department.⁷⁶

SECTION 43.—PANAMA, JANUARY 18, 1885

On January 18, 1885, Commander Lewis Clark, of the U. S. S. *Alliance*, lying at Colon, Panama, telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy that a revolution was in progress there and that the President of Panama had announced his inability to protect the property of the Panama Railroad Company.⁷⁷ The general superintendent of the railroad, on the same day, applied to the United States consul at Colon, Mr. R. L. Wright, Jr., for an armed force to guard the specie, treasure, and merchandise in transit over the road. Mr. Wright requested Commander Clark to land such a force, and at 5.30 P. M. the *Alliance* was warped alongside Pier No. 1, and twelve marines under the command of the marine officer of the ship were landed and marched to the freight office of the railroad, where they were stationed to guard the safes

⁷³ Ibid., p. 537. Commander A. A. Batcheller had taken aboard the *Galena* about two hundred and fifty Americans before the bombardment. Only five remained in Alexandria.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 538. See Beresford, 191, 195. Beresford was British provost marshal.

⁷⁵ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1882, p. 42.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

⁷⁷ 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, p. 53. Commander Clark to Mr. Chandler. See also *ibid.*, p. 55.

and vaults of the company. After the marines had been sent ashore, the Gatling guns and 3-inch field pieces of the Alliance were wheeled onto the wharf abreast of the ship's gangway, a sentry posted by them, and the whole force of the ship was prepared to disembark at a moment's notice.⁷⁸ At six o'clock the next morning the marines returned aboard ship.⁷⁹

SECTION 44.—PANAMA, MARCH 30-APRIL 10, 1885

Early in the spring of 1885 a serious revolution, threatening the maintenance of the interoceanic traffic, occurred on the Isthmus of Panama. In order to keep open the transit and to maintain existing treaty obligations, a considerable force of seamen and marines under Commander Bowman H. McCalla was sent to Aspinwall (Colon) to act under the orders of Acting Rear Admiral James E. Jouett, commanding the United States Atlantic Squadron.⁸⁰ Admiral Jouett, with the vessels of his command, had been ordered by a telegram from the Navy Department to proceed to Aspinwall.⁸¹

On March 16, 1885, an insurgent demonstration against the Colombian government under the leadership of Aizpuru achieved the occupation of the city of Panama by the insurgents. This resulted in the virtual blocking of the Panama Railroad. Colombian troops, hastily sent from Aspinwall, soon drove the insurgents out of Panama, but while they were engaged in doing so, another insurrection, led by a man named Prestan, arose in the town they had left unguarded behind them. The national troops returned and defeated the force under Prestan outside of Aspinwall on April 1. During this engagement the insurgents set fire to the town and a great part of it was destroyed. Meanwhile Aizpuru had suc-

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 53, 54, Mr. Wright to Mr. Hunter, January 20, 1885.

⁷⁹ For an account of the nature of the revolutionary disturbance at Panama, see *ibid.*, pp. 55-58, Mr. Adamson to Mr. Hunter.

⁸⁰ 49th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, p. iii, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885.

⁸¹ Ibid., *Movements of Vessels*, pp. 17, 18.

ceeded in reoccupying Panama City and most of the isthmus along the line of the railway, effectually blocking traffic.⁸²

At Aspinwall on March 30, insurgents under Prestan seized the S. S. *Colon* of the Pacific Mail Line. A small force from the U. S. S. *Galena*, then lying in the harbor of Aspinwall, boarded the *Colon* and restored her to her owners the same day. During the subsequent burning of Aspinwall, a "fire and rescue party" from the *Galena* landed and attempted to check the spread of the flames but were unable to save much of the town.⁸³

"Under these circumstances it became evident that the occasion had arisen for the enforcement of the rights secured to the United States by the following clause of our treaty of 1846 with New Granada (United States of Colombia):⁸⁴

And, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists.⁸⁵

Rear Admiral Jouett reached Aspinwall with the *Tennessee*, on April 10.⁸⁶ In addition to the small force sent ashore from the *Galena* on March 31 and April 1, Jouett found on his arrival that a landing party had been sent ashore at Panama by the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Shenandoah*, lying at that port.⁸⁷

⁸² Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885, p. xv. The insurgent leader's name is variously reported as Aizpuru, Azipuru, and Aizpurn.

⁸³ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885; *Movements of Vessels*, p. 18.

⁸⁴ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885.

⁸⁵ Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation & Commerce, 1846, Art. XXXV (Malloy, I, 312).

⁸⁶ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885, p. xv. Rear Admiral Jouett's force included the *Tennessee*, *Swatara*, *Alliance* and *Galena*. The ships had been acting singly and were collected by telegraph, the *Galena* being already at Aspinwall. See *Movements of Vessels*, pp. 17 and 18.

⁸⁷ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1885, p. xv.

The Navy Department, in addition to the ships sent to Aspinwall by telegraphic orders, also dispatched from New York an expeditionary force made up of about seven hundred and fifty seamen and marines especially equipped for operating ashore. This force, which was under the orders of Commander McCalla, included three Gatling guns, and three 3-inch rifled landing guns. It arrived at Aspinwall in two sections, on April 11 and 15.⁸⁸

On April 10, the day of his arrival, Admiral Jouett sent ashore a force collected from his squadron to attempt to open the transit of the isthmus and to occupy Aspinwall and Matachin. As soon as the first section of the expeditionary force arrived, it was ordered to proceed across the isthmus to Panama City. Two armored cars were improvised and fitted with howitzers, Gatlings, and quick-firing cannon, and sent out to patrol the railroad line.

By the night of April 11, all these arrangements were completed, and on the following day regularly scheduled trains began to run over the road.

When it arrived at Aspinwall on April 15, the second section of the expeditionary force was ordered to relieve the seamen from the squadron who had been holding the town, and Commander McCalla, in accordance with orders from the Navy Department and Admiral Jouett, assumed command of all United States forces ashore. He immediately transferred his headquarters from Aspinwall to Panama City, taking with him two more companies of marines.

Panama City, at that time, was occupied by Aizpuru and his forces, busily engaged in throwing up barricades and entanglements behind which to resist the national troops then advancing on the city. Knowing that many of Aizpuru's men had taken part in the burning of Aspinwall, and fearing that a battle in Panama City might lead to a similar catastrophe, Commander McCalla, on April 24, ordered up the garrison from Aspinwall and the reserve battalion of marines from the squadron and occupied most of Panama

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. xvi.

City. Next day he caused the arrest of Aizpuru and his aides and held them until they signed an agreement that fighting should not take place nor barricades be erected within the limits of the city. When this document had been signed, on the evening of April 25, Commander McCalla withdrew the American forces to the railroad station outside the city, a position which commanded the approaches to Panama.⁸⁹

On April 28, national troops from Buenaventura arrived before Panama under Colonels Montoya and Reyes. Before an engagement could take place, a conference was arranged on April 29 between these officers, Aizpuru, and Admiral Jouett, after which Aizpuru and his forces capitulated.⁹⁰

With the reestablishment of the national authority of Colombia, evacuation of the American forces began. Most of the expeditionary force had reached New York again on May 16; and on May 25 the last of the United States marines left the isthmus.⁹¹

"The action of the Department," wrote Secretary of the Navy William C. Whitney in his report of November 30, 1885, "was carefully confined to measures only as were necessary [sic] to enforce treaty stipulations, every precaution being taken to respect the autonomy of Colombia; and our interference ceased the moment the object had been accomplished and the freedom of transit had been securely reestablished."⁹²

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. xvi. On April 24, an additional force was landed at Panama from the U. S. S. *Iriquois*, which had just anchored off that port.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. xvii.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. xvii. The report of the Surgeon General of the Navy for 1885 (49th Cong., 1st sess., House Ex. Doc. No. 1, Part 3, vol. II, p. viii), dealing with the affair at Panama is interesting. During the occupation there were 105 cases of malarial fever, with 2 deaths; 7 cases of yellow fever, with 2 deaths; and 6 cases of gunshot wounds, with 2 deaths.

⁹² Ibid., p. xvii. For detailed information on the expedition see 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, pp. 59-69, 103-149, especially the report of Commander McCalla upon the naval expedition to the Isthmus of Panama, April, 1885.

SECTION 45.—KOREA, JUNE, 1888

Because of unsettled political conditions in Korea, a part of the Asiatic Squadron, under Rear Admiral Ralph Chandler, was kept constantly in Korean waters during the year 1888. In June, at the request of the United States minister to Korea, who anticipated an outbreak of the populace at Seoul, an armed detachment of twenty-five seamen and marines under the command of Lieutenant C. D. Galloway was landed from the U. S. S. *Essex* at Chemulpo, and marched twenty-five miles to the capital to protect American residents. A few days later, when the city became quiet once more, the force returned to the *Essex*.⁹³

SECTION 46.—NAVASSA ISLAND, HAITI, APRIL, 1891

In April, 1891, the U. S. S. *Kearsarge*, Captain Horace Elmer, was ordered by the Navy Department to proceed to Navassa Island, a small island lying to the southwest of Haiti, and to inquire as to the situation there.⁹⁴ The *Kearsarge* reached the island on April 29, and Captain Elmer found that negro laborers employed there in considerable numbers had gotten out of control. A detachment of marines was landed under command of Lieutenant George T. Bates, U. S. M. C., to protect American lives and property. The marines remained on the island about three weeks,⁹⁵ and were withdrawn when most of the negroes had returned to work.

⁹³ 50th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, pp. xx and xxi, Report of the Secretary, of the Navy, 1888. For a more detailed account, see the MS. log of the *Essex*, in the files of the Bureau of Navigation, Washington, D. C.

⁹⁴ 52 Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, p. 151, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1891, Appendix "Movements of vessels."

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 617, Report of the commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 1891.

SECTION 47.—VALPARAISO, CHILE, AUGUST 28-30, 1891

In the midst of the civil war in Chile, between the supporters of President Balmaceda and the liberal faction known as the Congressional party, when the Congressionalists had captured Valparaiso and the city was in a turmoil, an armed force from the U. S. S. *San Francisco*, Captain W. T. Sampson, and the U. S. S. *Baltimore*, Captain W. S. Schley, was sent ashore there to protect the United States consulate and the women and children who had taken refuge in it.⁹⁶

This force, which was ordered ashore by Rear Admiral George Brown,⁹⁷ commanding the South Pacific Station, was composed of sixty-six seamen and thirty-six marines, under command of Captain W. S. Muse, U. S. M. C. It was landed at Valparaiso on August 28 and was withdrawn aboard the ships on August 30, 1891.⁹⁸

SECTION 48.—HONOLULU, HAWAII, JANUARY 16-APRIL 1, 1893

King David Kalakaua died in January, 1890. Queen Liliuokalani, his sister, who succeeded him, soon gave evidence that she intended to change the policy of the Hawaiian government, and the political situation in the islands became tense. By 1892 the United States minister, Mr. John H. Stevens, was writing to Washington that "the Hawaiian pear" was about ready to pluck. On January 14, 1893, the

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 158, 159, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1891, Appendix A, Detailed Movements of Vessels.

⁹⁷ For the Navy Department's orders to Rear Admiral Brown before he sailed to take command of the South Pacific Station, see *ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 618, Report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1891. For accounts of the three incidents which did most to cause Chilean hostility toward Americans and which culminated on October 16, 1891, in unprovoked assaults upon sailors from the U. S. S. *Baltimore* who were visiting Valparaiso (the affair of the *Itata*, the presence of the *Baltimore* when agents of the American Cable Company spliced their cable in the open sea off Valparaiso, and the visit of Rear Admiral Brown to Quinteros Bay on August 20), see 52d Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, pp. 25-30, and 52d Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 91.

Queen prorogued the legislature and announced to her cabinet that she proposed to promulgate a new constitution, restoring some of the royal prerogatives. The ministers hastened to inform some of the prominent American residents, and the latter at once requested Mr. Stevens to ask the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Boston*, station ship at Honolulu, to land a force for the protection of American lives and property.⁹⁹

In compliance with this request a detachment was sent ashore on January 16, and the landing party occupied the Arlington Hotel and its grounds. Next day Queen Liliuokalani was deposed and a provisional government under the presidency of Sanford B. Dole was established. On February 1, Mr. Stevens, at the request of the provisional government, assumed a sort of protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States and unfurled the American flag over the government buildings. At the same time another detachment of marines from the *Boston* was landed under command of Lieutenant H. L. Draper. These were stationed in the square before the Court House, a position from which they could dominate the city of Honolulu.¹⁰⁰

Although the action of Mr. Stevens was disavowed by the United States in so far as it might impair the independent sovereignty of the Hawaiian government, the flag remained unfurled and the marines remained in control of the Hawaiian capital until April 1. On that date, by order of Commissioner Blount, who had been sent out to adjust matters by President Cleveland, the American flag was hauled down and the landing force reembarked.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Taylor, "The American Navy in Hawaii," 923.

¹⁰⁰ 53d Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, pp. 580, 583.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 583. Resolution of the Executive and Advisory Councils of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, passed on April 3, 1893, tendering sincere thanks to Lieutenant Draper and the marine guard of the U. S. S. *Boston* for "efficient, faithful and valuable services rendered to the Provisional Government. . . ." See also, Taylor, 934.

SECTION 49.—DISPLAY OF FORCE AT RIO DE JANEIRO,
JANUARY, 1894

On September 6, 1893, a large part of the Brazilian navy under the command of Admiral Mello revolted and began a civil war with the Brazilian government. The insurgents were joined by the garrisons of some of the harbor defenses at Rio de Janeiro, and the national government was for a time unable to put down the revolt.¹⁰² Admiral Mello left Rio with part of his fleet on December 1, and was succeeded there by Admiral Luiz Ph. da Gama, who published a proclamation announcing his adherence to the revolutionary cause and the restoration of the Empire. Soon after he assumed command at Rio, Admiral da Gama made some attempt to establish a blockade of the port, but his forces were not sufficient to accomplish this effectively, and the commanders of the naval vessels of the foreign powers there refused to recognize the insurgents as possessing the rights of belligerents.

Admiral A. E. K. Benham, commanding the South Atlantic Squadron, was ordered to Rio in the *Detroit* and arrived there soon after Admiral da Gama began to interfere with foreign commerce. In reply to a proclamation which announced that the revolutionary forces would begin to search merchant vessels for contraband, Benham declared that, since they had not the status of belligerents, such actions were beyond their rights and would, if they should seize a ship, amount to piracy. When Admiral da Gama countered by attempting to prevent vessels from going alongside the wharves, Benham declared that he would convoy any American ships whose commanders wished to dock, and would, if necessary, use force to protect them and their cargoes.¹⁰³

On January 29, 1894, the *Detroit* stood in toward the wharves with several American steamers. An insurgent gun-

¹⁰² Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1893, p. 46 ff.

¹⁰³ Foreign Relations, 1894, p. 115.

boat fired at a boat from one of the merchant vessels, and the *Detroit* answered with a shot from a 6-pounder which struck under the insurgent's bows. The gunboat then fired a gun to leeward and another over the merchantman, and Admiral Benham, with the *Detroit* now close aboard, ordered a musket fired at the insurgent which struck her sternport, and with a megaphone notified her commander that if he fired again the *Detroit* would sink the gunboat. The American steamers proceeded alongside the docks without further hindrance, and the *Detroit* withdrew to the anchorage.¹⁰⁴

A sharp exchange of notes followed between Admiral Benham and Admiral da Gama,¹⁰⁵ but foreign vessels were thereafter not molested, and the United States minister at Rio reported to the State Department that all the foreign commanders agreed with Admiral Benham's policy, and that his action had restored commercial operations. The Secretary of State approved Benham's conduct,¹⁰⁶ as did President Cleveland in his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1894. Subsequently, the naval revolt collapsed.

SECTION 50.—SEOUL, KOREA, AND TIENTSIN, CHINA, JULY,
1894-MAY, 1895

During the war between China and Japan, most of the operations of which took place on the Korean peninsula, orders were issued to the admiral commanding the Asiatic squadron to proceed with his flagship, the U. S. S. *Baltimore*, to Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, and to watch developments carefully, affording at the same time a feeling of security to the numerous American missionaries living in the capital.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁰⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 122, Admiral Benham to Admiral da Gama, January 30, 1894; and p. 127, Admiral da Gama to Admiral Benham, same date.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 121. The attitude of the United States toward the insurgents was probably stiffened by reports which reached Washington that they had the sympathy, if not the assistance, of Portugal, and by the presence of several Portuguese warships at Rio.

¹⁰⁷ 54th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 523, Report of Captain G. F. Elliott, U. S. M. C., accompanying the annual report of

The *Baltimore* reached Chemulpo on June 5, 1894,¹⁰⁸ and on July 23 telegrams were received from the United States minister at Seoul urgently requesting an armed guard to protect the legation there, and stating that the Japanese had seized the King of Korea and his palace after a skirmish.

A detail of two officers, a midshipman, a surgeon and a clerk, with twenty-one marines and twenty-nine seamen was prepared to go to Seoul by boat the next day, July 24. Late that afternoon no pilot for the river could be procured. Captain G. F. Elliott, U. S. M. C., believing that the guard was really needed at the legation, volunteered to march there with the marines during the night.¹⁰⁹ Carrying sixty rounds of ammunition each and with rations for three days, the marines left the *Baltimore* at 8 P. M., and assisted by a Japanese guide, reached Seoul early on the morning of July 25.¹¹⁰ The remaining part of the detail, under Ensign Heyward, reached the legation at 2.30 A. M., on July 26, having ascended the river by boat as first planned. The situation of all foreigners in Seoul was critical, and the guard was maintained at the legation until after the war.¹¹¹

On November 29, 1894, the *Baltimore*, at Nagasaki, was ordered to send a force of marines to Tientsin, to be held

the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 1895. See also, 53d Cong., 3d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, part 3, p. 24, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1894.

¹⁰⁸ 54th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 136, Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 1895.

¹⁰⁹ The weather was extremely hot and sultry, and it was not believed that the seamen could stand a march of about twenty-six miles. A march by day would have endangered the lives of the party.

¹¹⁰ Report of Captain Elliott, cited above. "The road was little more than a footpath for pack animals and varied in every degree of wretchedness, over clay hills, a mountain pass, three miles of deep sand, with two good sized streams to ford. The night was extremely dark, hot, and sultry. The distance was added to in order to avoid a Japanese division on the move for Ahsan, where the first land fight of the war took place three days later. This divergence took us through three miles of rice fields without a road, and the entire distance of thirty-one miles was made in eleven hours. As the men had not drilled on shore for a year, they were severely taxed. . . ."

¹¹¹ On September 26, the original force was relieved by Lieutenant Gill, with the marines from the U. S. S. *Concord*.

there at the call of the United States minister in case they should be needed as a legation guard during the rioting which broke out in Peking on the approach of the Japanese army.¹¹² With a detachment of fifty-one marines, Captain Elliott left the *Baltimore* at Chefoo on December 4, and reached the U. S. gunboat *Monocacy*, which was moored alongside a dock at Tientsin, two days later. There they remained, in company with similar German, British, Russian, French, Italian and Spanish forces, until the war ended. Peace was declared on May 10, 1895, and on May 16 the American force was ordered to withdraw.

SECTION 51.—NEWCHWANG, CHINA, NOVEMBER, 1894-APRIL,
1895

What seems by far the most curious operation for the protection of citizens abroad ever carried out by the armed forces of the United States took place in the autumn of 1894, when the inhabitants of Yingtze, the most northern port of China, were treated to the spectacle of a steel warship of moderate size charging upon the muddy banks of the Liao River, coming to rest almost in the main street of their city, and transforming itself by means of mud and matting into a fort.

In October, 1894, the U. S. S. *Petrel*, Commander W. H. Emory, refitting at Nagasaki, Japan, received orders from the Navy Department to proceed to Newchwang, China, for the protection of the foreign residents there.¹¹³ The officers of the *Petrel*, on consulting the Chinese Sea Directory, found that "Newchwang was not Newchwang at all, but was called by the Chinese, Yingtze, and sometimes Yenkow."¹¹⁴ They found also that their destination was "at the head of the Gulf of Petchili and fifteen miles above the mouth of the Liao River, whose navigation was closed from November until

¹¹² Report of Captain Elliott, p. 526. Report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 1895, p. 521.

¹¹³ See Lieutenant N. Sargent, U. S. N., "The *Petrel's* Installation in Mantchuria during the war between China and Japan," in Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, XXI, Whole No. 75 (1895), pp. 523-536.

¹¹⁴ The real Newchwang was about twenty miles inland.

April, and that before and after the solid freezing of the river, great flows of ice some thirty inches in thickness, charged up and down its course with every change of the tide, and with such force as to render it an impossibility for any vessel to remain at anchor off the town."¹¹⁵ It was decided that in order to remain at Newchwang during the winter the whole vessel would have to be taken ashore, where she would be protected from the ice; and before the *Petrel* left Nagasaki orders were telegraphed to begin the cutting of a dock in the side of the river bank. Haste was essential, as the November spring tides at Newchwang happened to occur during the second week of the month, and it was improbable, if the *Petrel* were not installed upon the crest of them, that she could be gotten into the dock there before the close of navigation.

The *Petrel* reached Newchwang, or Yingtze, on November 7, and found her muddy refuge rapidly taking shape under the efforts of some hundreds of Chinese laborers. It was completed by November 12, and on that day the first attempt was made to entice her into it. Not enough water could be gotten on the sill of the improvised dock, and after three unsuccessful trials, with the temperature falling farther and farther below the freezing point each night, it was found necessary to charge in at full speed through several inches of mud. Once over the sill, the *Petrel* was hauled to her resting place for the winter by her steam capstan and several hundred "jabbering coolies on shore."¹¹⁶

Chinese looters were expected at any moment, and were most likely to appear simultaneously with a Japanese attack. In haste the dock was pumped out, a mud enclosure was thrown up around the ship large enough for the protection of all the foreign residents, and the *Petrel* was completely roofed over with bamboo poles, matting, and a thick covering of mud. Receiving the name of "Fort Petrel," she was organ-

¹¹⁵ "The Petrel's Installation," 524.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 257. See the interesting photographs which accompany the article.

ized much like any frontier post.¹¹⁷ On several occasions during the winter the presence of the ship and her crew prevented an outbreak of rioting and emboldened the local Tao-tai or governor to enforce his authority "by decapitating some dangerous characters who were caught placarding the town with inflammatory proclamations."¹¹⁸

The *Petrel* remained in situ during the long, cold winter, and when the ice went out of the Liao River and she was able to come out of her dock, although no collision between her crew and either the Chinese or the Japanese had occurred, the Tao-tai and the foreign consuls and residents "reiterated their assurances that the fortifications, presence, and significant preparations of the *Petrel* had been of inestimable advantage to property and life." She sailed on April 24, 1895,¹¹⁹ bringing to a close a most remarkable landing operation. An armed force of the United States had not only landed for the protection of American citizens abroad, but had taken its ship ashore with it.¹²⁰

SECTION 52.—BOCAS DEL TORO, COLOMBIA, MARCH 8, 1895

Early in March, 1895, a report from the United States consul-general at Panama informed the government at Washington that a certain Mexican named Garcia¹²¹ who had

¹¹⁷ The numerous technical difficulties were overcome by ingenious efforts on the part of the engineering force. See *ibid.*, pp. 528-535, especially the diagram on p. 529. From December 1 to March 9, the temperature seldom rose as high as 32° F.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 536. "Upon her arrival the city was found to be in a state of panic; the Chinese portion of the town was terrorized by some hordes of Manchurian desperadoes, who, thrown out of employment by the war, had taken refuge in Newchwang, and had regularly organized themselves for the express purpose of looting the place and of murdering all foreigners."

¹¹⁹ 58th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 154.

¹²⁰ The *Petrel* mounted four 6-inch guns and a number of smaller pieces, and carried a complement of one hundred and twelve men. She displaced 892 tons, with a length of 176 feet and a beam of 31 feet. Her experience at Newchwang was shared by H. M. S. *Firebrand*, a small gunboat of 445 tons displacement, carrying forty-five men.

¹²¹ Throughout the correspondence and reports of the incident, his name is given as Garcia, or as Garza.

"given us so much trouble on the Rio Grande," had landed in Colombia, near the border of Costa Rica, and was marching on Bocas del Toro with the intention of taking it.¹²² On March 5, the Secretary of the Navy ordered Captain B. J. Cromwell, commanding the U. S. S. *Atlanta*, lying at Colon, to proceed at once to Bocas del Toro.

The *Atlanta* anchored in the entrance to the Bocas del Toro channel at about three o'clock on the afternoon of March 7, and Captain Cromwell immediately communicated with the Colombian authorities there, learning that all was quiet and that the national forces available, about fifty-eight men, were considered sufficient for the protection of the town. Next morning the *Atlanta* weighed and stood off shore to engage in target practice. On returning to the anchorage at 5 P. M., Captain Cromwell found that during the day the town had been surprised and attacked by Garcia, with about twenty-two men; that after a bloody engagement lasting four hours, in which Garcia and four of his men were killed and ten others wounded, the attacking force had been defeated and driven away; and that the retreating force had threatened to return and set fire to the town during the night.¹²³

In view of this threat, and because of the ease with which it might be carried out,¹²⁴ Mr. D. R. Hand, acting United States consular agent at Bocas del Toro, requested Captain Cromwell to send ashore an armed force for the protection of the consular agency and the property owned by American merchants, which was considerable. Captain Cromwell notified the alcalde of the town, General Serafin Jovene, of Mr. Hand's request, and asked permission to land some of his men.¹²⁵ Permission was given next day.¹²⁶ In the meantime, on the night of March 8, Captain Cromwell had sent ashore

¹²² 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, p. 160.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 161, Report of Captain Cromwell to the Secretary of the Navy, March 8, 1895.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 162, Mr. Hand to Captain Cromwell.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 163, Captain Cromwell to Gen. Serafin Jovene, March 8, 1895.

¹²⁶ Ibid. The alcalde was at the consulate when the landing party arrived, and expressed his pleasure at seeing the detachment ashore.

Lieutenant Commander E. D. Taussig with seventy men and a Gatling gun with orders to occupy the consulate and to protect it and all American interests in the town. This force was billeted in the consulate and in an American warehouse. The night passed without incident, and on receiving assurance on March 9 that the local authorities had the situation under control, the force was recalled to the *Atlanta* at noon.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 161-164, Report of Captain Cromwell to the Secretary of the Navy, and report of Lieut. Commander Taussig to Captain Cromwell.

CHAPTER IV

INSTANCES OF PROTECTION BY FORCE, 1899-1927

SECTION 53.—SAN JUAN DEL NORTE, NICARAGUA, FEBRUARY, 1899

On February 4, 1899, General Juan P. Reyes placed himself at the head of an army of insurgents and proclaimed a revolution against the government of Sr. Zelaya, President of Nicaragua.¹ Although the movement ended in failure, for a time it seriously threatened the existence of the de jure government. Ports on the east coast were declared closed and great excitement prevailed among the Nicaraguans. On February 9, President Zelaya requested that an American warship be sent to San Juan del Norte,² and about the same time the British consul cabled his government asking that a cruiser visit Bluefields and San Juan.³

At the request of the Department of State, the U. S. S. *Marietta*, Commander F. M. Symonds, was ordered to San Juan del Norte on February 10, and arrived off that port two days later.⁴ The revolutionists were in possession of the town and, amid general confusion, were attempting to force foreign merchants there to pay custom charges and port dues to the financial agent of General Reyes. The consuls and consular agents of the United States, Great Britain, and Norway and Sweden decided that their merchants should not pay such charges in cash.⁵ The revolution reached its climax about the time this decision was announced, on February 22; and in the face of imminent disorder, in response to the requests of the foreign merchants, a small force was landed from the *Marietta* and from a British vessel at San Juan del

¹ Foreign Relations, 1899, p. 550.

² Ibid., p. 548.

³ Ibid., p. 549.

⁴ Ibid., p. 553.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 558-559.

Norte.⁶ Soon afterward the cause of the followers of Reyes became hopeless, and by the end of February the revolution had collapsed.⁷ The force from the *Marietta* was reembarked on March 5, when conditions in San Juan del Norte became normal.⁸

SECTION 54.—APIA, SAMOA, MARCH 13-MAY 15, 1899

In February, 1899, Rear Admiral Albert Kautz, in command of the Pacific Squadron, was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with his flagship, the U. S. S. *Philadelphia*, to Apia in the Samoan Islands, where a disturbance among the natives had again arisen over the succession to the throne.⁹ Malietoa Tanu, the eighteen year old son of the former king, had been driven out of Apia by the forces of Mataafa, long a stormy petrel of Samoan politics. The islands were at that time under the joint administration of Great Britain, Germany and the United States. The German representative at Apia favored Mataafa, while the British and Americans wished to see Malietoa on the throne.¹⁰

The *Philadelphia* reached Apia on March 6 and found in the harbor H. M. S. *Porpoise*, Commander F. C. D. Sturdee; H. M. S. *Royalist*, and H. I. G. M. S. *Falke*. The situation ashore was already acute, since the followers of Mataafa were armed and bellicose. A small British force had been posted in the British consulate and in the town of Apia. Admiral Kautz, after consultation with the foreign naval commanders and some of the residents, decided to lend his aid to Malietoa

⁶ Ibid., p. 554.

⁷ Ibid., p. 556.

⁸ A few weeks later trouble again arose at Bluefields and San Juan. Some of the foreign merchants had paid in cash, under protest, duties to the insurgents, and the Zelaya government was trying to collect these duties under threat of "action." The U. S. S. *Detroit*, Commander Dayton, was ordered to Bluefields, and after her arrival a settlement was peacefully reached. See *ibid.*, p. 560, and especially, p. 563.

⁹ 56th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 4. See also *ibid.*, pp. 935-942.

¹⁰ Captain T. T. Craven, U. S. N., "A Naval Episode of 1899," in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LIV, No. 301 (March, 1928), p. 186.

and the British, thus supporting, he believed, the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1889.¹¹

On Monday, March 13, the Mataafaistas displayed unusually warlike preparations, and Kautz sent ashore twenty-five men under Ensign John R. Monaghan and Naval Cadet G. C. Sweet. These occupied the United States consulate. Next day the marine guard of the *Philadelphia*, under Lieutenant C. M. Perkins, U. S. M. C., relieved the seamen and the latter, reenforced to sixty-five men and commanded by Lieutenant H. A. Field, took over the defense of a line to the west of the German settlement.¹² Further small parties were posted in Apia and the town was put in a state of defense. Hostilities began on March 15, and, after the American and British forces had sustained continued sniping by the Mataafaistas, the *Philadelphia* and the *Royalist* bombarded the wooded hills behind Apia while the *Porpoise* steamed out to shell the hills near Vailoa. Mataafa's men increased their fire upon the town and many refugees were taken off to the *Philadelphia* in the ship's boats.¹³

Desultory sniping and bombardment continued for several days. On March 23 Malietoa was installed as king and formally recognized by the British and American forces. Next day H. M. S. *Tauranga*, Captain Leslie C. Stuart, arrived at Apia and landed reenforcements which brought the combined British and American forces ashore to two hundred and fifty.¹⁴ On Saturday, April 1, a party composed of sixty officers and men from the *Philadelphia*, under Lieutenant P. V. Lansdale, and sixty-two men from the British ships, accompanied by four interpreters, two Mormon missionaries and about one hundred and fifty friendly natives, the whole commanded by Lieutenant A. H. Freeman, R. N., set out from Apia to make a reconnoissance of the island and to

¹¹ Craven, pp. 187-191. Accompanying Captain Craven's article are some interesting photographs which he made during the landing.

¹² See the chart of the operations accompanying Captain Craven's article, p. xxv.

¹³ Craven, 192.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

break up a camp of Mataafa's men near Vailele. The reconnaissance was carried out, but as the expedition was returning to Apia it was trapped by Mataafa's men, who fired from ambush. The American Colt gun jammed, and in the fight which followed Lieutenant Lansdale, Ensign Monaghan and two American seamen, and Lieutenant Freeman and two British sailors were killed. The force was driven to the shore. There it was saved from pursuit by H. M. S. *Royalist*, whose commander shelled the woods occupied by the hostile natives.¹⁵ In addition to those killed, two British and five American seamen were wounded. It was estimated that about forty of Mataafa's followers were killed in the skirmish and fifty wounded.

By way of reprisal for the ambush, bombardments of the Mataafa positions took place on April 3; and on April 12 a joint force from the *Porpoise* and the *Philadelphia* burned a village occupied by hostile natives to the east of Apia. Soon afterwards H. M. S. *Torch* arrived with instructions for the British forces and with the news that commissioners had been designated to settle the affair and were on their way to the Samoan Islands. An ultimatum was sent to the Mataafa forces ordering them to retire behind a designated line on April 26. They complied, and hostilities ceased.¹⁶

The commissioners reached Apia on May 13 aboard the U. S. S. *Badger*, and two days later the American landing force was reembarked.

SECTION 55.—BOXER RISING IN CHINA, 1900

The part taken by American forces in the relief of the legations at Peking, China, as well as the defense of the foreigners in the capital while they were beleaguered by armies of the Society of Harmonious Fists, better known as the Boxers, was not inconsiderable.¹⁷ The Boxer rising did not

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 196-197.

¹⁷ The history of the Boxer Rising has been so often narrated at length that a summary of the military operations carried out by American forces in China during the spring and summer of 1900

burst suddenly forth. Lawless acts against foreign residents had for some years been increasing in frequency, and during the winter of 1898-1899 the representatives of the European nations and the United States at Peking found it advisable to call upon their naval forces in Chinese waters for legation guards.¹⁸ These were withdrawn in the spring, but the situation gave promise of further trouble, and early in 1900 the Navy Department decided to increase the American force on the Chinese coast.¹⁹ Rear Admiral Louis Kempff, with several vessels, was sent to reinforce the Asiatic Squadron under the orders of Rear Admiral G. C. Remey.

In consequence of these precautions, when the first appeals for help from the legations at Peking reached Admiral Kempff at Taku, in May, 1900, he was able to land and send forward immediately a force of fifty-six marines from the U. S. S. *Oregon* and *Newark*, under Captain John T. Myers, U. S. M. C., and Captain N. H. Hall, U. S. M. C.²⁰ This detachment reached the capital on May 29, only three weeks before the siege of the legations began with the killing of the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, on June 20, and took a heroic part in the defense of the international fort which was improvised from the British minister's residence.

seems adequate treatment of the affair here. For official printed sources, see 56th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1900, pp. 3-6; the report of Rear Admiral G. C. Remey, commander-in-chief of the U. S. Naval Forces on the Asiatic Station, *ibid.*, pp. 544-550; report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 1116-1132; also Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, and the Appendix volume for 1901 (published as 57th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 67); and the Report of the War Department, 1900, vol. I. See also the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1901, pp. 1273-1278. For the diplomatic background, see John H. Latané, *America as a World Power* (in the American Nation Series, XXV), pp. 100-113; and Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, 650-668.

¹⁸ The total number of foreign seamen and marines brought to Peking during the winter was one hundred and forty-one, of which eighteen were American.

¹⁹ 56th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 3, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1900.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 1130.

When it appeared that the Chinese government was itself hostile to foreigners and that the Boxers were being supported by Imperial troops, arrangements were made to send a larger force to Peking for the protection of the lives and property of Americans in the city. A second detachment, under Captain Bowman H. McCalla, U. S. N., made up chiefly of seamen from the fleet and numbering one hundred and twelve men with a 3-inch landing gun, was gotten in readiness to accompany a joint expedition of European forces then preparing to go to Peking while rail communications were still open.²¹ On the night of June 9, Admiral Sir Edward H. Seymour, R. N., the ranking officer among the forces at Taku, received a telegram from the British minister at the capital informing him that unless those at Peking were soon relieved, help would come too late. The message left no doubt as to the urgency of the situation, and next morning, at 9.30 o'clock, an Allied relief column, more than two thousand strong, started for Peking by train.²²

At Lang-Fang, three days later, the column found that the Chinese had destroyed the railroad. After ten days of hard fighting, for which they were not properly equipped, with their ammunition nearly exhausted and with a casualty list of sixty-two killed and two hundred and thirty wounded,²³ the Allies were forced to fall back, and on June 20, in the face of an overwhelming concentration of Chinese, the column dug in at Hsi-Ku, near Tientsin, to await reenforcements. Meanwhile the allied warships off the coast had bombarded

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4; Army and Navy Register, XXVIII, 1. See Captain J. K. Taussig, U. S. N., "Experiences during the Boxer Rebellion," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LIII, No. 290 (April, 1927), pp. 403-420. The accompanying photographs are interesting.

²² The relief column consisted of 915 British officers, seamen and marines, 450 Germans, 312 Russians, 158 French, 54 Japanese, 40 Italians, 25 Austrians, and the 112 Americans under Captain McCalla, a total force of 2,066. The detachments were all acting independently, but a nominal command was conceded to Admiral Seymour because of his seniority and because he controlled by far the largest number of men. All were expected to act in concert and, with the exception of the Russians, did so.

²³ Of this number, four of the dead and twenty-eight of the wounded were Americans.

and taken the Taku forts on June 17,²⁴ and two days later a force of eight officers and one hundred and thirty-two marines from Cavite, in the Philippines, under Major L. W. T. Waller, U. S. M. C., landed with one Colt automatic rifle and a 3-inch field gun, and immediately joined a body of four hundred and forty Russians in an attempt to relieve the column now besieged at Tientsin. On June 22 they came into conflict with Chinese troops and were driven back with a loss for the Americans of four killed and seven wounded.²⁵

The situation of the allied column under Admiral Seymour, to say nothing of the foreigners at Peking, was becoming desperate when, on June 22, British, French, German, Russian and Italian reinforcements reached Taku, bringing the allied force on the coast to two thousand men. On Sunday, June 25, this force advanced on Tientsin, relieving the Seymour column and capturing the walled city on July 14.²⁶

After the fall of Tientsin, systematic attacks upon the legations at Peking stopped. At the instance of the tsung-li-yamen an informal truce was arranged and a certain amount of communication took place between the legations and the outside world.²⁷

Most of the powers interested had meanwhile been hurrying additional troops, better prepared for land fighting, to Taku. The Ninth United States Infantry sailed from Manila on June 27,²⁸ and on July 1 Major-General Adna R. Chaffee left San Francisco with the Sixth Cavalry, under orders from the Secretary of War to take command of all

²⁴ The American vessels took no part in this operation although the U. S. S. *Monocacy*, Commander F. M. Wise, was fired upon by the forts.

²⁵ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1900, pp. 4, 1116, 1150.

²⁶ In this advance twenty-two American officers and 326 men took part, with a loss of one officer and four men killed and four officers and fifteen men wounded. See *ibid.*, pp. 4, 5, 1122, 1161, 1166; also the report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1901, p. 1275. The combined American forces in the column now totalled about 900, under Colonel R. L. Meade, U. S. M. C., with a casualty list of 24 killed and 98 wounded.

²⁷ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1900, p. 5.

²⁸ Two battalions of this force reached the scene of operations in time to take part in the assault on Tientsin on July 13.

American troops in China. Altogether, more than 15,000 United States troops were ordered to China, and between 5,000 and 6,000 arrived before the capture of Peking, but of this number only about 2,500 were actually engaged with the Chinese.²⁹

On August 8, urged forward by news that the legations were desperately holding out, the allied column, now swelled to more than 19,100 men,³⁰ advanced from Tientsin. The Chinese assaults upon the legations became sharper as the relief expedition neared Peking, and culminated in a fierce attack on August 13. Next day, after a last bitter resistance by the Boxers, the Allies entered the city and raised the siege.³¹

Negotiations between the Chinese plenipotentiaries, Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching, and the foreign representatives continued for more than a year until September 7, 1901. On that day the final protocol containing the demands of the foreign powers was signed,³² and on September 17 the withdrawal of foreign troops from Peking began.

Legation guards at the Chinese capital, however, became a permanent force for some time thereafter. During the period of disorder which attended the Chinese revolution of 1911, a strong guard of several companies of marines was stationed at the legation in Peking from October 11, 1911, until July 5, 1912.³³

SECTION 56.—PANAMA, COLOMBIA, NOVEMBER 20-
DECEMBER 4, 1901

During a more than usually serious revolutionary disturbance in the state of Panama, Colombia, which reached a crisis in November, 1901, it became necessary once again, in

²⁹ Report of the Secretary of War, 1900, I, part 1, p. 24.

³⁰ Ibid. Of this number, 8,000 were Japanese; 4,800, Russian; 3,000 British; 2,500 American; and 800 French; with the Italians and Austrians already noted.

³¹ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1900, p. 6; 1901, p. 1278.

³² Intrigue among the powers was the chief cause of the delay.

³³ Report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1912.

order to protect American property on the Isthmus and to keep the traffic moving across it, to land considerable forces of marines at both Colon and Panama.³⁴ After correspondence with the Governor of Panama, in which that official admitted the inability of his forces to guarantee the safety of American lives and property and the free passage of the Isthmus,³⁵ Lieutenant Commander Henry McCrea, of the U. S. S. *Machias*, at Colon, landed a force from his ship and occupied the property of the Panama Railroad Company on November 20.³⁶

Two days later, Secretary Long telegraphed Captain Thomas Perry, commanding the U. S. S. *Iowa*, at Panama: "Situation contending forces makes the transit of the Isthmus unstable. Land force. Camp in favorable position outside city; prepared to forestall interruption transit. This necessary to forestall possible action by other powers."³⁷ Lieutenant Commander McCrea was notified of this action and instructed to keep his force on shore at Colon until further orders reached him.

On November 24, at about 4 P. M., Captain Perry sent ashore a body of two hundred and forty-eight men, consisting of one company of marines and three companies of seamen with their officers and auxiliaries. The next morning, at 8 o'clock, he boarded a train at Panama with one hundred and fifty of this force under command of Lieutenant Commander G. H. Peters, and began clearing the line and restoring freedom of transit.³⁸ Meanwhile Commander McCrea, at Colon, had forbidden the landing of any revolutionary forces at the wharves or the bombardment of the town without notice to non-combatants.³⁹ These actions resulted in the restoration

³⁴ For an account of the situation and the interruption to traffic, see 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, pp. 69-73, 176-225.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 201, Lieutenant Commander McCrea to the Secretary of the Navy, November 20, 1901.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 207, 210. An armored car mounting two machine guns and flying the United States flag was attached ahead of the engine.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

of order along the line of the railroad for several days, during which an armed guard of forty seamen or marines was placed on every passenger train that crossed the Isthmus.⁴⁰ An arrangement with the leaders of the contending factions had the effect of causing both sides to stop firing during a battle at Buena Vista, near Gatun, while passenger trains were passing the field of action.⁴¹

On Thursday, November 28, at a conference on board the U. S. S. *Marietta*, at Colon, an agreement was reached whereby the Liberal forces there, under General de la Rosa, evacuated the town and turned over the control of it to the foreign naval officers present at 11 A. M. on November 29, who in turn relinquished the town to the National forces under General Alban at 2 P. M. the same day. Under the articles of the agreement, which was brought about by the skillful diplomacy of Commander Henry McCrea, of the U. S. S. *Machias*, assisted by Commander Francis H. Delano, of the U. S. S. *Marietta*, Captain A. Galloway, of H. M. S. *Tribune*, and Commander P. le Bris, of the French cruiser *Le Suchet*,⁴² Captain Perry, as the senior naval officer present, received the surrender of General de la Rosa and restored the town of Colon to General Alban.⁴³

During the time between 11 A. M. and 2 P. M. on November 29, an American force of about three hundred seamen and marines occupied Colon except for the French quarter, which was guarded by a small detachment from the cruiser *Le Suchet*. The British cruiser *Tribune* made fast alongside the dock of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company with her landing party ready to be sent ashore if the need arose.⁴⁴ The event proceeded peaceably. When the formalities attending the transfer of control were over, the American forces in Colon were withdrawn outside the town to the property of the railroad company, and certain restrictions

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 211, 212.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 212.

⁴² Ibid., p. 218.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 218.

⁴⁴ See the terms of the agreement referred to, *ibid.*, p. 213.

which Captain Perry had placed on the use of the railroad by National troops were removed. Although rumors of the approach of fresh bodies of Liberal troops were frequent, these proved unfounded, and conditions were so far normal on December 2 that Captain Perry ordered the American forces still on guard at the railroad company's wharves to reembark.⁴⁵ On December 3, the guards on trains crossing the Isthmus were reduced from forty to twenty or twenty-five men; all the landing party from the U. S. S. *Concord* at Panama and the U. S. S. *Marietta* at Colon, and one-half the force from the U. S. S. *Iowa* were sent aboard their ships; and orders were issued that the American force still ashore should reembark at 10 o'clock next day. On December 4, after a conference with General Alban, who had now become Governor Alban, Captain Perry withdrew with his seamen and marines to the U. S. S. *Iowa*.⁴⁶ The longest period of service on shore by any American detachment was ten days.⁴⁷

SECTION 57.—BOCAS DEL TORO, COLOMBIA, APRIL 16-22, 1902

During April, 1902, the landing of American forces at Bocas del Toro, Colombia, twice repeated on a small scale the incident of November 29, 1901, at Colon.⁴⁸ On April 16 Commander Henry McCrea, lying in the U. S. S. *Machias* at Bocas del Toro, landed one section of a company of seamen for the protection of American residents and property, anticipating an attack on the town by Liberal forces during the night.⁴⁹ Next day he was asked by the commander of

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 219.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 220.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 222. The total American force landed was 460; at Panama, from the *Iowa*, 15 officers, 162 seamen, 55 marines, and 16 auxiliaries; from the *Concord*, 3 officers, 45 seamen, 12 marines, and 15 auxiliaries; at Colon, from the *Machias*, 2 officers, 57 seamen, and 11 marines; from the *Marietta*, 3 officers, 53 seamen, and 11 marines. See the table in Captain Perry's report, p. 221.

⁴⁸ See Message from the President of the United States, transmitting . . . copies of . . . reports and . . . correspondence . . . which relate to the military occupation of . . . Colon and Panama, etc., 58th Cong., special sess., S. Doc. No. 10. (Printed as an appendix to 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143).

⁴⁹ 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, pp. 254-255.

the Liberal forces to attempt to arrange a capitulation on the part of the National troops. A conference was held that night on board the *Machias*, at which the National officers were convinced of the futility of further resistance, and it was agreed that they should on the next day turn over the town to Commander McCrea, who should immediately surrender it to the commander of the Liberal troops. Meanwhile, a general armistice was established on shore.⁵⁰

The terms of this agreement were carried out exactly at nine o'clock on the morning of April 18, in the presence of a full company of seamen from the *Machias*, as well as the leaders and some of the troops of each party. Immediately after the Liberal commander had assumed control, the American force was withdrawn to the *Machias* except for a small guard of marines who were left to protect American property until the new government could guarantee its safety.

Two days later a large force of National troops under General Gomez, governor of the province, arrived on two small vessels. The military situation on shore was reversed, and on April 20 the Liberals agreed to capitulate.⁵¹ The Liberals evacuated Bocas del Toro early on the evening of April 21, and as soon as they had gone General Gomez requested Commander McCrea to take over the care of the city during the night. Commander McCrea accepted the responsibility, and with forty-five men landed from the *Machias* organized a patrol of the town, enforced a strict curfew ordinance, closed the pulquerias or saloons, and notified the people of the city that the American forces had orders to shoot any incendiaries or housebreakers caught in the act. There was no disturbance during the night, and next morning at eight o'clock without any ceremony, Commander McCrea turned over the city to the Colombian authorities. The American forces were immediately reembarked.⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 256, Report of Commander McCrea to the Secretary of the Navy.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 256, 257.

⁵² Ibid., p. 258, Report of Commander McCrea to the Secretary of the Navy.

SECTION 58.—PANAMA, COLOMBIA, SEPTEMBER 17-NOVEMBER 18, 1902

Revolutionary disturbances continued throughout the Isthmus of Panama during the summer and autumn of 1902.⁵³ In September the free transit of the isthmus again became seriously menaced and at length actually obstructed by the operations of the contending political forces, and armed forces of the United States were landed to restore the traffic and to maintain it.

On September 17, at Colon, Commander T. C. McLean sent ashore from the U. S. S. *Cincinnati* a detachment of seamen under orders of Lieutenant D. W. Blamer with instructions to place guards on all trains crossing the isthmus and to keep the railroad line unobstructed.⁵⁴ At the same time, Commander McLean notified the commanding officers of the Colombian and revolutionary forces that the railroad and the trains were being guarded by United States forces and that no armed men of either party would be allowed to use the line.⁵⁵ A force from the U. S. S. *Ranger* at Panama, Commander W. P. Potter, cooperated with the seamen from the *Cincinnati*.⁵⁶ Under these conditions the traffic across from Colon to Panama was to some extent restored.

When the U. S. S. *Panther* reached Colon on September 23, Lieutenant-Colonel B. R. Russell, U. S. M. C., was ordered by Commander McLean to land with the battalion of marines under his command for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of Americans and assisting in maintaining a free movement of traffic across the isthmus.⁵⁷ In accord-

⁵³ For a detailed account of the situation see 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, pp. 241-337. See also pp. 73-76.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 286, Commander McLean to Lieut. Blamer. See also *ibid.*, pp. 329 and 330.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 286-287.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 285, Commander Potter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 22, 1902. On September 11 the Secretary of the Navy had ordered the *Cincinnati* and the *Wisconsin* to the isthmus without delay, and the *Panther*, with the marines, to follow as soon as ready (see p. 332).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 287, Commander McLean to Lieut.-Col. Russell. The battalion numbered about three hundred and fifty officers and men.

ance with his orders, Lieutenant-Colonel Russell proceeded to Panama with three of his four companies of marines, leaving the other at Colon. At Panama the force of seamen landed from the *Ranger* was relieved by the marines under Lieutenant-Colonel Russell and reembarked. A system was organized whereby the seamen landed from the *Cincinnati* and the company of marines under Major Barnett furnished guards for all trains at the Colon end of the line, and the three companies of marines under Lieutenant-Colonel Russell performed the same service at the Panama terminus.⁵⁸ The guards were changed at a point about the middle of the isthmus. Rear Admiral Silas Casey, in the U. S. S. *Wisconsin*, who had been ordered to Panama by the Navy Department on September 12 from Bremerton,⁵⁹ arrived on September 30 and relieved Commander McLean as senior officer in command of the United States forces at the isthmus. He considered the arrangements already made by Commander McLean satisfactory and did not alter them.

The disposition of the American forces remained almost unchanged until November 12, when a series of successes on the part of the Colombian forces enabled their commander-in-chief, General Perdomo, to give Admiral Casey some assurance that the national government was again able to fulfill its treaty obligations and protect the line of the railway from obstruction. On that date two of the three companies of marines at Panama were transferred to Colon.⁶⁰ Three days later the armed guards were removed from freight trains, and one and one-half companies of marines reembarked on the *Panther*, and on November 17 all the marines at Colon except half a company were withdrawn. Next day all train guards were removed, and the last of the marine battalion retired aboard the *Panther*.⁶¹ At a conference on board the *Wis-*

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 290, Report of Rear Admiral Silas Casey to the Secretary of the Navy, October 6, 1902.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 326.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 317, Rear Admiral Casey to the Secretary of the Navy, November 17, 1902.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 319.

consin which ended on November 21, the commanders of the opposing political parties, Generals Victor M. Salazar and Lucas Caballero, signed a treaty of peace. This was approved by General Perdomo, minister of the Republic of Colombia, thus ending the war on the isthmus.⁶²

SECTION 59.—SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, MARCH
30-APRIL 21, 1903

During a revolutionary outbreak in the Dominican Republic which occurred in March and April, 1903, the U. S. S. *Atlanta*, Commander W. H. Turner, was ordered from Pensacola to Santo Domingo City to protect American interests.⁶³

She arrived in Santo Domingo roads on March 30,⁶⁴ and on April 1, Commander Turner ordered ashore a detachment of twenty-nine marines under command of First Lieutenant Richard G. McConnell, U. S. M. C. The detachment was quartered in the house of the United States Consul General, and remained in Santo Domingo City until April 21,⁶⁵ helping to prevent by its presence unnecessary bloodshed.⁶⁶ With the end of the revolutionary movement, it was reembarked on board the *Atlanta*.

SECTION 60.—PANAMA, NOVEMBER 4-6, 1903

When it became apparent that a revolutionary movement might be expected during the autumn of 1903, President Roosevelt directed the Navy Department to issue such orders "as would insure our having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need arising."⁶⁷ On November 3

⁶² Ibid., pp. 319-321.

⁶³ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1903; Report of the Bureau of Navigation, p. 469. See also, Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 390-391.

⁶⁴ 58th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 143, Movements of Vessels, p. 508.

⁶⁵ Ibid., Report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1903, p. 1229.

⁶⁶ Ibid., Report of the Bureau of Navigation, p. 469.

⁶⁷ Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 266. For a statement of the relations between the United States and Colombia at this time, and a

the commanding officers of the U. S. S. *Boston*, *Nashville* and *Dixie* were instructed to maintain free and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus, occupying the line of the railroad if necessary, and to prevent the landing of "any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama."

The expected revolution, perhaps somewhat belated,⁶⁸ began at six o'clock on the evening of November 3 and was completely successful. Next morning, the Colombian gunboat *Bogata* shelled the town of Panama for a short while, killing a Chinaman. Meanwhile, the *Nashville*, Commander John Hubbard, had reached Colon on November 2, and found the city quiet. At daylight the next morning, a Colombian gunboat entered the port and, since he had not yet received the instructions from the Navy Department mentioned above, Commander Hubbard took no action to prevent her landing about five hundred Colombian troops. Later in the day, when he had received and deciphered the Department's instructions, he went ashore to notify the superintendent of the Panama Railroad that these troops must not be transported to Panama, and found that the revolution was an accomplished fact. Generals Amaya and Tobal, who had been in command of the Colombian troops disembarked at Colon, were under arrest at Panama, where they had gone by special train.⁶⁹ On November 4, Colonel Torres, the senior officer of the Colombian forces at Colon, probably suspecting the part played by American citizens in charge of the railroad in making the revolution a success, notified the United States consul that if Generals Amaya and Tobal were not released by 2 o'clock in the afternoon he would open fire on

detailed account of the action of the United States at Panama, see *ibid.*, pp. 260-278. (Message from the President of the United States transmitting a statement of action in executing the act entitled "An Act to Provide for the Construction of a Canal Connecting the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," approved June 28, 1902).

⁶⁸ See the amusing exchange of telegrams between Assistant Secretary of State Loomis and Mr. Felix Ehrman, United States Consul-General at Panama, *ibid.*, p. 231.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 269, 270.

Colon and kill every American citizen in the town.⁷⁰ Commander Hubbard, at 1.30 P. M., sent ashore a detachment of forty-two men under Lieutenant Commander H. M. Witzel and Midshipman J. P. Jackson, with orders to occupy a stone building belonging to the railroad company and to put it into the best possible state for defense. Many of the American residents of Colon took refuge in this building, and others went aboard two steamers which were made ready to haul out from the dock. Commander Hubbard got the *Nashville* under way and steamed close in to the town, prepared to open fire on the Colombian troops with shrapnel if they attacked the railway sheds.⁷¹

Soon after the party from the *Nashville* had occupied the stone shed, the troops under Colonel Torres surrounded the building and for an hour and a half their attitude was so threatening that Commander Hubbard believed their purpose was to provoke an attack. Lieutenant Commander Witzel's orders were to refrain from firing unless fired upon, and no shots were exchanged. About 3.15 P. M. Colonel Torres came to the building and declared that the whole affair was due to a misapprehension. He was friendly to the Americans, he said, and after certain stipulations, agreed to withdraw his forces to Monkey Hill if the *Nashville's* party would reembark. The American forces withdrew, and the night passed quietly.⁷²

Next morning, November 5, Commander Hubbard discovered that Colonel Torres had not removed his troops so far from the town as he had agreed to do, and on inquiring into the matter he learned that the Colonel intended to occupy Colon again unless he received orders from General Tobal instructing him to withdraw. Commander Hubbard knew that General Tobal had declined to give any orders whatever, and, believing that the situation of the previous day was about to be repeated, at once ordered ashore a landing

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 268.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 268, 269, Report of Commander John Hubbard to the Secretary of the Navy.

⁷² Ibid., p. 270.

force with two 1-pounders. These guns were mounted on railroad cars behind cotton bales. He then sought an interview with Colonel Torres and told him that he had relanded his men because the Colonel had not kept his agreement, that the American force had no interest in the affairs of either political party, that their attitude was neutral, that their only interest ashore was to protect American citizens and to maintain free passage across the Isthmus, and that he was prepared to use force to carry out these purposes if it should be necessary. Colonel Torres persisted in occupying Colon, but during the afternoon was induced by representatives of the new government of Panama to embark all his troops on a British steamship and return to Cartagena. While the Colombian troops were preparing to sail, the U. S. S. *Dixie*, Commander Delano, reached Colon, and landed a part of her battalion of marines. The *Nashville's* party returned to their ship.⁷³ The marines from the *Dixie* reembarked next day, November 6.⁷⁴

SECTION 61.—PUERTO PLATA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, APRIL,
1904

When a revolution against the government of Dr. Morales had been keeping the Dominican Republic in a turmoil for some months,⁷⁵ the Navy Department, early in 1904, ordered Commander A. C. Dillingham, in the U. S. S. *Detroit*, to proceed to Dominican waters and attempt to bring about peace between the contending factions as well as to protect American lives and property wherever they might be endangered.⁷⁶ The United States government had recognized the Morales government as de facto, and although no evidence can be found in the printed sources,⁷⁷ it seems fair to sur-

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

⁷⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1904, p. 261.

⁷⁶ 58th Cong., 3d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 535, Report of C. D. Sigsbee, Rear Admiral commanding the Caribbean Squadron, to the Secretary of the Navy, September 27, 1904.

⁷⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1904, is incomplete in its account of American action in the Dominican Republic, as is also the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1904.

mise from the action taken by Commander Dillingham that his instructions authorized him to support the Morales government as much as possible.

The *Detroit* reached Puerto Plata on January 2, and found H. M. S. *Pallas*, Commander C. Hope Robertson, R. N., already there.⁷⁸ At the time it seemed that President Morales was slowly overcoming the open armed resistance of the Jiminez party, but his superiority was evidently small. General Eugenio Deschamps, commanding an important part of the Jiminez army, was in possession of Puerto Plata. Forces under General Cespedes, fighting on behalf of the Morales provisional government, approached from the east and Cespedes announced that he intended to attack Puerto Plata. The town was unfortified, and Deschamps prepared to defend his position from the shelter of its buildings.

Commanders Dillingham and Robertson went ashore with small detachments from their ships, established a cordon of flags around the entire city, and notified the opposing generals that they would permit no fighting within the line of flags. A few days later General Cespedes began to attack Puerto Plata and Commander Dillingham placed the *Detroit* so that her guns might aid in preventing any armed force from entering the town. He sent ashore, at the same time, an armed detachment with orders to allow no fighting within the city.⁷⁹ The troops under Deschamps marched out of Puerto Plata to meet the Cespedes forces and fought them outside the cordon of flags. They were quickly defeated and retreated through the cordon, throwing down their arms as they reached the line of flags. The town immediately surrendered to General Cespedes. A similar incident, on a much smaller scale, took place a few weeks earlier at Sosua, a small village nearby.

On February 11, the Caribbean Squadron, consisting of the U. S. S. *Newark* and *Columbia*, reached Santo Domingo City

⁷⁸ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1904, p. 540.

⁷⁹ The *Pallas* was not at Puerto Plata when the attack began. Probably she had gone to coal.

while carrying out a cruise along the south coast of the Dominican Republic as ordered by the Navy Department. The city was invested by the insurgents, who were constantly firing into it. The Clyde steamer *New York* was unloading cargo in the river and "it became a delicate matter to insure, without the use of force,"⁸⁰ her peaceful discharge. The insurgent leader on the left (east) bank of the river promised Captain Miller of the *Columbia* that his men would not molest the *New York*, but nevertheless she was heavily fired upon from the east bank. The *Newark*, Captain Richard Wainwright, immediately moved in and shelled the insurgent lines, and under cover of her fire detachments were landed from both American ships, which occupied the bank of the river opposite the city and pursued the insurgents. The rebel leader was found about two miles in the interior, and a written guarantee was obtained from him that his forces would not again occupy the shore of the river opposite Santo Domingo City so long as the *New York* remained at her anchorage. The American detachments at once retired to their ships, and the *Columbia* and *Newark* sailed for Santiago, Cuba.

Commander Dillingham, assisted by Commander Albert Mertz, of the *Newport*, and Lieutenant Commander A. E. Culver, of the *Bancroft*, offered his diplomatic offices to the leaders of the contending factions; and it was largely by the efforts of these three and through "the moral influence toward peace exerted by the naval vessels"⁸¹ that a conference held on board the *Detroit* in June led to an agreement on terms of peace and the capitulation of the insurgents near Monte Cristi.

SECTION 62.—ANCON, REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, NOVEMBER, 1904

During November, 1904, General Huertas, commanding the army of the Republic of Panama, attempted to stir up an in-

⁸⁰ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1904, p. 540.

⁸¹ 58th Cong., 3d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, pp. 535, 536, Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1904.

surrection among his troops with the purpose of overthrowing the existing government of the state.

On receiving word that a disturbance was imminent, Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Squadron, ordered Major John A. Lejeune, U. S. M. C., commanding the Marine Battalion at Camp Elliott, Canal Zone, to send a force to the seat of the trouble for the protection of American lives and property. Major Lejeune directed Captain Louis McC. Little to proceed in command of Company A of the battalion to Ancon, Panama, and on November 17 the company of marines occupied several houses in that town in a position to be able easily to perform their mission in case serious rioting had broken out.

The insurrectionary movement collapsed, and the marines returned to Camp Elliott on November 24, without incident.⁸²

SECTION 63.—CUBA, SEPTEMBER 13, 1906

Following the reelection of Thomas Estrade Palma as President of the Republic of Cuba, in August, 1906, his political opponents began an armed insurrection against his government which quickly assumed serious proportions.⁸³ On September 8, Mr. Steinhart, United States consul general at Havana, telegraphed the Secretary of State that President Palma had expressed a wish that American warships be sent at once to Havana and Cienfuegos, and had admitted that his forces were unable to protect foreign lives and property.⁸⁴ Steinhart added that Palma would soon ask for American intervention in Cuban affairs. This request, although informally frowned upon by President Roosevelt,⁸⁵ was urgently pressed on September 12, and Roosevelt sent Secretary Taft to Cuba in an effort to bring about peace between the hostile factions.⁸⁶ Eventually, on September 29, a provisional gov-

⁸² 59th Cong., 1st sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 1236, Report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1905.

⁸³ Foreign Relations, 1906, p. 454 ff.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 473.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 475.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 480, 481.

ernment of Cuba was set up under the authority of the President of the United States.⁸⁷

Meanwhile the cruisers *Marietta* and *Denver* had been sent to Cienfuegos and Havana, and on September 13, when rioting seemed imminent in both cities, on opposite sides of the island, the commanding officers of the cruisers landed forces for the protection of foreign interests. Captain Folwell, of the *Denver*, sent into Havana a guard of one hundred and twenty seamen and marines. These were withdrawn the next day, when Steinhart received a telegram from Acting Secretary of State Bacon informing him that President Roosevelt wished the vessels sent to Cuba to be under his personal orders and that he would decide "when and how they shall be used for the protection of American life and property."⁸⁸ The situation at Cienfuegos and in the Santa Clara Valley was more threatening than that at Havana, and the force landed from the *Marietta* under Lieutenant J. V. Klemann remained ashore and was strengthened on September 24 by a battalion of marines from the *Dixie* under Major A. W. Catlin. All these forces at Cienfuegos were stationed as guards for American sugar plantations, which were threatened with burning by the revolutionists,⁸⁹ and they remained in and about Cienfuegos until relieved by much larger forces on September 30, when armed intervention in Cuba by the United States began.⁹⁰

SECTION 64.—TRUXILLO, HONDURAS, MARCH 18, 1907

While Honduras and Nicaragua were at war in 1907, the U. S. S. *Marietta* was sent by the Navy Department to protect American interests along the eastern coast of Central America. When the ship anchored at Truxillo, Honduras, on March 18,

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 489, 490.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 478.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 479. See also Annual Reports of the Navy Department, Report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 1906.

⁹⁰ Under the terms of Article III, of the Platt Amendment, adopted as a part of the Cuban constitution on June 12, 1901, the United States possessed the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban

the commanding officer of the *Marietta* found that the town was occupied by Nicaraguan troops under General Estrada, who had captured the port six days earlier. When he learned that a force of several hundred Honduran troops was approaching the town and likely to attack it at any time, he sent ashore a detail of ten men under Ensign F. Rorschach as a guard for the United States consulate. Ensign Rorschach was instructed to notify General Estrada of the purpose of his landing and to assure him that the detail from the *Marietta* would confine its actions strictly to the protection of American interests.⁹¹

On the same day a similar force from the *Marietta* was landed at Ceiba under Midshipman L. N. McNair. A somewhat larger detachment from the *Marietta*, under Lieutenant J. U. Klemann, was ordered ashore at Puerto Cortez on March 26, and, on April 5, marched thirty miles to San Pedro, where it was stationed as a guard for American interests. On April 10, the details at Truxillo and Ceiba were reenforced by additional marines and seamen from the U. S. S. *Paducah*, and a small party was sent into Puerto Cortez. All these forces were withdrawn by May 21.⁹²

Marines from the *Paducah* were stationed in Laguna, Honduras, from April 28 to May 23. On that day they were transferred to Choloma, and remained there guarding American and other foreign property until June 8.⁹³

SECTION 65.—BLUEFIELDS, NICARAGUA, MAY 17, 1910

Since the inauguration of Jose Madriz as President of Nicaragua on December 21, 1909, his government had been opposed by an armed revolt under the leadership of General Juan J. Estrada. The United States offered its cruisers

independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life and property and individual liberty, etc. American intervention came to an end in January, 1909.

⁹¹ Undated letter from the Navy Department to the Department of State, as summarized in Department of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14, p. 66. (Printed and distributed Oct. 5, 1912).

⁹² Log of the *Marietta*, MS., Bureau of Navigation files.

⁹³ Report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, MS., Naval Library.

along the coasts as common meeting places where the rival factions, both of which it refused to recognize, might meet in the interests of peace;⁹⁴ but, when Thomas P. Moffat, American consul at Bluefields, reported on March 3, 1910, that General Estrada had signified his desire to end the revolution through the mediation of the United States, Secretary Knox replied that his government was not disposed to "make any suggestion in response to a unilateral representation."⁹⁵

On May 16, Executive Delegate Julian Irias, commanding the Nicaraguan gunboat *Maximo Jerez* (ex American *Venus*), arrived at Bluefields, and called upon the commander of the Estrada forces there to surrender the city and the Bluff, its dominating fort. This ultimatum was delivered through the U. S. S. *Paducah* and the American consulate, and stated that in case the Estradaistas refused to capitulate, twenty-four hours would be allowed for the removal of noncombatants, after which the *Maximo Jerez* would begin a bombardment of the city and the Bluff.⁹⁶ Commander W. W. Gilmer, of the *Paducah*, immediately issued a proclamation notifying the leaders of both factions and Delegate Irias that in order to safeguard the lives and property of Americans, other foreigners, and noncombatants at Bluefields, there must be no fighting in the city; that until a stable government was established, not more than one hundred armed men, necessary to preserve order as police, would be permitted in Bluefields; and that neither faction might bombard the town, since such bombardment would serve no military end.⁹⁷ Next day, May

⁹⁴ Foreign Relation, 1910, pp. 738-740.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 743. Since Dec. 20, 1909, an expeditionary force of marines under Colonel James E. Mahoney, numbering thirty-two officers and seven hundred and nine men, had been held near Corinto, on the Pacific coast, at first on the U. S. S. *Buffalo* and later, by permission of the government of Salvador, on one of the Great Corn islands. Since most of the fighting took place in the eastern part of Nicaragua, on May 14, the Secretary of the Navy ordered the *Buffalo* and her marines back to Panama, where an additional force of more than a thousand men was held ready to proceed to Nicaragua in case of need (See Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1910, pp. 20, 61, 803).

⁹⁶ Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 745.

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 745, 746.

18, Commander Gilmer landed a detail of one hundred men to enforce his decree, since an engagement was expected. The Navy Department, on May 19, at the request of the Department of State, instructed Commander Gilmer that it was the policy of the United States not to interfere between the hostile parties but to hold both sides strictly accountable for injury to Americans. This policy was consistently maintained.⁹⁸

Madriz complained to President Taft on June 13 that his army had stormed and taken the Bluff on May 27, and that his commanding general had been instructed to occupy Bluefields immediately afterward, as it was without a garrison, but that he was prevented from doing so because Commander Gilmer warned him that his entrance would be opposed and landed additional seamen from the *Paducah*. This, Madriz declared, had permitted the Estradaistas to neglect their base and bring all forces against his column, thereby defeating it. He added that the United States, through Commander Gilmer and the *Paducah*, had prevented the *Maximo Jerez* from blockading Bluefields and cutting off supplies from the revolutionists when they were carried in American ships, and lastly he protested that a force to attack his positions at the Bluff and Pearl Lagoon was being prepared in Bluefields, and that the American guard there prevented his generals from forestalling this. Declaring his opinion that such actions constituted a breach of neutrality by the United States, Madriz requested President Taft to "rectify his orders to Commander Gilmer."⁹⁹

Secretary Knox replied that the *Maximo Jerez* had sailed from New Orleans "illegally and clandestinely," "as an expedition to the Madriz faction" under the name of *Venus*, and that therefore his government refused to recognize her right to establish a blockade, adding that, so far as Commander Gilmer's actions were concerned, "The United States took only the customary step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either faction within the unfortified and ungarrisoned

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 747, 750.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 751, 752.

soned commercial city of Bluefields, thus protecting the preponderating American and other foreign interests. . . .¹⁰⁰

Soon afterward, trouble arose when, because the Estrada forces had chartered several steamships from American companies, General Rivas, commanding the Madriz troops at the Bluff, threatened to fire upon all vessels owned by those companies whether or not they were at the time under charter to the revolutionists. On June 3, Commander Gilmer ordered American guards upon all merchant ships passing the Bluff "when in legitimate trade."¹⁰¹ When the *Paducah* was relieved by the *Dubuque*, on June 16,¹⁰² Commander H. K. Hines continued the policy of Commander Gilmer, and, at the request of Consul Moffat, on July 31, when General Rivas again prepared to bombard the city, Hines sent him a note stating: "I have the honor to inform you, if a bombardment of Bluefields takes place under the pretence of an attack on Halfway Cay, or if a shot from one of your guns strikes a vessel under my protection, I will immediately proceed to seize the *Venus* and *San Jacinto*, and if the use of further force is necessary, I will attack the Bluff."¹⁰³

The Estrada forces finally prevailed, and Madriz left the country. A provisional government was set up, awaiting the election of a constitutional president, and on October 15, Thomas C. Dawson, American Minister to Panama, was sent to Managua to act as Special Agent of the United States near the Provisional Government of Nicaragua.¹⁰⁴

SECTION 66.—HONDURAS, JANUARY 26, 1911

A revolution for the purpose of putting in power former President Manuel Bonilla began in Honduras on July 22, 1910.¹⁰⁵ Under the direction of Generals Christmas and

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 752.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 757.

¹⁰² Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1910, pp. 72, 95.

¹⁰³ Department of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14, p. 68.

¹⁰⁴ Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 763.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 1911, p. 291.

Jose Maria Valladares, the movement for a time succeeded so well that on November 3, the President of Honduras, Miguel R. Dávila, requested "the decisive cooperation of the United States as a service to the foreign residents at the port" of Amapala.¹⁰⁶ The U. S. S. *Tacoma* and *Marietta* were sent to Honduras to protect American interests, and on the night of January 26, 1911, after the insurgents had captured Ceiba and were reported on the march to Puerto Cortes, the commanding officer of the *Tacoma* landed a force of sixty men in expectation of a possible attack on that town.¹⁰⁷ On January 27 the commanding officer of the *Marietta* cabled the Navy Department that he had established a neutral zone around Puerto Cortes and had forbidden fighting in the city, adding "if the revolutionary leader appear with superior force I shall require government of Honduras to surrender town or fight outside. Will use force if necessary." Four days later he was authorized to take "such military measures as may be necessary to prevent fighting in Puerto Cortes."¹⁰⁸ President Dávila and General Bonilla were both notified that such authority had been given him.

Meanwhile, on January 28, Dávila had requested President Taft to lend "valuable intervention for the purpose of terminating the war."¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, American mediation was offered. Under orders from Dávila the commandant of Puerto Cortes, on January 31, evacuated that town, delivering it to the control of the British and American consuls under the protection of small forces landed from the American ships and H. M. S. *Brilliant*, which had arrived on January 28. General Christmas, with the revolutionary forces, was allowed to enter the city and occupy it after 1 P. M. on February 1. A joint force of seventy-two British and Ameri-

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 292.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 297. Foreign Relations omit most of the details of the landing and the action taken by the American naval officers. See Department of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14 (1912), p. 69.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 298.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 297.

can seamen was sent to San Pedro aboard the train by which the government troops evacuated Puerto Cortes, partly in fulfillment of a guarantee of safe conduct to the interior, and partly to insure peace there while the commandant of San Pedro evacuated that town under a similar agreement to that made at Puerto Cortes. Guards were placed on all trains in the disturbed area and quiet was quickly restored.

Thomas C. Dawson was designated special commissioner of the United States and sent to Puerto Cortes to attempt to arrange terms by which the war might be ended.¹¹⁰ Conferences attended by representatives of both factions were held on board the *Tacoma*, and an agreement was reached embodying stipulations which were accepted by President Dávila on March 4.¹¹¹ When the necessity for the protection of foreign lives and property no longer existed, the British and American forces were withdrawn.

SECTION 67.—ORIENTE, CUBA, JUNE 5-AUGUST 5, 1912; WITH
A NOTE ON TURKEY¹¹²

A negro uprising, organized by the "Independientes de Color," occurred in Cuba during May, 1912, and assumed such proportions that on the twenty-third of that month the Navy Department ordered the *Prairie*, with five hundred marines on board, to proceed to the United States naval station at Guantanamo and join the *Nashville* and the *Paduca*

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 299.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 302.

¹¹² When the Turkish armies were being thrown back on Constantinople by victorious Balkan troops in the autumn of 1912, rioting broke out in the Turkish capital and the lives and property of all Christians became endangered. On November 18, in accordance with a decision of the members of the Diplomatic Corps, about 2,500 men and twenty-six guns were landed to protect foreign residents at Constantinople by the British, French, German, Russian and Italian warships which had gathered there, and a small detail from the U. S. S. *Scorpion*, an armed yacht used as station ship in Turkish waters, landed at the same time as a guard for the American legation. The detail from the *Scorpion* reembarked on December 3. See Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 1353.

there.¹¹³ Two days later the American minister at Havana was instructed to inform the Cuban government that "in the event of its inability or failure to protect the lives or property of American citizens . . . the Government of the United States, pursuant to its usual custom in such cases," would land forces to accord the necessary protection; and that such action did not constitute intervention.¹¹⁴

Although President Jose Miguel Gómez of Cuba asked President Taft to refrain from landing any detachments on Cuban territory even for protection, because such action, while not considered specifically as intervention, would not "seem anything else" and would discredit his government at home and abroad;¹¹⁵ and assured him that the rising would quickly be suppressed, Secretary of State Knox replied that the American government did "not undertake first to consult the Cuban Government if a crisis arose requiring a temporary landing somewhere to protect life and property on the broad principles of international practice."¹¹⁶ The crisis soon arose, for the revolt, especially in the eastern part of the island, was more serious than the Cuban government would admit. On June 5, although as yet no Americans had been injured and none of their property destroyed,¹¹⁷ the commandant at the naval station at Guantanamo considered that the Cuban authorities had failed to take effective action for their protection and sent four companies of marines into the province of Oriente, and on the same day Secretary Knox threatened actual intervention.¹¹⁸

In the face of this situation, President Gómez hastened to express his gratification on learning of the step taken by the commandant at Guantanamo, and declared that as rapidly as American forces landed to take over the protection of foreign

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 246. For the details of the diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Cuba concerning the uprising, see *ibid.*, pp. 244-268.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

property the Cuban troops so employed would be withdrawn and used against the rebels.¹¹⁹ On June 9, after disorders amounting to a race war had prevailed in Havana for several days, the United States minister there urged the immediate presence of a warship at that port because of the large number of American women in the city,¹²⁰ and on the next day two vessels of the Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral Osterhaus, anchored in Havana harbor. In spite of strenuous efforts by the Cuban government to have them recalled, the ships remained until June 29, when, after the death of the negro leader, Estenoz, the rebellion began to dwindle.¹²¹ On that day they were ordered north, but the marines in Oriente were left ashore "to handle the situation" for some time longer. The last of them was withdrawn on August 5.¹²²

SECTION 68.—NICARAGUA, 1912-1925

General Luis Mena, Minister of War under President Alfonso Diaz, and a disappointed aspirant for the presidency of Nicaragua, on July 29, 1912, attempted to seize Managua, the capital of the state, and by a coup d'état to possess himself of the executive power.¹²³ Forestalled by prompt measures taken by President Diaz, General Mena, after being surrounded and paroled, on the evening of the same day cut the electric light wires in the capital and, with the entire Managua police force, including its chief, escaped from the city and joined a number of his followers in the direction of Granada.¹²⁴ As Minister of War, Mena had been able to make in advance such disposition of the military stores of the state that most of them fell easily into his hands as soon as he put himself in open rebellion against the government, and

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 260, 261.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-267.

¹²² Report from the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, MS., Naval Library.

¹²³ By far the best account of the Mena revolution and the events which preceded it may be found in the dispatches of the United States minister to Nicaragua, George T. Weitzel, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1912, pp. 993-1071.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1029, 1031, 1032.

largely on this account the revolutionary movement promised to be more serious than usual.¹²⁵

On July 31, the British Consul General, Mr. H. C. Venables, asked the United States Minister to Nicaragua, Mr. George T. Weitzel, for assistance in protecting his nationals; on the same day the officials of the National Bank of Nicaragua, an American corporation, informally "requested the Legation to mention confidentially to the Government that there were considerable sums of money in the vaults for which protection was sought against plain robbers as well as armed enemies." Two days later the manager of the railroad, owned by a company incorporated under the laws of the State of Maine, filed a protest with Mr. Weitzel complaining that much of its property had been forcibly seized by Mena's men.¹²⁶ These matters were brought to the attention of the Nicaraguan government on August 3, and Senor Diego M. Chamorro, Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied to Mr. Weitzel that his government was making every effort to protect foreign lives and property but regretted its inability to do so because of the necessity of using its forces for suppressing the revolution. He concluded by requesting that the government of the United States land forces to guarantee the property and lives of its own citizens and to extend its protection to all the inhabitants of the republic.¹²⁷

Further appeals for protection reached the United States Minister on the morning of August 3, and, faced with reports of risings in Chinandega and Leon, which, if serious, might cut the wire and rail communications with Corinto, the port of Managua, and completely isolate the legation, Mr. Weitzel sent a telegram to Captain W. J. Terhune, commanding the U. S. S. *Annapolis*, which he knew was somewhere off the coast on a routine cruise, asking how many men he had available for a landing force. He followed this a few hours later with a request that Captain Terhune land a guard and order it to Managua.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1035.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1035-1036.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1032, 1036.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1036.

The *Annapolis* had sailed from Amapala on July 7, bound for Panama, and put in at San Juan del Sur to meet a mail steamer. Mr. Weitzel's telegrams reached her there and she at once turned back to Corinto. Captain Terhune disembarked a detachment of ninety seamen and five officers under Lieutenant James A. Campbell, Jr., and this force reached Managua early on the morning of August 4.¹²⁹ On August 11, Mena's troops began a bombardment of the capital which lasted until the morning of August 14, most of the six hundred shells fired falling in the residential section of the city, and about forty of them dangerously close to the United States legation.¹³⁰ The American seamen, during the bombardment, remained in the legation as a guard against street mobs.

Meanwhile, Mr. Weitzel had recommended to the Department of State that an additional force of marines be sent to Nicaragua as soon as possible. Three hundred and fifty marines were available at Panama, and on August 5, President Taft authorized Secretary P. C. Knox to request the Navy Department to forward them.¹³¹ These marines, under Major Smedley D. Butler, U. S. M. C., reached Managua on August 14, soon after the end of the bombardment and were welcomed by natives and foreigners. They were for a short time quartered in private houses in the city, but soon moved into the open country near Loma, where they established a camp.

The revolt in the west had also produced a sympathetic disturbance at Bluefields in the east, and the Navy Department ordered the U. S. S. *Tacoma* to visit that port. She arrived on August 6, and remained until October 19, maintaining a landing party of about fifty men in the city for most of that time.¹³²

On August 10, the U. S. S. *Denver* was diverted from a cruise along the Mexican coast. The situation in Nicaragua

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 1036. See also the Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1912, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, p. 12.

¹³⁰ Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 1039. The shells killed or injured one hundred and thirty-two women and children, but not one man.

¹³¹ Ibid., pp. 1032-1033.

¹³² Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1912, p. 12.

became so serious, with urgent requests for protection from Americans and American corporations reaching the Department of State almost daily,¹³³ that eleven days later it was decided to send there an additional regiment of marines and the cruiser *California*.¹³⁴ Rear Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, reached Corinto on August 28, and assumed complete control of American operations in the western part of Nicaragua. The *California* landed her regiment of marines, under Colonel J. H. Pendleton, U. S. M. C., and soon afterward a small force was sent ashore from the *Denver*. These forces proceeded to Managua, reaching the city on September 6, after opening the railroad from the coast, rebuilding several bridges, and organizing train crews composed of seamen and marines.¹³⁵

The U. S. S. *Glacier*, with provisions, and the *Prometheus* and *Saturn*, with coal, followed by the cruisers *Colorado* and *Cleveland*, all gathered at Corinto. With the disembarkation of the landing party from the *Cleveland*, the last ship to arrive, on September 14, the number of seamen and marines ashore in Nicaragua reached a total of 2,350.¹³⁶ This force proved ample for carrying out the policy of the United States as announced on September 4 by the Acting Secretary of State, Huntington Wilson, who requested Mr. Weitzel to notify the Nicaraguan government that the United States intended "to take the necessary measures for an adequate legation guard at Managua, to keep open communications, and to protect American life and property" as well as "to contribute its influence in all appropriate ways to the restoration of lawful and orderly government in order that Nicaragua may resume its program of reforms unhampered by the vicious elements who would restore the methods of Zelaya."¹³⁷

¹³³ Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 1043. Two Americans were reported murdered; one hundred and twenty-five planters, about two dozen American firms, several banking houses and the railroad and steamship company, American owned, applied for protection. See also, *ibid.*, p. 1051.

¹³⁴ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1912, p. 12.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13; Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1051, 1052.

¹³⁶ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, pp. 12, 13.

¹³⁷ Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1043, 1044.

A battalion of three hundred and fifty marines under Major Butler and one hundred seamen from the *Annapolis* under Lieutenant Campbell began on September 15 to open the railroad from Managua to Granada,¹³⁸ now the headquarters of Mena's army, where the civilian population and foreign residents had been shamefully treated and forced to suffer many deprivations since the beginning of the revolution.¹³⁹ At Nindiri their train, carrying a white flag and the United States colors, was fired upon by a battery mounted on the Barranca. Major Butler sent a peremptory demand to General Zeleydon, of Mena's forces, to evacuate the Barranca and Coyotepe, hills which commanded the railroad line. When this was refused, the American forces advanced on October 4, and drove the revolutionary troops from these positions with a loss of four killed and five wounded.¹⁴⁰ Meanwhile Major Butler entered Granada on the morning of September 22, disarmed the revolutionists who were terrorizing the city, and found that Mena was confined to his bed in the San Francisco fortress by rheumatism. The rebel leader offered to turn over all his remaining forces and armament to Major Butler, who, after communicating with Admiral Southerland, then on his way to Granada, accepted the surrender. Admiral Southerland arrived on September 24 and immediately notified the legation at Managua that he had arranged to parole all of Mena's forces there and to take Mena under his protection, provided he would leave Nicaragua forever. President Diaz consented to this arrangement, and three months later the State Department at Washington also gave its approval.¹⁴¹

Conditions in Leon and Chinandega remained intolerable. On October 5, as an American column under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles G. Long, U. S. M. C., was nearing Leon, committees of prominent revolutionists offered to President

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 1052.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 1059, 1060.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 1053, 1057; Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1912, p. 13.

¹⁴¹ Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 1053, 1070. Mena was sent to Panama for safe keeping.

Diaz and to Colonel Long to surrender on the same terms as those granted to Mena. These offers were accepted, but those who made them, either through fear or treachery, fled from the city soon afterward. When Colonel Long's men entered Leon on the morning of October 6, to take control in accordance with the terms agreed upon, they were fired on. A sharp engagement followed, in which three Americans were killed and three wounded. The town was taken and the revolutionary troops disarmed. Within four days after the occupation of Leon, all organized opposition to the Diaz government collapsed.¹⁴²

Admiral Southerland then disposed his forces so that they occupied a line across a part of Nicaragua from Leon to Chinandega and made an effort to keep the Diaz or Government troops from coming in contact with any of the former revolutionists. None of the latter was permitted to come within two miles of any town in this area, and no reprisals of any sort were permitted in any place occupied by marines or seamen. The protection of the American forces was extended not only to foreigners but also to "all reputable Nicaraguans" in the district, and under these conditions the *pax Americana* soon settled on the disturbed republic.¹⁴³ By degrees the seamen and marines were withdrawn until, on November 14, when another Diaz, Adolfo, had been elected and seemed in a fair way to be inaugurated on January 1, the American fleet sailed from Corinto, leaving in Nicaragua only the marines from Panama. When their transport ar-

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 1057; Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1912, p. 13.

¹⁴³ Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 1061. The efforts of the Americans were not unappreciated by the Nicaraguans. "Daughters of this beloved soil which God has endowed with a prodigality of beauty and natural riches . . . celebrated with enthusiasm" their arrival upon its shores. Admiral Southerland, who left Granada before the ladies of the town recovered from the effects of Mena's occupation, received a bunch of flowers "which in their perfume carry for you and your great and generous country the tenderest feelings of the women." That "worthy subordinate officer," Major Smedley D. Butler, executed his mission with judgment and prudence and also received his reward. See *Ladies of Granada to Admiral W. H. H. Southerland*, *ibid.*, pp. 1062, 1063.

rived, these also withdrew on November 22, with the exception of one battalion under Colonel Long at Leon and one company under Captain Robert C. Underwood at Managua.¹⁴⁴ A gunboat was left at Corinto as a station ship and about one hundred marines were retained "temporarily" at Managua lest their withdrawal should "be construed as the tacit consent of the United States to renew hostilities."¹⁴⁵ This force gradually assumed the character of a permanent legation guard, and its final withdrawal on August 5, 1925, caused a ripple of surprise both in Nicaragua and in the United States.¹⁴⁶ During the thirteen years of their stay, the country enjoyed unusual peace and prosperity. Fifteen months after their departure, the fears of Mr. Weitzel, expressed to the Secretary of State on December 14, 1912,¹⁴⁷ were vindicated.

SECTION 69.—HAITI, 1914

Amid wild disorder at Port au Prince, Haiti, President Oreste abdicated on January 27, 1914,¹⁴⁸ and on the same day a force of one hundred and twenty seamen and marines was landed there from the U. S. S. *South Carolina* and *Montana* as a guard for the American legation and to protect foreign interests.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, His Imperial Germanic Majesty's ship *Vineta* sent ashore at Port au Prince a detachment of seventy men and soon afterward legation guards were landed from British and French cruisers. The successful revolutionary leader, Oreste Zamor, was elected president of Haiti on February 8, and as soon as his government established order throughout the capital the foreign guards were reembarked.

When the defeated army of Theodore, a minor rebel leader, evacuated the port of Cape Haitien on February 20 and left

¹⁴⁴ Foreign Relations, pp. 1067, 1068.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 1069.

¹⁴⁶ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1925, p. 606. The American public had forgotten that the marines were there. The people of Nicaragua had expected that they would stay forever.

¹⁴⁷ Foreign Relations, pp. 1067, 1068.

¹⁴⁸ Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 334.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 336.

no police or other organized forces to maintain order, a body of marines and seamen from the U. S. S. *Wheeling* landed and patrolled the streets during the night. The seamen returned to their ship next morning, but the marines remained on guard at the consulate until the troops of President Zamor, who occupied Cape Haitien on February 21, had restored orderly government.¹⁵⁰

When, the next autumn, Zamor was in his turn overthrown by a revolt, the marine detachment of the U. S. S. *Tacoma* landed at Cape Haitien and took control of the foreign settlement on October 19, retiring, as usual, as soon as the excitement attending the change in government was over.¹⁵¹ Elaborate precautions to prevent serious disorders in Haiti during this revolt were taken by the Navy Department. The U. S. S. *Kansas* and the transport *Hancock*, with eight hundred marines on board, were sent respectively to St. Marc and Port au Prince to be ready in case of need to protect American and foreign interests, but it proved unnecessary to order the marines ashore.¹⁵²

SECTION 70.—VERA CRUZ, MEXICO, APRIL 21-NOVEMBER 23, 1914

At noon on April 9, 1914, a paymaster in the United States Navy and seven seamen had just bought some cases of gasoline from a German merchant and were loading them into the whaleboat of the U. S. S. *Dolphin* at the Iturbide Dock, Tampico, Mexico, when they were arrested by a patrol of armed Mexican soldiers.¹⁵³ The fact that the boat was flying the American flag did not deter the Mexicans from taking two of the men out of it, or from marching all seven through the streets of the city, in the center of the patrol, until, near a railroad crossing, a Colonel Hinojosa inspected them and

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 336.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 354.

¹⁵² Ibid., pp. 355, 356, 357. The State Department at Washington was disturbed by the threat of European action in Haiti foreshadowed by the landing of foreign detachments at Port au Prince in January. Haiti had been irregular in her payments on foreign loans, and when the European war broke out, suspended them.

¹⁵³ Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 448.

immediately ordered them marched back again to their boat. About 1.30 o'clock they were released and allowed to return to the *Dolphin*.

Meanwhile, Admiral H. H. Mayo, the senior American naval officer at Tampico, had been informed of the incident by the German, who had put off in haste to the flagship as soon as he saw the *Dolphin's* men arrested. Mayo sent Lieutenant-Commander Earle ashore with side arms to investigate.¹⁵⁴ When Earle and the United States consul found General Zaragoza, commander of the Huertista troops at Tampico, the General declared that the Americans had been arrested by mistake and put the blame for the incident on Colonel Hinojosa. The same afternoon, Admiral Mayo sent a note to General Zaragoza demanding that an apology for the insult be brought to him by a member of his staff, that Colonel Hinojosa be severely punished, that the flag of the United States be hoisted in a prominent place in the city and saluted with twenty-one guns, which would be returned by the *Dolphin*, and that all this be done within twenty-four hours. After taking these steps on his own authority, Admiral Mayo notified Washington of the affair and his action.¹⁵⁵

The United States government, next day, sent Mr. Nelson O'Shaughnessy, chargé d'affaires at Mexico City, to see Huerta and find out what he proposed to do about Admiral Mayo's demands. Huerta would promise no more than punishment for Colonel Hinojosa, and appeared to think that the incident should have been closed with his colonel's short note of apology to the paymaster whom he had arrested.¹⁵⁶ Before the twenty-four hours allowed by Mayo's note to General Zaragoza had passed, the latter asked for another day's delay so that he could consult his government, alleging faulty communications. This request was granted by Mayo, and for

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 451.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 449.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 450.

two more days the Mexican government delayed action on one or another pretext.¹⁵⁷

The unpleasantness of the situation was increased on April 11, when the mail orderly of the U. S. S. *Minnesota*, lying at Vera Cruz with the *Florida*, was arrested in the post office of that port and publicly marched to jail, where, after he had been examined, he was released and his place in prison filled by the soldier who had caused his arrest. Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, who was senior to Mayo, was on board the *Florida*, and at once reported this incident to the Navy Department.¹⁵⁸

On April 14, O'Shaughnessy at Mexico City received a telegram from William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State, informing him that the United States ships *Michigan*, *Louisiana*, *New Hampshire*, *South Carolina*, *Arkansas*, *Vermont*, *New Jersey*, *Tacoma*, *Nashville*, and *Hancock*, the last a transport with a regiment of marines on board, had sailed from Hampton Roads for Vera Cruz.¹⁵⁹ O'Shaughnessy conveyed this news to Huerta, who said that he wished to submit the entire affair to the Hague Tribunal, and declared that he considered it an ideal case. Instead, he submitted it to the Mexican Senate in executive session.¹⁶⁰ When O'Shaughnessy returned next day for Huerta's answer, the Mexican president "unbosomed himself," complaining that "the policy of (the United States) toward him was the result of the machinations of his enemies," and that he favored "simultaneous salutes," for he did not believe that the *Dolphin* would return his salute since the President of the United States had not answered his Christmas telegram.¹⁶¹ Both O'Shaughnessy and the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs worked hard to bring about a peaceful solution of the difficulty, even going

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 451. Among others, Huerta declared that he could not countenance a salute during Holy Week.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 455, 465. Fletcher declared in his telegram that this incident was without significance and that the attitude of the Mexican authorities was correct, but a different view seems to have prevailed at Washington.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 459.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 461.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 464.

so far as to draw up a protocol in which the proposed exchange of salutes became a complicated ceremony.¹⁶² President Wilson and Secretary Bryan could see no necessity for such an instrument and refused to let the chargé d'affaires sign it.¹⁶³

At length, on April 20, President Wilson referred the matter to Congress in a special message, reviewing the Tampico and Vera Cruz insults along with others, and declaring that he had felt it his duty "to sustain Admiral Mayo in the whole of his demand and to insist that the flag of the United States should be saluted in such a way as to indicate a new spirit and attitude on the part of the Huertistas." He asked the approval of Congress toward his intended course in using the armed forces of the country "in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States."¹⁶⁴ The sanction of Congress was given by a large majority of both houses.¹⁶⁵

Before the armada from Hampton Roads, under Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger, reached Mexican waters, the Navy Department, in order to prevent the delivery of a large shipment of arms and ammunition to the Huertistas,¹⁶⁶ found it necessary to order Admiral Fletcher to seize the port of Vera Cruz.¹⁶⁷ Soon after daylight on April 21, a force of seven hundred and eighty-seven officers, seamen and marines from the *Florida*, *Utah* and *Prairie*, under the orders of Captain William R. Rush, U. S. N., landed without opposition and occupied the custom house, railroad station and yards.¹⁶⁸ Soon after they had obtained their objective the Americans were heavily fired upon by snipers from the housetops of the

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 469.

¹⁶³ Ibid., pp. 470, 471.

¹⁶⁴ Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XVII, pp. 7935, 7936. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 475, 476.

¹⁶⁵ The vote was, in the House, 323 to 29; in the Senate, 72 to 13.

¹⁶⁶ Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 477.

¹⁶⁷ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1914, p. 50.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, p. 141. The U. S. Consul at Vera Cruz reported the landing took place at 11.30 A. M.

city and four men were killed and twenty-two wounded.¹⁶⁹ The resistance of the Mexicans stiffened and, at 3 A. M. on April 22, while the fleet shelled the southern part of the city, forces were landed from the *San Francisco* and the *Arkansas*; and as the ships under Admiral Badger arrived during the day their landing parties of seamen and marines joined the forces in the city. Sharp fighting continued until April 23, when the whole of Vera Cruz was in the hands of the Americans. Rear Admiral Fletcher assumed command of all the operations ashore on April 22, and retained this position until the arrival of a brigade of the United States army under General Frederick Funston on April 30.¹⁷⁰ By April 30, the number of marines ashore at Vera Cruz reached 107 officers and 3148 men. After the troops under General Funston were ashore the seamen from the fleet were withdrawn to their ships, but the marines remained as part of the forces of occupation¹⁷¹ until these were all withdrawn on November 23. The American casualties in the operations were nineteen killed and about sixty-three wounded.¹⁷²

Soon after order was restored in Vera Cruz, Admiral Fletcher urged the civil authorities to resume their usual functions, and when they were unwilling to do so, himself took charge of the administration of the government of the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., Report of the Surgeon General, p. 358. The necessity for landing forces on the Mexican coast had for more than a year seemed so imminent to the fleet surgeons that they had worked out in every detail "the equipment of the landing forces, the organization of the Medical and Hospital Corps, and the sanitary organization to take charge of the public health and sanitation of whatever cities might be occupied" (See *ibid.*, p. 358).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., Report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, pp. 470-471; Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 491.

¹⁷¹ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1914, p. 141. A force of 28 officers and 1,100 marines was held off the west coast of Mexico from April to July on three vessels, but returned to San Diego, Cal., without landing (see p. 470).

¹⁷² The reports vary between 15 killed and 56 wounded (Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, *ibid.*, p. 142) to 17 killed and 63 wounded (Surgeon General, p. 358), and 19 killed (Secretary of the Navy, p. 50). The account in Foreign Relations puts the dead at 24.

city.¹⁷³ Naval officers were installed as collector of customs and as fiscal agent, and remained in those offices until the evacuation,¹⁷⁴ although Admiral Fletcher retired in favor of General Funston when the army arrived and established military government in Vera Cruz.

In the meantime, when the news of the occupation of Vera Cruz reached Mexico City, O'Shaughnessy was handed his passports, diplomatic relations were broken off, and for some months American affairs in Mexico were handled by the Brazilian minister.¹⁷⁵ The three great powers of South America, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, offered the services of their representatives at Washington in an effort at mediation, and on May 20, at Niagara Falls, Canada, a conference assembled for this purpose. Under pressure, Huerta resigned as President of Mexico on July 15, and was succeeded by General Carrvajal. He in turn, was driven out of the capital by Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa on August 12, and eight days later Carranza assumed the executive power. Although Villa soon afterward charged Carranza with ingratitude and began to make trouble, upon the latter's promise to respect the lives and property of Americans in Mexico the army of occupation was withdrawn.¹⁷⁶

SECTION 71.—OPERATIONS IN DOMINICAN WATERS, JUNE AND JULY, 1914

A revolution against the government of José Bordas Valdés, president of the Dominican Republic, began at La Vega, Santiago, on March 30, 1914.¹⁷⁷ On June 17, Captain Rus-

¹⁷³ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, p. 50.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

¹⁷⁵ Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 490-491.

¹⁷⁶ See *ibid.*, 1914, pp. 497-626; 1916, pp. 474-476; Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1915, p. 762. For an account of the relations between the United States and Mexico before and after the Vera Cruz affair, see John H. Latané, *American Foreign Policy*, pp. 669-674; World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, VI, No. 1; J. Fred. Rippy, *The United States and Mexico*, *passim*.

¹⁷⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, p. 222. For an exposition of the paternal interest of the United States in Dominican affairs, see *ibid.*, p. 205 ff.

sell of the U. S. S. *South Carolina*, lying at Puerto Plata, notified President and General Valdés, the troops acting in his interests, and the commander of the Dominican gunboat *Independencia* that a bombardment of Puerto Plata would be answered by the forces under his orders and would entail the destruction of the Dominican gunboats *Independencia* and *Jacagua*. Nine days later the government troops began a "careful" bombardment of the town, and soon afterward the U. S. S. *Machias* opened fire on the Valdés batteries. The shelling of the city stopped.¹⁷⁸ The Dominican government protested bitterly to Washington, but Secretary of State Byran approved the action of Captain Russell.¹⁷⁹

On July 14, at Santo Domingo City, the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Castine* informed the Dominican government that the city must be a neutral zone during impending hostilities and that no firing upon it by the troops of either party would be permitted. The Dominican government agreed to observe this order, and expressed its willingness to ask the assistance of the United States in suppressing the rebels under Vidal.¹⁸⁰

SECTION 72.—OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915

While troubled conditions in Mexico were still requiring the constant presence of American cruisers along her coasts,¹⁸¹ the development of a revolutionary movement in Haiti during the last week of June, 1915, caused the State Department to request that a naval force be sent there for the protection of American interests. Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, com-

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 239 and 244.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 245.

¹⁸¹ See Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1915, pp. 11, 12. In June an expeditionary force of three hundred marines was embarked on the U. S. S. *Colorado* at San Diego, California, and sent to Guyamas, Mexico. Raids by Yaqui Indians upon the property of American settlers in the Yaqui Valley, about twenty miles inland from Guyamas, were causing grave anxiety for the safety of the Americans, and the marines were held on board the *Colorado* in readiness to go to their rescue if necessary. Conditions improved, and the marines were not landed, but, after six weeks in Mexican

manding the Cruiser Squadron, was immediately ordered to Haitian waters with the U. S. S. *Washington*.¹⁸²

Learning on July 27 that the revolutionists had overthrown the government of Vilbrün Guillaume Sam and put to death about seventy political prisoners, including ex-President Oreste Zamor, Admiral Caperton left the U. S. S. *Eagle* at Cape Haitien, where she had landed twenty marines at the request of the French consul, and hastened to Port au Prince. There he found that President Guillaume Sam and his cabinet had taken refuge in the French and Dominican legations, and that a mob of about sixty revolutionists had broken into these legations, seized Guillaume Sam and cut him to pieces, and paraded about the city with the fragments of his body. There appeared to be no governmental authority in the city, and Admiral Caperton, after communicating with the Department of State, on July 28 landed about one hundred and forty marines¹⁸³ under arms for the purpose of preventing further rioting and the protection of the lives and property of foreign residents. On the next day another company of marines, hurried across from Guantanamo, was sent ashore, making a total American force in Port au Prince of about two hundred and forty. Such revolutionary authority as existed assented to the landing.¹⁸⁴ No serious resistance was encountered.

While an attempt was being made by a committee of Haitians to disarm all native soldiers and civilians and to bring about the election of a president by the assembly, on July 30 a party of Haitians made an attack on the American forces at Port au Prince. The attackers were driven off, but two Americans were killed. On the same day the French cruiser *Descartes* reached the city and, because of the violation of the French legation on July 27, landed a guard on July 31.

waters, returned to San Diego on August 10. (See the report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, *ibid.*, p. 763).

¹⁸² Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1915, p. 15.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 673; Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Five hundred more marines were ordered to Haiti by the Navy Department, and sailed aboard the U. S. S. *Connecticut* on July 31, being sent ashore as soon as they reached Port au Prince.¹⁸⁵

When it became apparent there were too many political factions in Haiti, each of which was making a desperate effort to obtain control of the government, and that a peaceful settlement of the affairs of the country, including the legitimate election of a new president and the reestablishment of order, could not be brought about without the assistance of foreign forces, six American vessels were despatched to Haitian waters, and the expeditionary force ashore was increased to two thousand marines, under command of Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller.¹⁸⁶ Ten of the principal ports of the country were occupied,¹⁸⁷ and military control over them assumed. The American marines took no offensive action against any of the Haitians without provocation, but on several occasions bands of Cacos, or hill bandits, who remained hostile to the marines throughout their occupation of the country, endeavored to cut off supplies and communications from the forces at Cape Haitian and Gonaives, and conflicts occurred.

A new president, Dartiguenave, was elected on August 12 and at once assumed office. A treaty between the United States and Haiti was ratified by the Haitian congress on November 11,¹⁸⁸ and, for all practical purposes under the military control of the United States, the Haitians began the work of establishing a stable government in their country. A considerable body of United States marines, assisted by one or two small cruisers, was maintained at strategic points in Haiti, preventing, so far as possible, armed outbreaks, and supporting the actions of a financial advisor, appointed by

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 763.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16. Part of this additional force landed on August 15, and the remainder on August 31 (see *ibid.*, p. 763). The force included a battalion of artillery, with twelve 3-inch field guns and two heavy pieces.

¹⁸⁷ Cape Haitien, Port de Paix, Gonaives, St. Marc, Port au Prince, Petit Goave, Miragoane, Jeremie, Les Cayes and Jacmel.

¹⁸⁸ Malloy, *Treaties and Conventions*, III, 2673.

the President of the United States, who had, under the treaty, almost dictatorial powers over the revenues of the country. A native constabulary, provided for in the treaty, which consisted, when organized by Colonel Smedley D. Butler, of one hundred and twelve American officers and 2500 Haitian gendarmes, assisted in bringing about an orderly condition throughout most of the state, so that it was possible, in May, 1916, to withdraw a large part of the forces of occupation and transfer these marines to Santo Domingo where they were needed.¹⁸⁹

The American casualties in Haiti, from the landing in 1915 until October, 1920, numbered forty-one, of whom thirteen were killed.¹⁹⁰ Between 1921 and 1927 no serious fighting took place between the marines and the Haitian people. Civil government was restored on July 12, 1924, but the United States retained control of the finances of the republic, and in March, 1927, a force of about five hundred marines was still on guard in Haiti.¹⁹¹

SECTION 73.—OCCUPATION OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, MAY,
1916-AUGUST, 1925

While American marines were still engaged in pacifying and cleaning up Haitian towns after the revolutionary disturbance of 1915, W. W. Russell, United States minister to the Dominican Republic, cabled the Department of State that he believed trouble was imminent at the other end of the island. Apparently upon such a gentle hint, Secretary Lansing informed Mr. Russell on January 24, 1916, that he might tell the Dominican President, Jiménez, "that this Government will, if requested, furnish the forces necessary to suppress insurrection and maintain order," and that such support would be conditioned upon his making every effort

¹⁸⁹ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1916, pp. 72, 73. For a detailed account of the occupation of Haiti, from 1915 until 1920, see *ibid.*, 1920, pp. 222-320.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1920, p. 311.

¹⁹¹ The Sun (Baltimore), March 13, 1927.

"to insure honest, efficient and popular Government for his people."¹⁹²

On April 15, Desiderio Arias, Dominican Minister of War, incensed at the treatment accorded some of his friends by President Jiménez, began to gather his faction about him, and for the next two weeks the United States minister was forced to exert all his efforts to prevent the President from resigning his office.¹⁹³ Moved by this situation, the government at Washington notified Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton at Port au Prince of its intention to support the "constituted authorities by all proper means" and directed him to cooperate with the United States gunboat *Castine* at Santo Domingo City. On May 1, Arias brought troops into the Dominican House of Representatives and secured by force the impeachment of the President, whereupon Mr. Russell cabled, "we must stand by the President at all hazards in spite of any action of this present Congress. Any further parleying with Arias will lessen our prestige."¹⁹⁴ Next day the U. S. S. *Prairie*, with two companies of marines hurriedly collected from Haiti, reached Santo Domingo City and, since Arias was in full possession of the town, the commanders of the *Castine* and the *Prairie* went into conference with him. Meanwhile the streets were patrolled "by irresponsible groups of soldiers and armed civilians."¹⁹⁵ At this juncture, Mr. Russell informed the State Department on May 3: "In view of probable landing [American] troops here tomorrow which may not be understood in other parts of [the] Republic as being for protection of American Legation, Consulate, American citizens, and in view of the fact that there are in other parts of the country Americans who would be in danger, I request additional ships be sent here with force sufficient to protect American life and property." Two days later fight-

¹⁹² Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 220, 221.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 223.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 223; Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1916, p. 764, Report of the Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 1916.

ing began, and the *Prairie* landed her two companies of marines for the protection of the legation, while a small force of seamen from the *Castine* went ashore and guarded the massed foreigners in the Haitian legation. Mr. Russell again wired that conditions in other parts of the republic demanded the presence of more ships, and Secretary Lansing reassured him with the news that a brace of destroyers had been sent to each of the towns of Puerto Plata, Macoris, and Sanchez.

Early on the morning of May 6, President Jiménez, finding that his army was out of ammunition, requested the American forces to capture Santo Domingo City for him.¹⁹⁶ Seven more companies of marines from Haiti were now on the way and were fully capable of doing this, but at the last moment the president, "forced by family and Cabinet, resigned rather than face the responsibility for loss of life and disastrous consequences that would result from [the] capture of the city by our forces."¹⁹⁷ The president's resignation was placed in the hands of Mr. Russell, who then took up the burden of sustaining in office and authority the four remaining cabinet ministers. Arias denied their powers; and the United States minister, finding that the total American force at the capital was less than five hundred, wired Secretary Lansing, "The senior naval officer here thinks that this is sufficient but I do not agree with him. I therefore request that a regiment of marines be sent here at once."¹⁹⁸

Admiral Caperton arrived at Santo Domingo City, and on May 13 arranged a conference there between himself, Mr. Russell and General Arias, at the close of which the Admiral delivered an ultimatum to the revolutionary leader, declaring that if "the rebel forces" then in the capital did not disarm and surrender their equipment to the American marines by 6 A. M. on Monday, May 15, he intended to occupy the city and forcibly disarm them. The next morning the Admiral

¹⁹⁶ Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 224.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 225.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 225.

came ashore to learn that Arias and his troops had abandoned the city during the time specified, taking with them the convicts from the prison and as much as they could carry of arms and ammunition.¹⁹⁹ The marines then entered the town without opposition, and it was expected that Congress would begin again to elect a president. On the following afternoon, Mr. Russell cabled the State Department that he believed no good would come to Santo Domingo by the immediate election of a president because it was probable that Arias or his candidate would be elected. Arias was near the city waiting to hear the result of the Congress' deliberations, and if he were elected all Mr. Russell's efforts for the past month would be nullified. If he should not gain the presidency, the chances were that Arias would start a revolution. He suggested that the Dominican Congress be prevented from electing anyone until peace was restored in the entire country and the occasion was favorable for the elimination of Arias. The State Department concurred in this view, and Secretary Lansing inquired whether Mr. Russell thought that, if the existing government carried on by the four remaining Cabinet Ministers did not suit him, the exigencies of the situation might not warrant, in the light of Mr. Russell's interpretation of the true sentiments of the Dominican Congress, consideration as to whether, after all, President Jiménez's resignation had been valid.²⁰⁰ Secretary Lansing also asked for a report as to whether "the complete disarmament of the revolutionary element throughout the country" might not be opportunely effected.

The Dominican Congress ignored Mr. Russell's request to postpone the presidential election, and the House of Representatives selected Dr. Henríquez, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Admiral Caperton sent a peremptory demand to the Senate that it make no move to vote. So matters stood for a few days, and on May 30 Admiral Caperton

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 226.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 227-229.

ordered the landing of American forces at Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi, and instructed the senior officers at those ports to take only such military action as might be necessary to "protect United States forces ashore, preserve peace, lives, protection and property of American citizens and other foreigners and to [uphold] constituted authority."²⁰¹

On June 1, a battalion made up of the marine detachments from the old battleships *New Jersey* and *Rhode Island*,²⁰² and a party of seamen from the U. S. S. *Sacramento*, effected a landing at Puerto Plata. In this operation, Captain Herbert J. Hirshinger, U. S. M. C., was killed. On June 5, two companies sent from Santo Domingo went ashore at the same port, and on the following day the artillery battalion and two companies landed at Monte Cristi. Admiral Caperton had reported to the Navy Department that an additional regiment would be needed to complete the pacification of the interior of Santo Domingo, and on June 21 and 22, the Fourth Marine Regiment disembarked at Monte Cristi.²⁰³ Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton assumed command of all American forces ashore in the Dominican Republic, and was directed by Admiral Caperton to occupy Santiago, seventy-five miles inland from Monte Cristi. At this time Santiago was held by the revolutionary forces, as was most of the interior.

Four days were spent in preparation, and on June 26 the American column, of about eight hundred and fifty men, with artillery, advanced from the port of Monte Cristi. Roads were bad, bridges had been destroyed, and the revolutionists resisted strongly. On July 3²⁰⁴ it was found necessary to

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 229-230.

²⁰² The marine guards from these two battleships and the *Yuma*, all recently placed in reserve, sailed for Santo Domingo on the cruisers *Salem* and *Memphis* on May 21.

²⁰³ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1916, p. 764. The Fourth Regiment, under Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, had left San Diego, California, on June 6.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 765, Report of the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, *ibid.*, p. 73, says June 30.

bring in the train and cut off communications with the coast, but next day a force of three companies under Major Hiram I. Bearss, which had been gallantly advancing along the railroad from Puerto Plata, driving back a superior body of revolutionists, succeeded in clearing the line to Navarrete and effecting a junction with the main column, thereby restoring a line of supply to the coast. Up to this point the American forces had fought a series of brief but sharp skirmishes with the Dominicans,²⁰⁵ taking several strong positions under a heavy fire, and sustaining a loss of two men killed and two officers and sixteen men wounded.²⁰⁶ After the capture of Navarrete, through the negotiations of a peace commission, it was arranged that the revolutionists should put down their arms and that a provisional government should be established. General Arias surrendered to the Government of Santiago,²⁰⁷ and on July 6 the American column entered that city without opposition. Soon afterward, all important points in the interior were occupied, and within a short time the pax Americana prevailed.

The losses of the marines during the operations in Santo Domingo until the capture of Santiago were one officer and three men killed, and two officers and seventeen men wounded.²⁰⁸ The number of Dominicans killed and wounded was not estimated.

Peace was not permanent, however. During October, several attacks were made upon the forces of occupation and several marines were killed.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the Dominican President, Dr. Francisco Henríquez,²¹⁰ who had been elected for a term of five months, seemed bent on convoking the electoral college for the purpose of electing senators and representatives, and, when it became apparent that most of these

²⁰⁵ See the somewhat florid account given in the Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Josephus Daniels), 1916, pp. 73, 74.

²⁰⁶ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1916, p. 766.

²⁰⁷ Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 232.

²⁰⁸ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1916, p. 766.

²⁰⁹ Foreign Relations, 1916, pp. 238, 239.

²¹⁰ A brother of the Dr. Henríquez mentioned earlier in this section.

would be supporters of Arias, who would probably elect the General when *Henríquez's* term expired, the State Department at Washington, in conference with Mr. Russell and some naval officers, decided on November 21 that no time should be lost in putting the Dominican Republic under martial law. Convinced that this course was the least of several evils, President Wilson, "with the deepest reluctance," approved and authorized it, and on November 29, a proclamation establishing military control of the republic was published at Santo Domingo City.²¹¹ Captain H. S. Knapp, who had relieved Admiral Caperton in command of the cruiser force in Santo Dominican waters, became military governor.

On December 4, the Dominican minister at Washington, Sr. A. Pérez Perdomo, presented to the Secretary of State a frank and bitter protest from his government against this "unexampled act in contempt of the sovereignty of the Dominican people which . . . brought to a climax the illegal course of the forces of American intervention."²¹² The military control remained in operation in Santo Domingo until July 12, 1924, when an independent native government was reestablished, and the last of the marines was withdrawn in August, 1925.²¹³

SECTION 74.—CUBA, 1917

Early in February, 1917, as the time for a presidential election in Cuba drew near, the political situation in the island became dangerous to peace, and the government of the United States watched with anxiety certain signs of increasing unrest.²¹⁴ Rioting began on February 11, and by the following day it became evident that an organized revolution-

²¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1916, pp. 240-243, 246, 247.

²¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 244, 245.

²¹³ George H. Blakeslee, *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States* (1925), p. 117. For a brief statement of American aims in the Dominican Republic before and during the occupation, see Herman G. James and Percy A. Martin, *The Republics of Latin America*, 1923, pp. 430-434.

²¹⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 350.

ary movement was at work in Camaguey and Santa Clara provinces. While as yet no hostility toward Americans or their interests had been displayed, Secretary of State Robert Lansing transmitted to William E. Gonzales, American Minister at Havana, a statement of the attitude of the United States toward the new movement and, as disorder increased, on February 15 Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels ordered naval vessels to Havana and Santiago.²¹⁵

Rioting occurred near Santiago, the banks were closed, and the rebels began to burn sugar cane in the fields, along with some of the railway loading scales. When the British consul at Santiago asked his minister at Havana for warships, the latter informed Gonzales that he entrusted the protection of British interests in Cuba to the United States government.²¹⁶

By February 25 it became clear that the extent of the rising was not so great as the revolutionary leaders had expected. The Cuban army remained generally loyal. But Santiago was held by the rebels and conditions in Camaguey and Oriente provinces were chaotic. Gonzales cabled to Lansing:

Next week or ten days will probably reveal what policy [of insurgents] will be. If it is destruction of property only quick action by the United States can prevent huge material losses. If that action takes form of giving physical aid to Cuban Government it can be exerted most readily by occupying ten or twelve ports and keeping open Cuban Railway, an American corporation. This alone would offer security to hundreds of American estates. If such support is given, the earlier it comes after need is determined, the greater its moral influence, and the greater its utility in releasing Cuban troops to suppress bandits.²¹⁷

On February 26, two hundred and twenty marines were landed near Guantanamo and two companies of the marine guard of the *Connecticut* were sent ashore at San Francisco.²¹⁸ Three days later Lansing cabled Gonzales to inform

²¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 353-360. The gunboats *Dixie* and *Machias* went to Havana and Santiago respectively.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 366.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 367.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 369.

President Menocal that, since the rebellion was crushed and as any further loss of life would be fruitless, he should make it clear by a proclamation that when the insurgents put down their arms elections would be held in Santa Clara and Oriente provinces and an amnesty granted to those who had taken part in the revolt. To that end, the United States offered its good offices. He instructed Gonzales to press for urgency, and to explain to Menocal that the destruction which had already occurred and which was bound to be increased by further fighting would probably force the United States "to take such action as might destroy the moral effect of the Constitutional Government's successes."²¹⁹

President Menocal replied on March 3, explaining why he did not wish to follow the suggestion of the United States government, but on March 8 he issued a statement along the lines advised in Lansing's message to Gonzales. Meanwhile marine detachments from the *South Carolina*, *Michigan*, *Machias*, *Montana*, *New York*, *Texas*, and *Olympia*, three companies of marines from the *New Hampshire*, *Vermont*, and *Maine*, and a battalion of three companies despatched from the United States were sent ashore in Cuba to assist landing parties from the *Eagle* and *Paducah* in escorting foreigners to the coast, guarding railway lines and bridges, and preventing military operations within the limits of the more important ports.²²⁰

During April the attitude of the rebels toward Americans in Cuba became bitter. Apparently their leaders had counted upon intervention by the United States and the friendly attitude of the American navy.²²¹ Wild reports of damage and destruction reached the State Department.²²² These were declared false by Gonzales and James L. Rodgers, United States Consul General at Havana, who reported on April 30 that he had established the fact that no Americans had been

²¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 371, 372.

²²⁰ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1917, pp. 26, 27, 840; Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 381, 424.

²²¹ Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 372, 400.

²²² Ibid., pp. 425-428.

harméd in the revolutionary districts.²²³ Nevertheless, on May 10 Secretary Lansing informed Secretary of War Newton D. Baker that conditions in Cuba were unsatisfactory and that American properties were in danger.²²⁴ He added that he had been warned by the National Council of Defense that it considered the production of sugar in Cuba of the utmost importance for the Allied and Associated Powers in prosecuting the war with Germany, and emphasized the need of protecting that commodity from further destruction in the field. Finally he asked the Secretary of War whether it would be possible to send to Cuba at short notice a part of the United States army to aid the Cuban government in protecting sugar growing properties and restoring order in Oriente.

Secretary Baker replied that the army could supply a force when requested, and on May 15 Lansing instructed Gonzales to make every effort to obtain from Menocal an agreement permitting the landing of United States troops for the protection of sugar estates. The troops might be sent to Guantanamo ostensibly for training and held there in readiness for any emergency.²²⁵ President Menocal at once reviewed the progress made by his forces against the revolutionists and attempted to show that the presence of further American forces was unnecessary.²²⁶ On May 18 Lansing cabled to Gonzales that he should explain to Menocal that conditions in Haiti made necessary the presence there of marines then stationed in Cuba, and that other forces would be sent to replace them as they were withdrawn.²²⁷

Meanwhile the main body of rebels, about two thousand men under the revolutionary generals Vidal, Gonzales and Lopez, had surrendered at Santiago on May 17.²²⁸ The paci-

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 429.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 403, 404.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 406.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

fication of Santa Clara and Oriente provinces proceeded rapidly thereafter. President Menocal and Vice-President Nuñez were inaugurated on May 20 without disorder. By May 24 nearly all of the United States marines in Cuba had been withdrawn and hurried to Haiti.²²⁹ Although on May 18 Secretary Lansing had requested Secretary Baker to send two regiments of the United States army to Cuba,²³⁰ this was not immediately done. On July 12, F. L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, asked Gonzales to explain to Menocal that the United States would like to send troops to Cuba to replace the departed marines. Two days later the Cuban President gave his cordial assent and also declared that the United States might use training camp sites in Cuba for winter training if this were found desirable.²³¹

SECTION 75.—OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA, DECEMBER 23, 1926

When the government of President Adolfo Díaz, which came into power in Nicaragua on November 14, 1926, and was recognized by the United States two days later, found itself faced by serious opposition from a rival Liberal government under Juan B. Sacasa, who had been inaugurated on December 2 by his followers, Díaz lost no time in proclaiming that the Liberal revolutionists were being aided and supported by Mexico.²³² The Mexican Foreign Office denied this charge, as did also Dr. Sacasa, who styled himself Constitutional President of Nicaragua, but on December 15, in a message to the Nicaraguan Congress, Díaz reiterated his statement and three days later declared his belief that the United States would not "stand aloof and allow Mexico to overthrow a Nicaraguan Government recognized by the United States."²³³ While the Liberal forces were achieving

²²⁹ Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1917, p. 840.

²³⁰ Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 409.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

²³² Charles W. Hackett, "Rival Governments in Nicaragua," in *Current History*, February, 1927, pp. 734, 735. This article contains a brief and excellent summary of the political situation in Nicaragua since January 1, 1925.

²³³ Mexico had recognized the Sacasa government on December 8.

a series of successes, on December 23 and 28 Díaz repeated his bids for American intervention and elaborated his charges that Mexico was aiding the Sacasa faction.

On December 23, Rear Admiral Julian Latimer, commanding the United States cruiser force in the Caribbean, landed sailors and marines at Bluefields and at Rio Grande Bar, and on the day following, sent ashore additional forces at Puerto Cabezas, the capital city of the Liberal faction.²³⁴ According to the Department of State, this action was taken in order to protect American lives and property in the disturbed areas after appeals for protection had been received from American citizens "having interests in that district."²³⁵ A neutral zone, which included all the territory lying within rifle range of the American properties at these ports, was established by order of Admiral Latimer immediately after his forces landed, and all Nicaraguans within this zone were required to disarm. Dr. Sacasa and his troops were given permission to leave the zone at Puerto Cabezas under arms provided they did so before 4 P. M. on December 24. A censorship on radio stations within the neutral zones was enforced for a week, being lifted after Dr. Sacasa had registered a protest against it with the Department of State.

Dr. T. S. Vaca, representing the Sacasa government at Washington, on December 25 protested against the landing of American forces at Puerto Cabezas on the ground that such action was intervention, and denied that American property there had been endangered. On the next day, Señor Salamon de la Selva, secretary of the Nicaraguan Federation of Labor, asked officials of the American Federation of Labor "to exercise its influence against the landing of armed forces in Nicaragua . . . to aid reactionary rulers."²³⁶ On December 28, Senator Moses introduced a resolution calling upon President

²³⁴ Current History, March, 1927, p. 735; United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LIII, No. 288 (February, 1927), p. 229.

²³⁵ An unofficial report stated that there were two American fruit and five mahogany companies at Puerto Cabezas, and more than 1000 Americans.

²³⁶ Quoted in Current History, February, 1927, p. 736.

Coolidge for information as to the action taken or contemplated by American forces in Nicaragua, and on January 19, the President sent to Congress a message in which he defended the speedy recognition of the Díaz government by the United States and the steps taken by Admiral Latimer, and stressed the anarchic conditions prevailing in Nicaragua since the withdrawal of American marines in 1925, as well as the aid given to the Liberals by Mexico.

Fighting between the opposing factions still continued, especially in the interior, and on January 10, Admiral Latimer announced the establishment of three more neutral zones on or near the eastern coast: at Pearl Lagoon; another at Prinzapulka, sixty miles to the north; and the last at Rama, twenty-five miles up the Rio Escondido, where there were American mahogany concessions. Meanwhile the Navy Department had despatched more cruisers and transports to Nicaraguan waters, and by the end of January the American forces ashore and along the coasts numbered about 5000 men and fifteen ships.²³⁷

When the Liberals, prevented from fighting near their strongholds along the eastern coast by the American neutral zones, carried the war westward toward Managua and threatened to cut the national capital off from its port on the Pacific, about six hundred seamen from the U. S. S. *Galveston*, *Milwaukee*, and *Raleigh* were landed at Corinto on February 20, and stationed as guards along the railroad to the capital. Upon the arrival of a brigade of marines equipped with artillery and six airplanes, which sailed from Norfolk on February 23 under the command of Brigadier General Logan Feland, Admiral Latimer relieved the sailors ashore. Meanwhile more neutral zones were set up at Corinto, Managua and Leon, after which only two large towns in Nicaragua, Matagalpa and Granada, were free from that form of protection.²³⁸

²³⁷ United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LIII, No. 289 (March, 1927), p. 366.

²³⁸ Ibid., LIII, No. 290 (April, 1927), p. 493.

On February 20 President Díaz proposed to the United States government an alliance offering this country practically a protectorate over Nicaragua. The proposals included financial supervision, a military mission, and a loan of \$20,000,000. Toward this advance the attitude of the State Department at Washington was not favorable.²³⁹

Early in April, Henry L. Stimson was sent to Nicaragua as the special representative of President Coolidge for the purpose of conferring with the naval and diplomatic agents of the United States and the Nicaraguan leaders and, if possible, producing a formula which would be acceptable to all parties. He reached Managua before the end of the month and after brief negotiations, at a conference at Tipitapa, on May 3, secured the hesitant agreement of the representatives of Sacasa to an armistice. On May 11, a second meeting at Tipitapa, attended by Sacasa's commander-in-chief, General J. M. Moncada, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Latimer, Minister Eberhardt, and General Feland, led to the completion of an agreement by which the insurgent troops were to disarm. This agreement was immediately ratified by all the leaders of the Sacasa forces except one, Sandino. Four days later, as the insurgent armies began delivering their arms and equipment into the custody of the United States marines, Mr. Stimson felt justified in telegraphing to the State Department that the civil war in Nicaragua was "definitely ended."²⁴⁰

SECTION 76.—OPERATIONS IN CHINA, 1926-1927

: With the breaking up of organized government that followed in the wake of the Cantonese or Nationalist forces, as the fortunes of a strange sort of civil war permitted them to come over the mountains from their native province of Kwangtung into the Hunan district, the situation of foreigners resident in China, and particularly along the Yangtze

²³⁹ Isaac Joslin Cox, *Nicaragua and the United States, 1909-1927*, in *World Peace Foundation Pamphlets*, X, No. 7, contains a full and able account of the relations between the two nations.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 797-802.

Valley, became perilous. Hostility toward foreigners, always latent, flared up in demonstrations and rioting. Although an effort was made by the diplomatic and naval officers of the United States to evacuate as many Americans as possible before disaster should overtake them, a considerable number, for reasons which must have seemed good to them in view of the obvious and increasing danger, found it expedient to remain at their posts. Attempts to protect these citizens and their property, and to evacuate them safely when their withdrawal became imperative, involved American naval forces in thirty-seven distinct clashes with Chinese troops between September 3, 1926, and May 27, 1927.²⁴¹

Thirty-one of these incidents occurred when American naval vessels or merchant ships under their protection were fired upon by Chinese troops from the banks of the Yangtze river or from other vessels. Invariably the naval forces held their fire until the Chinese had opened upon them with rifles, machine guns and in some cases with field guns. On twenty-five occasions, when a definite target was offered by the Chinese marksmen, the ships returned their fire, usually with machine guns but occasionally with their main batteries. During these encounters eleven American seamen were wounded. The number of casualties caused among the Chinese has not been estimated.²⁴²

Between September and June it became necessary on six occasions to land armed forces for the preservation of American lives and property. When the inhabitants of Hankow, on September 3, 1926, became terrified by the advance of the Cantonese upon the Han cities and thousands of panic-stricken natives stormed into the foreign concessions with their goods,

²⁴¹ For detailed and most able accounts of the operations of United States forces in China during the critical period, see Lieutenant Commander Glenn Howell, U. S. N., "Operations of the United States Navy on the Yangtze River—September, 1926, to June, 1927," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LIV, No. 302 (April, 1928), pp. 273-286; and Lieutenant Commander Roy C. Smith, Jr., U. S. N., "Nanking, March 24, 1927," in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LIV, No. 299 (January, 1928), pp. 1-21.

²⁴² For brief detailed accounts of these actions see Howell, *op. cit.*, 275-278.

when the streets were choked and the situation completely out of control, the Chinese authorities requested assistance from the United States naval vessels in the port for the purpose of restoring order. Immediately full landing parties from the American ships were sent ashore and ordered to take up a position in the former Russian concession. This force remained in Hankow, cooperating with British, French and Japanese forces, until September 16, when conditions permitted their withdrawal.

From November 5 to 7 United States seamen were stationed in Kiukiang to protect American lives and property during the crisis attending the fall of the city to the Cantonese. A small force from the United States gunboat *Elcano* landed at Ichang on December 17 to guard Americans there during an engagement between Chinese armies. After noon on January 3, 1927, wild rioting broke out along the edge of the British concession at Hankow. The local police, assisted by a force from British ships on the river, proved unable to control the disturbance, and at nightfall an American landing party was sent into the British concession to help protect citizens of the United States while they were being evacuated. Before morning, when all the Americans had been removed to safety, the naval party was withdrawn.²⁴³

On March 21, as the Cantonese advanced toward Shanghai, it became necessary to station an international force in the city to protect the International Settlement and the French concession from looting and destruction. United States seamen and marines were landed. From time to time these were relieved and reenforced. In May, 1928, a force of about fifteen hundred marines was still stationed at Shanghai.

During the winter of 1926-1927 the flotilla known as the United States Yangtze Patrol, usually consisting of six river gun boats, was heavily reenforced by the addition of several destroyers and a light cruiser.

The most serious affair, which must have been far more disastrous except for the remarkable coolness, determination

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 279.

and self-control displayed by almost all the Americans, both naval and civilian, concerned in it, took place at Nanking on March 24. For weeks before that time foreign consuls had warned their nationals that trouble would occur when the Cantonese or Nationalist troops entered the city and had tried to evacuate as many as possible to Shanghai. About one hundred American women and children departed, but when, on March 23, the Cantonese surrounded Nanking, there still remained sixty-eight men, one hundred and fifty-three women, and eighty-eight children. During that day, as the Nationalist troops were entering the city, one hundred and four of the women and sixty-nine of the children were taken off to the U. S. destroyers *Noa* and *Preston*, which vessels, together with the British light cruiser *Emerald* and three Japanese destroyers, comprised the foreign naval forces at Nanking.

During the evening of March 22, eleven men from the *Noa* under the command of Ensign Woodward Phelps were landed and brought to the American Consulate. This party was unarmed except for five automatic pistols concealed beneath their coats, since the Chinese were holding up and refusing to admit into the city all armed foreigners. A number of rifles, with amunition, was known to be stored in the Consulate. A signalman was included in the party sent to the Consulate and another was stationed at the residence of Mr. Earle Hobart, manager for the Standard Oil Company, so that direct communication between the destroyers and the Consulate might be maintained in any eventuality. The Consulate was about two miles from the waterfront, behind a hill, and could not be seen from the ships. Its roof was visible from the building on Standard Oil Hill which, in turn, lay only about a mile from the water and could clearly be seen by those on the naval vessels. The situation of the house on Standard Oil Hill, which enabled it to be more easily and effectively protected than the Consulate, caused Mr. Hobart's residence to be designated as the rendezvous for Americans in an emergency.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Unless another reference is given, the facts stated in this section may be assumed to have been taken from Lieutenant Commander

On the twenty-third a guard of six seamen from the *Preston* was stationed at Mr. Hobart's house and an additional signalman was, fortunately, sent with them. During the forenoon of that day Ensign Phelps signalled for a Lewis gun, which was successfully smuggled into the Consulate although as yet there appeared no serious threat of danger. All through the day a stream of defeated but, generally, orderly Northern soldiers straggled through Nanking toward the Yangtze. About six o'clock that evening they became more riotous when it was found that many had no chance to be carried across the river. About ten thousand of these troops were forced to return into the city for the night and looting and wild firing began.

At the Consulate, near which the shooting was continuous though not great in volume, Ensign Phelps stationed his armed guard about the compound with orders to keep out all unauthorized persons. If shot at, the guard was to fire first into the air and next to kill. All gates were barricaded except that in front, and here boxes filled with sand were arranged to give the sentries protection from the sniping. During the night Chinese on three occasions tried to break into the compound but were frightened away. At daybreak a murdered Northern officer was found just outside one of the gates.

About eight o'clock the first of the Nationalist troops to be seen passed by the gate, but they were apparently so intent upon rounding up the stragglers left by their Northern enemies that they ignored the Consulate.

Shortly afterwards more arrived. The Consul was at the gate. The soldiers cursed him savagely. The Consul (he speaks Chinese fluently) told them who he was, and that Americans had no hostility toward the Nationalists. A petty officer, his face twisted with violent hate, pointed his pistol at Mr. Davis and shouted: "You are all alike! The British and Italians are killing our men in Shanghai, and you Americans have drunk our blood for years and become rich. We are busy now killing Northern soldiers, but we will soon begin killing all foreigners in Nanking regardless of from what country they are."²⁴⁵

Howell's account cited above, which has been paraphrased for the sake of conciseness.

²⁴⁵ Howell, 282.

These troops passed on, but soon afterward the telephone at the Consulate, which still functioned, brought the news that the American Church Mission had been entered by Nationalist troops who were looting. Next the president of Nanking University telephoned that Nationalist soldiers in uniform had robbed a group of Americans in the University and had wantonly shot through the head and killed Dr. J. E. Williams, the vice-president. Loyal Chinese servants and tradesmen rushed into the Consulate and reported that the Japanese Consulate had been looted and the Consul killed, and that the British Consulate General was also being attacked. Seven Americans from a nearby mission hurried in to declare that they had barely escaped with their lives from some Nationalist troops who attempted to kill them. Further accounts from the Chinese gave details of the attack on the British Consulate, including the murder of the Consul. Telephone calls to that Consulate brought no answer.

Desperately, Mr. Davis made every effort, both directly and by telephone, to have the police put him in touch with some high Nationalist official in order that he could make an appeal for the protection of Americans and of all foreigners. This endeavor and many others subsequently made proved futile.

Mr. Davis then learned by telephone from Mr. Hobart, whose house on the Hill was not far from the British Consulate, that the reported attack on the Consulate was true and that two officers from the *Emerald* along with some other British had just come to his house for refuge. Mr. Hobart advised the Consul to leave the Consulate and bring his entire party at once to the house on Standard Oil Hill. The chief of the Nanking police, who reached the American Consulate at this time, was apparently badly scared and he also urged the party to leave at once. A hurried consultation brought the decision to abandon the Consulate immediately.

Refugees had brought the total number of Americans in the Consulate up to twenty-four, including Mrs. Davis and the two Davis children.

The guard was armed with rifles and revolvers. Packs, blankets and superfluous equipment were left behind. The machine gun parts were distributed among the missionaries, who promised to carry

them. All preparations were made with a view toward expediting the passage of the party across the mile and a half of open, hilly country which they had to traverse.

At about 11.00 A. M. the party set forth from the rear gate of the Consulate—the civilians carrying a large American flag on a bamboo pole, Mrs. Davis and her children in the middle of the column, the armed guard covering the rear. A Chinese policeman accompanied the procession, and a faithful servant carried two suitcases for Mrs. Davis.

The party had gone only 100 yards when rifles were fired at it from a distance of several hundred yards, and from this moment until Standard Oil Hill was reached the procession was under constant fire. The policeman promptly deserted, but the servant trudged along until he was shot down.

At one point the fire became especially hot and came from a very short distance away, but the party ran through a dense bamboo grove and thus saved their lives, for they were not pursued by this particular group of miscreants. Only the unbelievably poor marksmanship of the Nationalist soldiers prevented the desperate group from being wiped out.

At the request of the consul, Ensign Phelps ordered his men not to shoot except as a last resort, for it was plainly apparent that resistance could but result in a furious attack upon the party from all directions.

The going was hard, particularly upon Mrs. Davis and the children, who bore up well. The missionaries became frightened and threw away some parts of the machine gun, probably considering that they hindered their progress. One of the missionaries lost six full pans of ammunition he had been detailed to carry.

They were three-quarters of the way to the Hill when Plumley, Ray D., a sailor of the guard, was wounded in the back by a bullet and knocked down. Then the guard opened up on its pursuers, killing or wounding two. This frightened the remainder, who in the meantime had killed the servant of Mrs. Davis and stolen the suitcases.

When the party finally reached the house on the Hill they found there, in addition to Mr. and Mrs. Hobart, several American civilians, two officers from the *Emerald*, five British civilians, two Scandinavians, two Russians, two signalmen from the destroyers and the guard of six seamen from the *Preston*, totalling altogether forty-seven men, two women and two children. A telephone call to the Consulate, where some of the Chinese staff had remained, brought word that five minutes after the procession had left about forty Nationalist soldiers had broken in and looted the entire building, firing at the servants but killing no one. Mr. Davis thereupon resumed his efforts to establish contact with some responsible official. He was unsuccessful.

About 12.15 P. M. groups of soldiers began arriving at Mr. Hobart's house. With a few brief intervals between bands, there were soldiers at the door from that time on to the end.

All arms were stowed on the second floor, and all sailors except the signalmen were kept out of sight.

By one o'clock the surrounding houses on the hill were being looted by soldiers and more and more of these rascals appeared in view.

Coming to the house they were met at the door by Mr. Davis and Mr. Hobart, whose lives were in continual jeopardy.²⁴⁶ These soldiers were all ugly and hostile. They covered Mr. Davis and Mr. Hobart with loaded and cocked pistols, and most of the time held these at the breasts of the brave gentlemen. By doling out to each successive band a portion of the entire amount of money and valuables the unfortunate refugees were able to collect amongst themselves, the robbers were successively induced to leave.

Hope that some official might appear and restore order persisted. Resort to the use of force by the armed guard could obviously be considered only as a last measure, for in addition to the fact that their firing would be sure to start a general assault upon the house, those in charge "had been told over and over that the American Government would not act to protect property, but only in case of a life and death issue."

Finally a group of soldiers arrived whose obvious determination was to force a way into the house and to murder the foreigners within it. The guard, until now concealed upstairs, prepared for action. It was decided that the best chance of saving the lives of the party consisted in seizing the soldiers as they entered and tying up and gagging them. As six of the Nationalists broke in the door and presented cocked pistols at those inside, the seamen rushed down the stairway. The soldiers threw down their bandoliers and escaped through the door before they could be seized. As soon as they had reached the cover of some outbuildings they commenced a steady sniping fire upon the house, the noise of which promptly attracted reinforcements who joined in until the fire was incessant.

Women and children were told to lie flat on the floor of

²⁴⁶ For a parallel account, expressing vividly the feelings and impressions of Mrs. Hobart, see Alice Tisdale Hobart, "What Happened at Nanking," in *Harpers Magazine*, CLV (July, 1927), pp. 133-148.

²⁴⁷ Hobart, 143.

the bathroom, where they were somewhat protected by concrete and tiles. Signalmen climbed onto the balustrade upon the roof, and with snipers bullets chipping the rail beside them, semaphored to the warships:

"1534-Z-D43 and *Emerald* V Socony. Commence firing, fire over our heads. SOS.—SOS.²⁴⁸

The signal had been prearranged, and immediately the *Noa* opened with a two-gun salvo, dropping the shells just where they were needed, to the left and just over the house. The *Emerald* and *Preston* joined in, and the ships enclosed the house in a box barrage. At once the soldiers fled, while the armed guard hastened their flight by killing three or four with their rifles.

After fifteen minutes the way seemed clear and a signal was made to the ships that the party was about to make for the river. The *Noa* and *Preston* ceased fire, and while all three ships sent away their landing parties to meet those from the Hill, the *Emerald* continued to drop salvos behind the house. Throughout the shelling, the two destroyers cleared the landings of snipers by spraying them with machine guns.

Hindered by a sixty foot wall and a canal, the party from the Hill eventually made its way to the river. They were missed by the joint landing force sent from the ships, but were seen by H. M. destroyer *Wolsey* and taken off.

A conference of British and American naval officers, held immediately in the *Emerald*, drew up a set of demands requiring: the protection of all foreigners still ashore and their evacuation under guard to the waterside; the issuance of strict orders for the protection of all foreign lives and property; and the presence on board the *Emerald* of the general commanding the Nationalist forces before eleven o'clock that night. Just as the demands were sent ashore by an official of the local Red Swastika who had come on board to mediate, Rear Admiral Henry H. Hough, commanding the Yangtze Patrol, arrived in the *Isabel* and became the senior naval officer present.

Negotiations proceeded throughout the night and until the

²⁴⁸ Smith, 17.

next afternoon. Time was passing, the replies of the Chinese were insolent or evasive, there were still in Nanking, dead or alive, more than one hundred Americans, seventeen British subjects, and a number of other foreigners. Though it was feared that shelling the city would lead to the murder of any foreigners remaining alive, the entire landing forces available could not hope to force an entrance into Nanking. Eventually it was decided with the British that if the foreigners were not released by the late afternoon the *Isabel*, *Noa*, *Preston*, *Emerald* and *Wolsey* would jointly shell the salient military points throughout the city. The Chinese general commanding was notified. An adjutant from the general arrived for further parley but was told that there could be no further talk and was sent ashore, obviously much alarmed. News reached the ships that most of the Americans in the city were imprisoned in Nanking University.

About half past four o'clock, while the naval commanders were gathered in the *Isabel* for a last conference, there appeared on the bund the British Consul General, who had been shot but not killed, the missing British marines, and all the remaining British civilians except two. Almost at the same moment the first group of the Americans from the University came in sight on the waterfront. By eight o'clock that night all Americans, with the exception of Dr. Williams, whose body was buried before the party left the University, were on board naval vessels. Included among these was a Miss Moffat, who had been shot through the body twice by soldiers and whose condition was critical.

The American ships fired thirty-four rounds of shell; the *Emerald*, seventy-six. Six Chinese civilians, including two women who were looting, were killed, and a small number of soldiers.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁹ Smith, 18, 19, 20.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS ON THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

I have the honor to represent, that the commercial relations between the United States and Cuba are already very considerable, and that they would unquestionably be more considerable if rendered more secure from unlawful depredations I have therefore the honor to propose that your excellency should so far co-operate with me as to sanction the landing, upon the coast of Cuba, of our boats and men, when in pursuit of pirates. This measure . . . is not intended in any number to infringe upon the territorial rights of your excellency.

Captain James Biddle to the Captain General and Governor of Cuba, April 30, 1822.¹

This Government does not undertake first to consult the Cuban Government if a crisis arises requiring a temporary landing somewhere to protect life and property on the broad principles of international practice. You will clearly explain all this orally to President Gómez.

Secretary of State Philander C. Knox to the United States Minister at Havana, May 29, 1912.²

The policy of the United States in making use of its armed forces for the protection of citizens abroad has changed greatly since the days when President Monroe and the Eighteenth Congress, with hesitation and debate, considered the wrongs of sundry merchants and seamen whose lives were taken and whose property was destroyed by pirates operating out of Cuba and Porto Rico, and made up their minds to violate the sovereignty of Spain and effectually stop the trade of piracy only after naval officers, less nice upon points of international law in the face of actual conditions, had begun to accomplish the desired object in their own way and at their own risk.³ The operations against such pirates as Diaboleto and Ripol,⁴ insignificant as they would appear today, involved, nevertheless, a real violation of the territory of Spanish islands, and on this point the consciences of Monroe and his contemporaries were tender.

¹ Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 805.

² Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 250.

³ See above, pp. 9-17.

⁴ See above, secs. 5 and 9.

Doubtless, it was as obvious to them as it is to us today that armed interposition or intervention even for the protection of a state's citizens can be carried out only in the territory of a comparatively weak nation, and that as a pretext it may be abused. In spite of the brave words of the Monroe Doctrine, in 1823 the United States might still with justice have been classed as one of those nations in whose affairs a European power or coalition might safely meddle.

As nations weak upon the sea are scrupulous about the rights of small neutrals, so it seems probable that the nice care for Spain's shadowy sovereignty over large parts of her West Indian islands, which the United States displayed in the face of bold and persistent provocation, was grounded upon a firmer base than idealistic conception of international law and courtesy. There was much talk of intervention, both in Europe and in America, in the diplomatic conversations of that time,⁵ and since the United States so definitely took a stand against European intervention in the western hemisphere, to have acted hastily in violation of Spain's sovereignty would not have become the leaders of this country. Interposition as distinct from intervention was a term still to be coined.

Since the operations of the American flotillas under Biddle and Porter against the Caribbean pirates were the earliest important instances in which the armed forces of the United States were used for the protection of its citizens abroad,⁶ the circumstances which caused them and the attitude toward them of President Monroe and his Congresses must be considered in some detail.

Commerce between the United States and the West Indies became important at an early date. By the closing years of

⁵ See John H. Latané, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, chap. VIII.

⁶ Porter's skirmishes with the natives at Nukahiva in the Marquesas have been included for the sake of completeness. See chap. II, sec. 2, above. The occupation of Amelia Island, Spanish Florida, in 1812, was for the protection of citizens at home; as were the expeditions against Barataria, Louisiana, in 1814, and Spanish Florida, in 1817.

the first quarter of the nineteenth century this trade equalled in volume and value the American trade with France and the French colonies, and upon its steady continuance the fortunes of many of the people of the Northern States depended. This profitable commerce was enjoyed without hindrance until about 1820, when, in consequence of the wars for independence which broke out in several of the Spanish colonies in America, "many ferocious spirits" were put out of employment. In the years that followed, a class of men grew up on the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico who seemed determined, in piracy and cruelty, "to emulate the buccaniers of former times."⁷

At first their acts of piracy were confined to the occasional plundering of American merchant ships and the mistreatment of their crews. Under authority of an act of Congress passed on March 3, 1819, entitled "An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime of Piracy," which provided "that the President of the United States be . . . authorized and requested to employ so many of the public armed vessels, as, in his judgment, the service may require, with suitable instructions to the commanders thereof, in protecting the merchant vessels of the United States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations,"⁸ and another act of December 20, 1822, authorizing an additional naval force for the suppression of piracy and for "affording effectual protection to the citizens and commerce of the United States,"⁹ Monroe despatched a small number of American cruisers to the West Indies.

This force was to some extent a check on the pirates, but the frequent and necessary withdrawal of our ships during what was then known as "the sickly season" and the supine-

⁷ 18th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 3. Memorial of Sundry Merchants (and others), Citizens of New York, Praying Congress to take into Consideration the Subject of Piracies committed on the Commerce of the United States by vessels from the Island of Cuba, etc. (December 13, 1824).

⁸ Annals of the Congress of the United States, 15th Cong., 2d sess., vol. II, col. 2523.

⁹ Ibid., 17th Cong., 2d sess., col. 1337.

ness or actual connivance of the local authorities of the islands,¹⁰ made it possible for a really formidable system of piracy to arise. Whole crews were murdered, their vessels burned and the cargoes sold openly, in some cases, at Havana or Matanzas.¹¹ The piratical system was simple and much like that which soon afterward gave trouble in the Aegean Sea.¹² It depended chiefly upon the use of small, swift boats in which the pirates would dash out upon merchantmen becalmed near the islands, capture them by boarding, and slaughter their officers and crews, thus removing most of the chances of quick detection and pursuit. If discovered, they could usually retreat with ease and safety into the islands where the forces designed to suppress them could not follow without violating in some degree the sovereignty of the Spanish government. When pursuit was no longer to be feared they lived by the sale of their plunder, which they disposed of to the natives at "prices tending to seduce the neighboring population,"¹³ and mingled with the people of the coast towns in order to obtain information of the arrival or departure of merchant ships offering suitable prey.

Against such a system, so long as they were not permitted to pursue the pirates on land, naval forces proved unable to afford security to commerce without the aid of "the cordial, unwavering and energetic cooperation of the local governments; a cooperation which would render their lurking places on land unsafe, and make punishment the certain consequence of detection."¹⁴ President Monroe attributed the existence of the system of piracy to "the relaxed and feeble state of the

¹⁰ See Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823, Richardson' Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 782; 18th Cong, 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, p. 120 (Report of Lieut. Commandant John H. Lee to Commodore David Porter, May 12, 1824); *ibid.*, p. 111 (Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1824); Monroe's eighth annual message to Congress, Dec. 7, 1824, Richardson, *op. cit.*, 826, 827.

¹¹ Memorial of Sundry Merchants, cited above.

¹² See above, pp. 18, 19.

¹³ Monroe's eighth annual message to Congress, Richardson, 826.

¹⁴ 18th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 1, Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1824.

local governments,"¹⁵ and believed that if the governor of Cuba possessed the power to do so he would suppress it. During 1822 and 1823 the President sent agents to the governors of Cuba and Porto Rico to protest against the outrages committed upon the commerce of the United States, especially those growing out of an almost uncontrolled issuance of commissions as privateers in the service of Spain. The governors admitted the abuses but referred all American claims and protests to the government at Madrid. Meanwhile piracy flourished, and the requests made by these agents and our naval officers in West Indian waters that permission be given to land on unsettled parts of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico in order to pursue pirates who took refuge there were met by an insistence that the Spanish government had taken measures for the suppression of the evil, and that such permission could not be granted.¹⁶

At length, on the advice of his Secretary of the Navy, Samuel Southard, who urged that unless the cooperation of the Spanish governors took a more practical form "additional means ought to be entrusted to the Executive, to be used in such manner as experience may dictate,"¹⁷ Monroe, on December 7, 1824, put the matter squarely before Congress, and requested its decision. Should the pirates be pursued on land when they took refuge on one of the Spanish islands? Should the local authorities be held responsible for the lawless acts of those nominally under their jurisdiction? Or should some other measure be first attempted?¹⁸ A few days later a memorial from some of the merchants of New York, one of a large number presented to Congress on the same subject, declared that unless more adequate protection were

¹⁵ Richardson, 827.

¹⁶ See Richardson, 780; Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 805 (Robert Trail Spence to the Hon. Smith Thompson, September 3, 1822); *ibid.*, p. 808 (James Biddle to the Hon. Smith Thompson, May 6, 1822). The minister accredited to Spain, who was instructed to press the American claims and protests, was prevented from landing at Cadiz by the French blockade of that port.

¹⁷ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1824, cited above.

¹⁸ Richardson, 827.

soon afforded the valuable trade with the West Indies would be materially diminished. "It is a lawful commerce," declared the memorialists, "and our citizens have a right to claim the protection of government in its pursuit."¹⁹ They suggested further remonstrances addressed to the government of Spain and the authorities of Cuba, and declared that if such were made without result they pledged their support to the United States government "in any ulterior measures which may be necessary."

On December 21 and 22 the Senate, in resolutions, requested detailed information on the injuries sustained by American citizens, and on the measures already adopted for the suppression of the nuisance. In a special message to the Senate on January 13, 1825, Monroe transmitted the information required and suggested three devices by which piracy might effectually be ended: the pursuit of escaping pirates into "settled as well as unsettled parts of the Island from whence they issue, another by reprisal on the property of the inhabitants, and a third by the blockade of the ports of those islands."²⁰

The President added:

It will be obvious that neither of these measures can be resorted to in a spirit of amity with Spain otherwise than in a firm belief that neither the Government of Spain nor the government of either of the islands has the power to suppress that atrocious practice, and that the United States interposed their aid for the accomplishment of an object which is of equal importance to them as well as to us. Acting on this principle, the facts which justify the proceeding being universally known and felt by all engaged in commerce in that sea, it may fairly be presumed that neither will the Government of Spain nor the government of either of those islands complain of a resort to either of those measures, or to all of them, should such resort be necessary. It is therefore suggested that a power commensurate with either resource be granted to the Executive, to be exercised according to his discretion and as circumstances may imperiously require.

Three days earlier the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had brought in a bill on the subject of the piracies with a report which recited the friendship of the United

¹⁹ Memorial of Sundry Merchants, cited above.

²⁰ Richardson, 848.

States for Spain, the repeated protests and remonstrances, and added:²¹

To these reiterated remonstrances no answer was returned till very recently, and to this day all that has been obtained is a *promise* of a satisfactory answer to the applications of the Government of the United States:—although Spain has been solemnly warned that if she did not promptly acquit herself of her obligations to us on this subject, our Government would be constrained, from the nature of the outrages, to become its own avenger, and, availing itself of its own resources, protect the commerce and lives of the American citizens from destruction. In the same spirit of conciliation an appeal has been made to the local authorities, accompanied with requests that if from weakness, they were unable to exterminate the hordes of banditti who took shelter from pursuit within their territories, that permission might be given our forces to pursue them on land. This has been denied on the vain punctilio of national dignity. The posture in which Spain now stands, is that of connivance [at] these injuries, or incapacity to prevent them. “A Sovereign who refuses to cause reparation to be made of the damage caused by his subject, or to punish the guilty, or, in short, to deliver him up, renders himself an accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.” If the committee were of opinion that refusal on the part of Spain was wilful, and not the result of inability, they would, with a full view of all the consequences which the measure involves, at once recommend an appeal to the last resort of nations against Spain and all her dependencies . . . they content themselves with recommending only such measures as are believed indispensable effectually to reach the mischief. . . .

Doubtless this bill, which never became law, contained provisions for drastic remedies. Certainly its tenor shows that the patience of the American government was reaching its end. Perhaps, had events continued to drag on and had the suppression of piracy depended altogether on the “vain punctilio” and hesitant actions of Spanish and American statesmen, war with Spain and all her dependencies might have resulted, and our destiny been made manifest at an earlier date. But during the years while our diplomatic efforts dragged their slow length along, American naval officers, on their own initiative and at the risk of their careers, had somewhat irregularly but effectually put an end to piracy in the Caribbean.²²

²¹ 18th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. No. 9, pp. 1, 2. See also Am. St. P., Naval Affairs, I, 1050, Report of the Committee on Naval Affairs, Jan. 11, 1825.

²² See above, chap. II, secs. 2-9, and the Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1826, p. 7.

The circumstances of the suppression of piracy in the West Indies have been treated at such length for two reasons: first, because they furnish the earliest significant examples of the use of the armed forces of the United States for the protection of its citizens in an area where such use of those forces has most often been made,²³ and secondly, because they display so clearly, when contrasted with the more recent occasions in the Caribbean, a change which has taken place in American policy since President Monroe became, almost involuntarily, a scourge among the pirates.

The use of force in Cuba and Porto Rico during the years from 1822 to 1825 amount essentially to acts of reprisal. The flotillas under Biddle and Porter punished pirates for outrages already committed, and the preventive effect of their operations lay chiefly in making future piratical aggression too unprofitable or dangerous. Today it has apparently become the policy of the United States to protect the lives and property of its citizens abroad as well as the foreign interests of its citizens at home, not only before they have suffered irreparable damage but even before they are seriously threatened.²⁴

For twenty-nine years after the pirates had ceased to give trouble, the United States landed no force in the Caribbean countries. It was not until 1853 that Captain Hollins, in the *Cyane*, appeared off San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua, and for a few days prevented the "pretended authorities" of that town from destroying the property of an American firm.²⁵ His bombardment of San Juan in the following year was the forceful expression of his government's policy and amounted, once more, to reprisal. In 1856 occurred the first of many landings on the Isthmus of Panama.²⁶ Here the circumstances were simplified by the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, and, as in the subsequent landings on the Isthmus,

²³ United States forces have sent ashore for the protection of American citizens more often in the Caribbean countries than in all the rest of the world.

²⁴ See above, p. 110, for a single example.

²⁵ See above, p. 32.

²⁶ See above, p. 37.

the protection of American citizens was little more than incidental to the maintenance of the interoceanic traffic under rights given the United States under the terms of Article XXXV of that treaty. One more small affair in Panama (1860) completes the tale of Caribbean landings before the Civil War. After 1865, although this country was taking a greater interest in the republics immediately to the south, upon only nine occasions were its armed forces sent ashore to protect its interests there (and of these, six were on the Isthmus of Panama), until, with the close of the war with Spain, the political and commercial attention of this country became definitely focused upon the Caribbean area.

Some reasons for our failure to make frequent use of armed force for the protection of our citizens and interests in the Caribbean countries during the years before 1899 present themselves. For much of that period the United States was a growing nation, absorbed in the physical and political changes occurring within itself. Such interest as it manifested in the Antillies was confined to abortive attempts to buy some of them for the purpose of establishing new slave states, and to prevent European nations from acquiring them. Furthermore, though our commerce with the subtropical countries was large, it did not approach, even proportionately, the colossal value that it was to attain after 1898, when the increasing wealth of this country allowed Americans to indulge their taste for chocolate, sugar and bananas, and the sudden demand for oil fuel created by the development of the internal combustion engine made Mexico's petroleum fields more valuable than her silver mines.

Until the end of the nineteenth century the United States was not in a position, financially, to lend large sums of money to foreign governments or bankers or to send great companies of its own citizens abroad for the development and exploitation of the natural resources of other nations; and consequently not a great deal of tangible property in the Caribbean countries was owned by Americans and no great number of our citizens resided there. American concessions were

not so valuable and so inclusive as they became in the twentieth century, the politicians of Central America were corruptible, and the populace of the sub-tropical republics had not reached the state of enlightenment in which they later resented the exploitation of their natural heritages by foreign nations.

Under these conditions the United States had in the Caribbean neither the quantity of citizens and property nor of interests that she was to possess there after the war with Spain; and most of her interests were confined to the ports of the southern republics where they might often be sufficiently protected by a show of force without the necessity for an actual landing.²⁷

The great change in American policy toward the use of force for the protection of its interests in the Caribbean republics which began soon after the war with Spain was due in no small measure to the reversal of the economic factors mentioned above. Americans poured into the West Indies in the wake of our armies, and American loans and investments accompanied them. Prosperity followed and, coupled with weak governments, proved a strong incentive to revolution and turbulence. "Chronic wrongdoing," which the impotence of most of the Caribbean governments permitted to flourish, at length became a nuisance in an area which the construction of an interoceanic canal was transforming from a backwater into a main artery of sea-borne trade;²⁸ and under the energetic leadership of President Roosevelt the United States began to exercise an international police power for its abatement. Roosevelt's message to Congress on December 6, 1904, in which he invoked the Monroe Doctrine and formulated what has been called the Roosevelt Corollary, was the first authoritative expression of

²⁷ In 1858 Commander John Almy, with the U. S. S. *Fulton*, effected by a show of force at Tampico, Mexico, the release of five American steamers and their captains. For another example of a show of force in the Caribbean, see the affair of the *Haitian Republic* at St. Marc, Haiti, 1888, in Moore, *Digest*, VII, 117-118. A great number of similar incidents might be cited.

²⁸ See 58th Cong., 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 3, p. 15.

a change in the American attitude. His policy was followed and elaborated by his successors in office.

In 1910, when American forces in Bluefields, Nicaragua,²⁹ by establishing a neutral zone about the town, necessarily and involuntarily aided the revolutionists and robbed the government forces of the fruits of a victory, President Madriz protested to President Taft. Secretary of State P. C. Knox replied that "the United States took only the customary step of prohibiting bombardment or fighting by either faction within the unfortified and ungarrisoned commercial city of Bluefields, thus protecting the preponderating American and other foreign interests."³⁰ Here was no reprisal, but active prevention.

Two years later, when Cuba was troubled by internal disorders,³¹ the American minister at Havana was instructed to inform the Cuban government that "in the event of its inability or failure to protect the lives or property of American citizens . . . the Government of the United States, pursuant to its usual custom in such cases,"³² would land its own forces for that purpose. When the Cuban president, Gómez, asked President Taft to refrain from sending American forces into the island and assured him that the disturbances would quickly be suppressed, Secretary Knox replied that the United States government did not undertake first to consult the Cuban government if a crisis arose requiring a temporary landing somewhere on the broad principles of international practice.³³ When this reply was made no American had yet been injured and no American property had been destroyed.³⁴ Truly, since the doubts and hesitations, in the face of murder and plundering, of President Monroe and the statemen of his time, American policy toward the protection of citizens and property in the Caribbean has altered.

²⁹ See above, sec. 65. The operations at Panama in 1885 furnished a precedent for all later "neutral zones."

³⁰ Foreign Relations, 1910, p. 752.

³¹ See above, sec. 67.

³² Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 248.

³³ Ibid., p. 250.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 258.

Subsequent operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua have done nothing to make the change of policy less evident. Any further extension of our efforts on behalf of our citizens in the Caribbean area must lead, it would seem, to occupation and annexation.

Although the protection of American lives and property in the Far East has less often involved the use of armed force than has been the case in the Caribbean, on several of the occasions when such force was used the operations were on so extensive a scale as almost to amount to war.³⁵ Most of the protective measures, however, were minor affairs and, in their essentials, much like those carried out by maritime powers in the territory of weak or disorganized nations throughout the world.³⁶ In only one respect do they differ from similar operations carried out in the Caribbean: while many of the latter have, since 1898, almost unavoidably possessed political significance, the use of force in Asia by the United States has beyond question been confined entirely to the purpose avowed—the protection of American lives and property.

In Oceania our protective actions, though frequent, have consisted chiefly in punishing semi-civilized or barbarous natives for the murder of American traders and in suppressing local riots and preserving or restoring order. Here our assumption of police duties, while begun in good faith and simply for the protection of our interests, has influenced greatly the steps by which the United States acquired the Hawaiian and a part of the Samoan archipelago.

The use of the armed forces of the United States for the protection of its citizens abroad in such other emergencies, scattered throughout three continents, as have required it, has involved nothing for which the American people need be ashamed, and has given our traders and travellers “a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions.”

³⁵ See above, secs. 37 and 55.

³⁶ See Moore, *Digest*, VII, secs. 1092 and 1093; and R. Robin, *Des occupations militaires en dehors des occupations de guerre* (Paris, 1913).

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VITA

Milton Offutt was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on March 19, 1899. He entered Princeton University in October, 1916. On March 21, 1917, he enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve Force and served in the Mine Force, Second Naval District, and in the U. S. Torpedo Boat *Morris*. He was discharged from the naval service on March 23, 1919, with the rating of Chief Quartermaster. Returning to Princeton, he graduated from that university in 1921 with the degree of Bachelor of Arts. From July, 1921, until August, 1923, he was a member of the Editorial Staff of *The Evening Sun*, Baltimore. In October, 1923, he entered the graduate school of the Johns Hopkins University, where he pursued studies in history, political science and political economy. In March, 1925, he was appointed Assistant in History for the year 1925-26, and in March, 1926, he was appointed Instructor in History.

